The Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla): It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 107-724.
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute No. 2 Offered By Mr. Spratt
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute which is next made in order by the rule.
The Speaker pro tempore: The Clerk will designate the amendment in the nature of a substitute.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows:
Amendment in the nature of substitute offered by Mr. Spratt:
Strike the preamble and insert in lieu thereof the matter preceding the resolved clause, below, and strike the text and insert in lieu thereof the matter following the resolved clause, below:
Whereas the Government of Iraq, without cause or provocation, invaded and occupied the country of Kuwait on August 2, 1990;
Whereas, in reaction to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, President George H. W. Bush assembled a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and to enforce a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted in opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion of Kuwait and demanding Iraq's immediate withdrawal, and thereafter passed Resolutions 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670, 674, and 677, further demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait;
Whereas the Government of Iraq defied the United Nations, flouting and violating each of these resolutions;
Whereas Iraq's defiance resulted in the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 which authorized the use of all means necessary to repel Iraq from Kuwait and to compel its compliance with the above-referenced resolutions;
Whereas allied forces, led by the United States, attacked Iraqi forces on January 16, 1991, and drove them out of Kuwait;
Whereas, after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a cease-fire agreement sponsored by the United Nations, pursuant to which Iraq agreed--
(1) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all chemical and biological weapons and stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities related thereto;
(2) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and related major parts and production facilities;
(3) not to acquire or develop any nuclear weapons, nuclear- weapons-usable material, nuclear-related subsystems or components, or nuclear-related research, development, support, or manufacturing facilities; and
(4) to permit immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical, and missile capabilities, and assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all nuclear- related items and in developing a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance;
Whereas, in flagrant violation of the cease-fire agreement, Iraq sought to thwart the efforts of arms inspectors to uncover and destroy Iraq's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles;
Whereas, because of Iraq's demonstrated will to attack neighboring countries and arm itself with weapons of mass destruction, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, and 1205, demanding that Iraq destroy all weapons of mass destruction, cease further development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, stop the acquisition of ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 150 kilometers, and end its support of terrorism;
Whereas Iraq has continued to defy resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and to develop weapons of mass destruction, has not stopped its support of terrorism, has refused to cooperate with arms inspectors of the United Nations, and since December 1998 has barred and denied all such inspectors any access to Iraq;
Whereas Iraq has materially breached its international obligations by retaining and continuing to develop chemical and biological weapons, by actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and by supporting international terrorism;
Whereas the attacks of September 11, 2001, underscores the extent of the threat posed by international terrorist organizations, and makes clear the gravity of the threat if they obtain access to weapons of mass destruction;
Whereas the House of Representatives (in H. J. Res. 658 of the 101st Congress and H. Res. 322 in the 105th Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of the 101st Congress and S. J. Res. 54 in the 105th Congress) have declared support for international action to halt Iraq's defiance of the United Nations;
Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), Congress called upon "the President [to] consult closely with the partners of the United States in the Desert Storm coalition and with the members of the United Nations Security Council in order to present a united front of opposition to Iraq's continuing noncompliance with Security Council Resolution 687";
Whereas in H. Res. 322 of the 105th Congress, the House of Representatives affirmed that the "current crisis regarding Iraq should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic means, but in a manner which assures full compliance by Iraq with United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding the destruction of Iraq's capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction";
Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to "work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge" posed by Iraq and to "work for the necessary resolutions", while making clear that "the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable"; and
Whereas Congress supports the efforts by the President to enforce through the Security Council the United Nations Security Council resolutions referenced above: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the "Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction from Iraq Resolution".
SEC. 2. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President should be commended for calling upon the United Nations to address the threat to international peace and security posed by Iraq's refusal to meet its disarmament obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions;
(2) the President should persist in his efforts to obtain approval of the Security Council for any actions taken against Iraq; and
(3) the President should continue to seek, and the Security Council should approve, a resolution that--
(A) demands full and unconditional compliance by the Government of Iraq with all disarmament requirements imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1154, 1194, and 1205;
(B) mandates the immediate return to Iraq of United Nations arms inspection teams, empowered with increased staff and resources and unconditional access to all sites they deem necessary to uncover and destroy weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles, without regard to any objections or conditions that Iraq may seek to impose; and
(C) authorizes, if the President deems advisable, a military force, formed under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council but commanded by the United States, to protect and support arms inspectors and make force available in the event that Iraq impedes, resists, or in any way interferes with such inspection teams;
(4) if the United Nations Security Council fails to pass a resolution that satisfies the conditions of paragraph (3), and if the President determines that use of the United States Armed Forces is necessary to compel Iraq to comply with all such disarmament requirements, the President should seek authorization from Congress to use military force to compel such compliance by invoking the expedited procedures set forth in section 5;
(5) if the United States must resort to force, the President should endeavor to form a coalition of allies as broadly based as practicable to support and participate with United States Armed Forces, and should also seek multilateral cooperation and assistance, specifically including Arab and Islamic countries, in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq; and
(6) if the United States resorts to force, Congress will provide all possible support to the members of the United States Armed Forces and their families.
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEW UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.
The President is authorized to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to any resolution of the United Nations Security Council adopted after September 12, 2002, that provides for the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to prevent or otherwise limit the authority of the Armed Forces to use all appropriate force for self defense and enforcement purposes.
SEC. 4. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATIONS.
In the event that the United Nations Security Council does not adopt a resolution as described in section 3, or in the event that such a resolution is adopted but does not sanction the use of force sufficient to compel Iraq's compliance, and if the President determines that use of the United States Armed Forces is necessary for such compliance, the President should seek authorization from Congress to use military force to compel such compliance by invoking the expedited procedures set forth in section 5 after the President submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate a certification that--
(1)
(A) the United States has sought passage by the United Nations Security Council of a resolution described in section 3, and the Security Council has failed to pass such a resolution, and no other action taken by the United Nations Security Council has been sufficient to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council resolutions referred to in section 2; or
(B) the United Nations Security Council has passed a resolution that does not sanction the use of force sufficient to compel compliance, and--
(i) the United Nations Security Council is unlikely to take further action that will result in Iraq's compliance with such resolution; and
(ii) the use of military force against Iraq is necessary to compel compliance;
(2) the use of military force against Iraq will not impair international cooperation in the fight against terrorism or participation in United States military actions undertaken pursuant to Public Law 107-40; and
(3) the United States is in the process of establishing, or has established, a coalition of other countries as broadly based as practicable to support and participate with the United States in whatever action is taken against Iraq.
SEC. 5. EXPEDITED CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING USE OF FORCE.
(a) Qualifying Resolution.--
(1) This section applies with respect to a joint resolution of the Senate or House of Representatives--
(A) that is a qualifying resolution as described in paragraph (2); and
(B) that is introduced (by request) by a qualifying Member not later than the next legislative day after the date of receipt by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate of a certification by the President under section 4.
(2) For purposes of this section, a qualifying resolution is a joint resolution--
(A) that does not have a preamble;
(B) the title of which is the following: "Joint resolution authorizing the President to use all necessary means, including the Armed Forces of the United States, to compel the Government of Iraq to comply with certain United Nations Security Council resolutions." and
(C) the text of which is as follows: "The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate means, including the Armed Forces of the United States, to compel the Government of Iraq to comply with the disarmament provisions in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1154, 1194, and 1205 and with any other resolution of the United Nations Security Council adopted after September 12, 2002, that requires the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles.".
(3) For purposes of this subsection, a qualifying Member is--
(A) in the case of the House of Representatives, the majority leader or minority leader of the House of Representatives; and
(B) in the case of the Senate, the majority leader or minority leader of the Senate.
(b) Placement on Calendar.--Upon introduction in either House of a resolution described in subsection (a), the resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.
(c) Consideration in the House of Representatives.--
(1) A resolution described in subsection (a) shall be considered in the House of Representatives in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.
(2) On or after the first legislative day after the day on which such a resolution is introduced, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the House of Representatives to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. Such a motion is privileged and is not debatable. An amendment to the motion is not in order. It shall not be in order to move to postpone the motion or to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the House of Representatives shall immediately proceed to consideration of the resolution without intervening motion, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the House of Representatives until disposed of.
(3) Debate on the resolution shall be limited to not more than a total of 20 hours, which shall be divided equally between the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. An amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not in order.
(6) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on the resolution, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.
(7) A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.
(d) Consideration in Senate.--(1) A resolution described in subsection (a) shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.
(2) On or after the first legislative day after the day on which such a resolution is introduced, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the Senate to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is privileged and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the Senate shall immediately proceed to consideration of the resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of.
(3) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than a total of 20 hours, which shall be divided equally between the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. An amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not in order.
(6) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.
(7) A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order. (8) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.
(e) Action on Measure From Other House.--(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:
(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).
(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution--
(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but
(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.
(2) Upon disposition pursuant to paragraph (1)(B)(ii) of a resolution described in subsection (a) that is received by one House from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider such a resolution that was introduced in the receiving House.
(f) Legislative Day Defined.--For the purposes of this section, with respect to either House of Congress, a legislative day is a calendar day on which that House is in session.
(g) Section Enacted as Exercise of Rulemaking Power of the Two Houses.--The provisions of this section (other than subsection (h)) are enacted by the Congress--
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and, as such, shall be considered as part of the rules of either House and shall supersede other rules only to the extent they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as they relate to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
(h) Presidential Recall of Congress.--In the event that Congress is not in session upon submission of a Presidential certification under section 4, the President is authorized to convene a special session of the Congress to allow consideration of a joint resolution under this section.
SEC. 6. WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Specific Statutory Authorization.--Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that--
(1) section 3 of this joint resolution is intended to constitute specific authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution; and
(2) if a joint resolution described in section 5(a)(2) is enacted into law, such resolution is intended to constitute specific authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
(b) Applicability of Other Requirements.--Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
SEC. 7. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
At least once every 60 days, the President shall transmit to Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution. The President shall include in such report an estimate of expenditures by the United States and allied nations to compel Iraq's compliance with the above referenced United Nations Security Council resolutions and any reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338; 22 U.S.C. 2151 note).
SEC. 8. INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE.
Nothing in this joint resolution is intended to derogate or otherwise limit the authority of the President to use military force in self-defense pursuant to the Constitution of the United States and the War Powers Resolution.
The Speaker pro tempore: Pursuant to House Resolution 574, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, on grave occasions like this when we pass a war powers resolution, surely, surely one of the things we should seek is a broad base of support. The amendment I propose in the nature of a substitute seeks to broaden the base for this resolution. If we adopt it, I believe that H.J. Res. 114 will gain votes and pass this House by an even bigger majority.
I want to make it clear that we have not broadened the appeal of this resolution by watering it down. My substitute unflinchingly supports the President's campaign and the Security Council for beefing up arms inspection and backing them up with force, and if the Iraqis defy the new inspectors and the Security Council responds with military action, as it should, it authorizes the use of our Armed Forces. It empowers President Bush to use our Armed Forces just as his father did in 1991 in the Persian Gulf War in a military action sanctioned by the Security Council. If on the other hand the Iraqis defy the inspectors and the Security Council fails to take action, fails to respond, the U.S. will be faced with going it alone.
In these dramatically different circumstances my amendment calls for a second vote by the Congress to approve an attack of the use of force, but it ensures the President a fast track for its consideration. There are various differences between these two resolutions. The preamble is different, but this is the key difference, and it is an important difference.
I want to make clear, however, that there is no difference with respect to our assessment of Saddam Hussein. Those of us who support this substitute see him as a menace and a threat. We agree with the President in demanding that the Security Council enforce its resolution and allow him no quarter. But for several reasons we do not want to see the United States act alone, and this is not just our concern. Over the last several weeks we have spent days talking to retired general officers who have experience in this field, to General Hoar and General Zinni, former commanders of Central Command, to General Clark and General Boyd, former Commanders of Europe, and they have agreed on this much. If we act alone, they told us, instead of being the United Nations versus Iraq, any war that happens, instead of being a war legitimated by the U.N. Charter, this will be the United States versus Iraq and in some quarters the U.S. versus the Arab and Muslim world. That is why one general officer told us "I fear if we go it alone we may pay a terrible price."
Point number two, in any conceivable military confrontation with Iraq with or without allies, the United States will win. But having allies, especially allies in the region, could be a big tactical advantage, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and it will make it easier to achieve victory and less costly in money and, most importantly, less costly in human life.
Three, the outcome after the conflict is actually going to be the hardest part, and it is far less certain. We do not want to win this war only to lose the peace and swell the ranks of terrorists who hate us. A broad-based coalition will raise our chances of success even more in the post-war period.
I know that some will say this is an imposition on the President's power, a second vote, but in truth it is nothing more than the age-old system of checks and balances built in our Constitution. It is one way that Congress can say what we believe, that any action against Iraq should have the sanction of the Security Council and the support of a broad-based coalition, and if it does not, we should have a further say on it.
Others will say that this resolution relies too heavily on the Security Council, but let me say, Mr. Speaker, the precedent it follows was the precedent set by President Bush in 1991. He turned to the United Nations first. He secured a series of resolutions from the Security Council that culminated in Resolution 678. He did not threaten not to go elsewhere, he went straight to the Security Council. The end was a successful military action and I think a model worth emulating. My substitute does just that. I urge my colleagues to follow the precedent set by President Bush in 1991 and support my substitute amendment.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Hyde: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I oppose the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the gentleman from South Carolina. First and foremost, this substitute neither recognizes nor protects American sovereignty. It clearly yields to the United Nations the right and obligation to protect America. It relies on the U.N. first as a trigger mechanism. The President must wait until the U.N. acts or if it does not act or if it does not act properly, and God only knows how long that will take, then the President must return to Congress for further authorization for the use of force. And then once authorization is obtained, the use of force is limited to dealing with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats, but what about other threats to the U.S. national security such as the use of conventional weapons or Iraqi terrorism?
Iraq is a terrorist nation. Evidence exists that Iraqi operatives met with al Qaeda terrorists. This amendment does not allow the President to use force now even if an immediate or imminent terrorist threat is present. When the U.N. fails to act or does not act properly, the President must come back to Congress and seek authorization to use military force, but first he must certify to Congress that the U.N. has failed to pass a resolution or the U.N. has passed an insufficient resolution and the use of military force against Iraq "will not impair international cooperation in the fight against terrorism." In other words, if a Nation, say Iran, North Korea or Syria, maintains that it will no longer cooperate in the war against terrorism, then international cooperation has been impaired. How can the President make such a certification? At that point is he unable to ask Congress for the authorization to use force? Why would we want to have these types of roadblocks impeding our President at a time when he is trying to defend the national security of the United States? This amendment imposes a steeple chase on the President with one hurdle after another.
In conclusion, this substitute amendment would strike the bipartisan agreement that we have worked so hard to bring about and which is reflected in House Joint Resolution 114. Its primary focus is on approval of the U.N. before any military action can be taken against Iraq. It does not recognize the sovereignty of the United States, and it fails to acknowledge the President's warning in his speech on Monday that the danger from the Iraqi regime is an imminent and urgent threat to the United States. I do not propose that we subordinate our foreign policy to the Security Council whose permanent members include France, China, and Russia, and I urge a no on this amendment in the nature of a substitute.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to myself to read what the text of the resolution would provide: "The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate means, including the Armed Forces of the United States, to compel Iraq to comply with the disarmament provisions of the U.N.," and it cites those, "and any other resolution to require the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and the means of producing such weapons."
That is pretty sufficient language.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member of the House Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. Skelton: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, I am happy to rise in support of the proposal by my friend and colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
Several weeks ago the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and I drafted a resolution for the use of the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt) in negotiations with the White House. That draft contained a number of important principles, focusing on the role of the United Nations, on more narrowly defining the threat posed by Iraq as to its weapons of mass destruction, and on planning for what will be needed after the conflict, if military action should be taken.
These principles do not undermine, rather, they strengthen, American national security. Many of these principles have now been included in the resolution offered by the Speaker and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt).
On Tuesday night, I expressed my support for that resolution as it represents a significant improvement over the original draft submitted by the White House. But the Spratt substitute perfects a number of the principles contained in the base bill.
It connects American efforts more strongly to those of the United Nations. This resolution urges the President to work with the United Nations to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. If the United Nations authorizes the use of force to achieve these goals, the Spratt resolution provides immediate congressional authorization. But if the United Nations cannot, or will not, act, then this Congress must consider the benefits of unilateral action under a second resolution using expedited procedures.
The Spratt resolution does not tie the President's hands. U.S. national security will be protected. This resolution sends a strong message to Iraq that the Congress insists that it comply with its obligations.
It also sends a strong message to the United Nations and to our friends and to our allies all around the world that we are committed to acting with them to the greatest extent possible to meet this threat. In these ways, the Spratt substitute improves the resolution already before us.
I urge my colleagues to vote with me to support it.
Mr. Hyde: Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
Mr. Blunt: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise with some concern in my opposition to this resolution, because I have such high regard for my friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), who just spoke in favor of the resolution. But I have read the resolution carefully, and I think this is a step backward in all of our actions. It really restricts, rather than broadens, the use of force against Iraq that already is authorized under current law.
Section 3 is even narrower than Public Law 102-1, which already authorizes the United States to use force to restore international peace and security. We are already authorized to stop Iraq from supporting terrorism. We are already authorized to prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbors. We have already authorized the United States to protect Iraq's own civilian population.
I believe you can read this resolution clearly. All of those things would no longer be authorized. I think you cannot even continue to enforce the no-fly zone under this resolution.
Section 3 would require the United States to wait for the United Nations Security Council to act before the President could take action to protect our national security interests against the dangers of weapons of mass destruction posed by Iraq. Even the United Nations Security Council approval of section 3 would not authorize the United States to act. We would have to have United Nations action, and then we would have to have a second vote in this Congress.
The vote in the Congress is restricted by the substitute.
This is a step backward. It sends a muddy signal about our resolve. It completely replaces the Gephardt-Hastert resolution that is before us, and really postpones a critical question to another day.
We have put this question off too long already. This resolution asks us to put it off yet longer. I encourage my colleagues to join me in rejecting this Spratt substitute resolution and moving forward to pass the Hastert-Gephardt resolution later today.
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Pastor).
(Mr. Pastor asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Pastor: Mr. Speaker, I support the Spratt amendment because I believe that we should not rush into war without seeking the support of our allies. We should not send American troops into combat before making a good-faith effort to put U.N. inspectors back into Iraq under a more forceful resolution. We should not turn to a policy of preemptive attack without first providing a limited time option for peaceful resolution of the threat.
This amendment would authorize the use of U.S. forces in support of a new U.N. resolution mandating the elimination by force, if necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. If the Security Council does not pass such a resolution, the amendment calls on the President to then seek authorization for unilateral military action.
The Spratt amendment demonstrates our preference for a peaceful solution and coalition support without ruling out unilateral military force if it becomes necessary.
America has long stood behind the principle of exhausting diplomacy before resorting to war, and at times like this, we must lead by example.
Mr. Hyde: Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).
Mr Lantos: Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the Committee on International Relations for yielding me time.
First, Mr. Speaker, I want to commend my good friend from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), one of the most valued of this House, on a very thoughtful and creative amendment. I believe, however, that the amendment would weaken the hand of our Secretary of State in international negotiations that are occurring as we speak.
Every Member of this body prefers a diplomatic and peaceful solution. Every Member of this body prefers to have as many nations, friends, allies and others come with us as possible. But to enhance the prospects for a peaceful solution, both the Security Council and Saddam Hussein must perceive that diplomatic failure will lead to military action. This amendment fails to convey that critical message.
Mr. Speaker, the Spratt amendment requires the President to certify "that the use of military force against Iraq will not impair international cooperation in the fight against terrorism." This amendment effectively asks the President of the United States to certify the unknowable.
The initial impact of action in Iraq on international cooperation is uncertain. It may be argued that it will diminish it or it will enhance it. But one thing we are all certain of: Once Iraq is disarmed, international cooperation against terrorism will skyrocket, and international terrorism itself will have been dealt a severe blow.
While the principles behind the amendment and the underlying text have some similarities, I must oppose the amendment, Mr. Speaker, because I believe at this stage we must support the bipartisan- bicameral agreement reached with the White House.
I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this well-intentioned amendment. It would unravel the agreement which is on the verge of ratification, and it would undermine our goal of speaking with a strong and united voice.
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
Mr. Nadler: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, the Spratt resolution would permit the use of military force, but only to eliminate the real danger we face, Iraq's possession of nuclear or chemical or biological weapons. The President's resolution would allow the administration to use military force to seek regime change in Iraq, a very dangerous course of action.
It is one thing to say to Saddam Hussein, we are going to disarm you of your weapons of mass destruction. It is another thing to say, we are going to kill you, which is what regime change means. Faced with that threat, with that assurance, there would be nothing to deter Saddam Hussein from deciding, like Sampson in the Philistine temple, that he might as well pull down the world around him. Why should he not go down in history as an Arab hero by attacking Israel with chemical or biological weapons? Israel may then feel well to retaliate, and no one can calculate the course of escalation from there.
Just the other day the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, warned the Senate that "if Saddam Hussein concluded the survival of his regime were threatened, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist action."
The Spratt substitute is the most effective way to go about disarming Saddam Hussein, while avoiding tactics that could very well end up in regional conflagration. It grants more limited, but still sufficient, power to the administration to meet the threat posed by Iraq's weapons program. It allows for the President to use force in conjunction with the U.N. if it becomes necessary.
It does not, however, grant the President a blank check, on the model of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, as the main resolution before us does.
I am proud to support this resolution. It maximizes the chances we will disarm Saddam Hussein and eliminate the real danger, without getting into a major conflagration.
Mr. Hyde: Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley).
(Mr. Oxley asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Oxley: Mr. Speaker, let me first say to my friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and to all of the participants in this historic debate how much I appreciate their leadership and their ability to debate this issue in a very courteous and effective manner.
One hundred thirty-eight Members of this House were present back when we debated the original Gulf resolution. Those of us who were here at the time, including myself, remember that as one of the historic times in this Chamber. We return today in many ways to debate some of the very same issues we debated so many years ago.
All of us, I think, feel a tremendous sense of honor to have an opportunity to debate these issues before us. But ultimately the substitute offered by my friend from South Carolina fails to put us in a position to be as effective as we were back in 1991. Indeed, it probably takes us a step backward.
If you look at the U.N. resolutions, 16 resolutions ultimately in that language, there is the ability of the world to go after Saddam without another U.N. resolution, without another resolution passed by the Congress. Yet the President came to the leadership of our body and requested that the Congress give this kind of authority. That is exactly what our leadership did.
My hat is off to the Speaker and to the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), for coming together and putting together a bipartisan resolution that should be supported.
This is a serious matter, that Saddam Hussein has continued to resist our efforts. Let us reject this substitute, pass the underlying resolution, stand firm, as we did back some 11 years ago, and send a signal that the United States and our allies will perform adequately.
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Lipinski).
(Mr. Lipinski asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. Lipinski: Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt alternative resolution.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of Congressman Spratt's alternative to this resolution authorizing military force against Iraq. First of all, I would like to say that there is no question that Saddam Hussein is evil personified. He is Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin rolled into one reprehensible dictator. This world would no doubt be a better place without him.
But this record of cruelty does not give a lawful reason to attack Iraq without proof that their activities pose an imminent threat to the security of the United States. So I must ask: Why must we pass this resolution now? I still have not received a clear, convincing answer to that question.
I have asked it, and many other questions of those who support this resolution, including the Secretary of State. They have failed to make an effective case as to why Congress should authorize a historic shift in policy from containment and deterrence to that of pre-emptive attacks.
As far as I know Saddam Hussein has committed no new evil acts, since President Bush was sworn into office almost two years ago. Why didn't the President ask for this resolution at that time? During his campaign, President Bush himself said that the United States should not be the "world's policeman." Why the shift in policy? When the President first started talking about using military force against Iraq, it was said that Saddam Hussein was linked with September 11th, but then British and U.S. intelligence revealed that wasn't true. Also, when the President first started talking about removing Saddam Hussein, he claimed that he had the authority to do so under a 1998 resolution. However, now we are here considering the authorization of military forces at the President's request. Furthermore, the President was prepared to go it alone, and then he decided to ask for the support of as many allies as possible, including the United Nations. These are just some examples of the mixed messages from the Administration. The President's approach to the Iraq situation has had numerous changes in a short span of time.
Due to the President's disjointed approach, the lack of answers to many questions that various colleagues and I have, and the fact that containment of Saddam Hussein has worked for the past decade, I cannot support this resolution.
I have tried very hard to support the President and this resolution because I believe the President is sincere and truly thinks that military force is the only way to deal with Saddam Hussein. Perhaps he is right, but I cannot in good conscience support military force until we first seek U.N. weapons inspections and the support of the international community. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting Congressman Spratt's substitute resolution.
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to the arguments made on the other side. First, they claim that this bill somehow, even though there is not a word in it, supplants Public Law 102-1, which has the authority to go after terrorists, which is not true, and then they say that we are wrong in saying to the President, we do not want to dilute the focus on terrorism; we want you to certify to us that if we go to war in Iraq, it will in no way impair our first priority, and that is to get al Qaeda. We have to decide which way we want to go.
We say, that is still the law of the land, 102-1. We backed it then, we support it now, and we want to make al Qaeda our first priority.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a Vietnam veteran and a member of the Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. Reyes: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
I rise this morning in strong support of this substitute. As I said yesterday, many of us know that there is a better way, and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) has focused our efforts with his leadership and with his guidance. He has led the way to a carefully constructed and well thought out resolution, one that takes into account the dynamic and the potentially dangerous situation in which we find ourselves today.
Unilateral action, Mr. Speaker, would cost billions of dollars and possibly thousands of lives. Carelessly stepping into a conflict is not something that should be undertaken lightly. I do not think that the administration, as I said yesterday, has made the case for this type of action. This appropriate resolution supports the President's request of the Security Council for arms inspections that is backed by force. This resolution authorizes President Bush to use the same Armed Forces of the United States as his father did in the Persian Gulf War in military action that is sanctioned by the Security Council. If the Iraqis defy the inspectors and the U.N. will not authorize force, this Congress will expedite a vote for a new resolution to authorize that force.
Saddam Hussein and his regime are a menace to our security, and I agree with the President that the Security Council should enforce resolutions and put a stop to his system of "cheat and retreat." The Security Council should compel Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction and its means of producing such weapons, and if armed force is necessary, it should be with their concurrence as well.
This bill sets the stage for a prudent process to accomplish these objectives. More importantly, it emphasizes the tenet that war should be a last resort and not a first resort.
Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to support this resolution.
Mr. Hyde: Mr. Speaker I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
Mr. Rohrabacher: Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
Let us remember those words, and as I hear this debate they come back to me: "Gentlemen may cry `peace,' `peace,' but there is no peace. The war has actually begun."
Those are the words, of course, of Patrick Henry, who spurred on our people to fight for their liberty and fight for our country's security. And when all is said and done, America's security and our freedom is in the hands of our people. We do not choose to put the future of this country and the security of this country into the hands of the United Nations. As we debate this amendment, which again puts even more responsibility in the hands of the United Nations, let us take a brutal look at that organization and what this amendment accomplishes.
This amendment requires the United States to have the permission of the Communist Chinese and gangsters of other regimes to do what is necessary for our own security. That is ridiculous. Quit idealizing the United Nations for what it is not. It is not an international body that is run by saints. Instead, it is run by ordinary democratic countries, but also by despicable regimes which terrorize their own population.
Requiring the President, our President to get permission from the United Nations means we are requiring our President to make deals with governments like the Communist Chinese before doing what is necessary for our own security. No wonder the repressed people of China, like the Falun Gong, who had their demonstration here yesterday, like the people of Tibet, like the people of East Turkistan are afraid that our President may well make an agreement with the bosses in Beijing who terrorize them at the expense of those people who long for freedom.
We should not be relying on the United Nations. No, we should be relying on our strength and our commitment to those ideals that our Founding Fathers set forth so many years ago and have been fought for so many times by Americans. Let us remember what George Washington told us: "Put only Americans on guard tonight."
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Allen).
Mr. Allen: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
I wish to respond to some of the comments made just now by the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) and earlier by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).
It is true that this resolution seeks to have the United States first act in a multilateral basis through the U.N., but we are not transferring the job of protecting Americans to the United Nations. In section 8 of this resolution it says, "inherent right to self- defense." Nothing in this joint resolution, the Spratt substitute, is intended to derogate or otherwise limit the authority of the President to use military force and self-defense pursuant to the Constitution of the United States and the War Powers resolution.
But there is a reason why we need to act on a multilateral basis. It is because if we act against Saddam's weapons of mass destruction together with allies, we are less likely to provoke an Islamic fundamentalist uprising in the Middle East. We are more likely to diminish the number of recruits to Osama bin Laden, not to accentuate the number of recruits to terrorist causes.
Insofar as people have suggested this is a steeple chase or they are roadblocks to getting the second resolution passed, it is a week-long proposition. Come back, we have the resolution laid out in this substitute, there are no amendments, no points of order, it comes to the floor, we will have a debate of 20 hours, and it will be done.
This is critical. This is as important a vote as the vote on final passage, and I urge Members to support the Spratt substitute.
Mr. Hyde: Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Boehner).
Mr. Boehner: Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Illinois for yielding me this time.
I rise today in strong opposition to the amendment offered by our friend, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt). The amendment in the nature of a substitute basically puts us in a position of having to go to the U.N. and get a resolution of support or, if the U.N. cannot act or will not act, requires the Congress to come back and to have another vote.
I think one of the points that is missing in this debate is that it seems as though people think the President is not acting in a unilateral way.
We are the only superpower on the face of the Earth. We as a Nation, as a result, have a responsibility to lead. I think that the underlying resolution does, in fact, strengthen the President's hand to lead and to continue to build multilateral support. I believe that the amendment offered today basically undercuts the President's ability to continue to lead us and to build a multilateral action.
Secondly, the President is being very deliberate about this. This effort has been under way for the last 8 weeks. The President continues to consult with Members of Congress in both bodies, continues to work with our allies, continues to work with the U.N., and I think all of us would agree that the President made a forceful case for action because he was at the U.N.
Again, the amendment that we have before us handcuffs the President in terms of his ability to continue to bring about positive action at the United Nations.
Now, we have 16 amendments passed by the United Nations over the last 11 years dealing with chemical and biological weapons. What makes us believe that Saddam Hussein or anyone else who is going to act, if in fact the U.N. would ever act? But more importantly, why would we want to put the security and the freedom of the people of our country at risk or put them in the hands of the U.N. Security Council in hoping, maybe, that they will act.
The fact is in 1991 during the Gulf War we had a debate here and we kept hearing the same thing we are hearing now: wait, wait, wait. If we had waited any longer in 1991, the Iraqi regime would have been into Saudi Arabia and we would have had a much larger crisis than we have. The fact is that we have waited for a long time to bring this regime to a halt and to take away their threat, and I believe the underlying resolution done by the majority leader and the Speaker, along with the minority leader, gives the President the strongest hand possible in terms of building a multilateral coalition and, most importantly, protecting the American people whom we are sent here to represent.
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Baldacci).
(Mr. Baldacci asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr.Baldacci: Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Spratt amendment as the right way to security; not having to go it alone, but with the help of our allies.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today with a heavy heart. The decision whether or not to send our young men and women into war is the most difficult one a Member of Congress can face. In considering this matter, I have done considerable research, been briefed by the White House, talked with my colleagues and listened to the voices of the people of Maine.
It is clear that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous dictator. He has not hesitated to attack his neighbors, and even his own people. Since weapons inspectors were forced out of Iraq in 1998, we know that Hussein has taken steps to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons production capability. We have strong evidence that he is beginning to rebuild his nuclear program. Based on all that we have seen, in the past and in the present, it is clear that the Iraqi regime is a threat to international peace and security.
I am convinced that it is in the best interests of our Nation and our world that we eliminate these weapons of mass destruction. If Hussein does not use them directly, I believe there is a good chance that he will provide them to other terrorists who will. This situation cannot stand.
The question now before us is how to achieve our common goal of disarming Saddam Hussein. I am not supportive of a unilateral pre- emptive strike. As President bush said on Tuesday night, force must be our last resort, not our first. I am convinced that we will be strongest if we address this situation with the support of a multilateral coalition.
For that reason, I will be supporting Representative Spratt's substitute that calls for just such a multilateral approach. This resolution echoes the President's speech in which we urged the adoption of a new U.N. resolution that seeks to disarm Hussein, and if that resolution proves ineffective, calls for a coalition to disarm him. This substitute supports the President's intention to exhaust diplomatic approaches to disarming Iraq while still ensuring that he will be able to take action against Iraq if these methods prove ineffective.
To me, the most significant difference between Mr. Spratt's approach and that of the administration is that Mr. Spratt keeps Congress closely involved as the decision-making process moves forward, as is consistent with our Constitutional duty. Under the substitute, the administration will be required to return to Congress when and if it determines that diplomatic avenues have been pursued and have failed. At that time, expedited procedures will be in place to authorize military action if necessary.
When we are dealing with issues of this magnitude, I believe that there needs to be true consultation between the Congress and the administration. Simple notification is not enough. I agree that we need to speak with one voice, and this substitute gives us the tools to do that.
The bottom line is that yes, we must take action to protect our Nation and, indeed, the world from the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein has developed and continues to pursue. However, unilateral action is not, in my opinion, the most effective approach. I believe a multilateral approach offers the best chance to effectively disarm Saddam Hussein and put an end to his chemical and biological weapons programs. It's important for our government to work with other nations, and ensure that all non-military avenues have been exhausted, before taking action on our own. We should work with the world community and the United Nations Security Council. If these efforts fail, I support using force in concert with our allies.
I opposed the President's original resolution, and I commend my colleagues who have worked so hard to improve it. The underlying resolution has come a long way in addressing my concerns. However, I still believe that the Spratt approach is the best one at this time. It is a workable resolution, which neither ties the President's hands nor promotes unilateral action by the United States. I urge my colleagues to support this responsible approach.
Mr. Spratt: Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Snyder), also a Vietnam veteran and a member of the Committee on Armed Services.
Mr.Snyder: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Those of us that support this amendment do not believe that we are undercutting the President or somehow placing handcuffs on him. What, in fact, we believe we are doing is responding to the great common sense of the American people, the kind of discussions we all have at home and Americans are having all over the country in which they see a difference in the factual situations between America going in as an international body in cooperation with the United Nations versus America having to go it alone because the international community does not want to be with us. There are differences in those two scenarios, and the differences have different ramifications for the future of America's national security.
In fact, what the Spratt amendment does is give additional powers to the President not in the Constitution. It gives him the power to schedule this vote through an expedited process.
I think the Spratt amendment in fact is the kind of approach that the American people want us to take, to act in concert with the international community and, if that is not successful, to come back and expedite a way for a reevaluation by their elected representatives as expected by the Constitution.
