Mr. Kennedy: Mr. President, we face no more serious decision in our democracy than whether to go to war. America's values and interests are served best if war is a last resort. I do not believe America should go to war against Iraq unless and until other reasonable alternatives are exhausted, and I will vote against this resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.
Too often in this debate, we have failed to address the real effects of unilateral war with Iraq. The more we debate the war, the more we learn of the danger of going to war alone, the danger that it will cause to our urgent war against al-Qaida and terrorism, the danger that Saddam may be provoked into using his weapons of mass destruction against us or against Israel, the danger that allies we need will refuse to support us on other major challenges in the years ahead, and the dangerous new instability that could be caused in that volatile region if we go to war alone.
Because the threat of Saddam is real, I commend President Bush for taking America's case to the United Nations. We have a better prospect of disarming Iraq with the world behind us, than with our allies on the sidelines, or even at odds with our mission.
As we approach a vote on this important question, I offer the strongest possible affirmation that good and decent people on all sides of this debate who may in the end stand on opposing sides of this decision, are equally committed to our national security.
The life and death issue of war and peace is too important to be left to politics. And I disagree with those who suggest that this fateful issue cannot or should not be contested vigorously, publicly, and all across America. When it is the people's sons and daughters who will risk and even lose their lives, then the people should hear and be heard, speak and be listened to.
But there is a difference between honest public dialogue and partisan appeals. There is a difference between questioning policy and questioning motives. There are Republicans and Democrats who support the immediate use of force, and Republicans and Democrats who have raised doubts and dissented.
In this serious time for America and many American families, no one should poison the public square by attacking the patriotism of opponents, or by assailing proponents as more interested in the cause of politics than in the merits of their cause. I reject this, as should we all.
Let me say it plainly: I not only concede, but I am convinced that President Bush believes genuinely in the course he urges upon us. And let me say with the same plainness: Those who agree with that course have an equal obligation--to resist any temptation to convert patriotism into politics. It is possible to love America while concluding that it is not now wise to go to war. The standard that should guide us is especially clear when lives are on the line: We must ask what is right for country and not party.
That is the true spirit of September 11, not unthinking unanimity, but a clear-minded unity in or determination to defeat terrorism, to defend our values and the value of life itself.
Just a year ago, the American people and the Congress rallied behind the President and our Armed Forces as we went to war in Afghanistan. al-Qaida and the Taliban protectors who gave them sanctuary in Afghanistan posed a clear, present and continuing danger. The need to destroy al-Qaida was urgent and undeniable.
In the months that followed September 11, the Bush administration marshaled an international coalition. Today, 90 countries are enlisted in the effort, from providing troops to providing law enforcement, intelligence, and other critical support.
But I am concerned that using force against Iraq before other means are tried will sorely test both the integrity and effectiveness of the coalition. Just one year into the campaign against al-Qaida, the administration is shifting focus, resources and energy to Iraq. The change is priority is coming before we have fully eliminated the threat from al-Qaida, before we know whether Osama bin Laden is dead or alive, and before we can be assured that the fragile post-Taiban government in Afghanistan will consolidate its authority.
No one disputes that America has lasting and important interests in the Persian Gulf, or that Iraq poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein's regime is a serious danger, that he is tyrant, and that his pursuit of lethal weapons of mass destruction cannot be tolerated. The question is not whether he should be disarmed, but how.
How can we best achieve this objective in a way that minimizes the risks to our country? How can we ignore the danger to our young men and women in uniform, to our ally Israel, to regional stability, the international community, and victory against terrorism?
There is clearly a threat from Iraq, and there is clearly a danger, but the administration has not made a convincing case that we face such an imminent threat to our national security that a unilateral American strike and an immediate war are necessary.
Nor has the administration laid out the cost in blood and treasure of this operation.
With all the talk of war, the administration has not explicitly acknowledged, let alone explained to the American people, the immense post-war commitment that will be required to create a stable Iraq.
The President's challenge to the United Nations requires a renewed effort to enforce the will of the international community to disarm Saddam. Resorting to war is not America's only or best ocurse at this juncture. There are realistic alternatives between doing nothing and declaring unilateral or immediate war. War should be a last resort. Let us follow that course, and the world will be with us--even if, in the end, we have to move to the ultimate sanction of armed conflict.
The Bush administration says America can fight a war in Iraq without undermining our most pressing national security priority, the war against Al-Qaida. But I believe it is inevitable that a war in Iraq without serious international support will weaken our effort to ensure that Al-Qaida terrorists can never, never, never threaten American lives again.
Unfortunately, the threat from al-Qaida is still imminent. The Nation's armed forces and law enforcement are on constant high alert. America may have broken up the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan and scattered its operatives across many lands. But we have not broken its will to kill Americans.
As I said earlier, we still don't know the fate, the location, or the operational capacity of Osama bin Laden himself. But we do know that al-Qaida is still there, and still here in America, and will do all it can to strike at America's heart and heartland again. But we don't know when, where, or how this may happen.
On March 12, CIA Director Tenet testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that al-Qaida remains "the most immediate and serious threat" to our country, "despite the progress we have made in Afghanistan and in disrupting the network elsewhere."
Even with the Taliban out of power, Afghanistan remains fragile. Security remains tenuous. Warlords still dominate many regions. Our reconstruction effort, which is vital to long-term stability and security, is halting and inadequate. Some al-Qaida operatives, no one knows how many, have faded into the general population. Terrorist attacks are on the rise. President Karzai, who has already survived one assassination attempt, is still struggling to solidify his hold on power. And although neighboring Pakistan has been our ally, its stability is far from certain.
We know all this, and we also know that it is an open secret in Washington that the Nation's uniformed military leadership is skeptical about the wisdom of war with Iraq. They share the concern that it may adversely affect the ongoing war against al-Qaida and the continuing effort in Afghanistan by draining resources and armed forces already stretched so thin that many Reservists have been called for a second year of duty, and record numbers of service members have been kept on active duty beyond their obligated service.
They said that spy satellite, reconnaissance aircraft and other intelligence analysts with regional or linguistic expertise would have to be reassigned.
To succeed in our global war against al-Qaida and terrorism, the United States depends on military, law enforcement, and intelligence support from many other nations. We depend on Russia and countries in the former Soviet Union that border Afghanistan for military cooperation. We depend on countries from Portugal to Pakistan to the Philippines for information about al-Qaida's plans and intentions. Because of these relationships, terrorist plots are being foiled and al-Qaida operatives are being arrested.
Support from our allies has been indispensable in the war on terrorism, and has had real results: In December 2001, Singapore officials arrested 13 members of a group with ties to al-Qaida that had planned to bomb the U.S. embassy and U.S. commercial and military targets in Singapore. Malaysia has arrested nearly 50 suspected al- Qaida terrorists since September 11th. In March 2002, a joint U.S.- Pakistani police operation arrested 29 al-Qaida suspects, believed to include Abu Zubayday, a key bin Laden deputy. In May 2002, Morocco arrested three alleged al-Qaida members in connection with a plot to attack American and British naval ships in the Straits of Gibraltar. In June, Moroccan authorities also detained Abu Zubair, nicknamed "the bear"--a top associate of Abu Zubaydah. In June 2002, Saudi Arabia arrested seven al-Qaida members on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks. One of them, a Sudanese, had allegedly been involved in a missile attack near a Saudi airbase used by U.S. forces. The United States has worked closely with Yemen to combat terrorism, and the Yemeni government recently reported that it is holding 85 suspects accused of links to al-Qaida and other militant groups.
These arrests may seem small in number. But we know only too well that only 19 al-Qaida terrorists were responsible for the murder of nearly 3000 Americans on September 11.
It is far from clear that these essential relationships, which are yielding tangible law enforcement results, will survive the strain of unilateral war with Iraq that comes before the alternatives are tried, or without the support of an international coalition.
A largely unilateral American war that is widely perceived in the Muslim world as untimely or unjust could worsen not lessen the threat of terrorism. War with Iraq before a genuine attempt at inspection and disarmament, or without genuine international support, could swell the ranks of al-Qaida sympathizers and trigger an escalation in terrorist acts. As General Clark told the Senate Armed Services Committee, it would "super-charge recruiting for al-Qaida.
General Hoar advised the Committee on September 232 that America's first and primary effort should be to defeat al-Qaida. In a September 10th article, General Clark wrote: "Unilateral U.S. action today would disrupt the war against al-Qaida." We ignore such wisdom and advice from many of the best of our military at our own peril.
We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction. Our intelligence community is deeply concerned about the acquisition of such weapons by Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria and other nations. But information from the intelligence community over the past six months does not point to Iraq as an imminent threat to the United States or a major proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In public hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March, CIA Director George Tenet described Iraq as a threat but not as a proliferator, saying that Saddam Hussein, and I quote, "is determined to thwart U.N. sanctions, press ahead with weapons of mass destruction, and resurrect the military force he had before the Gulf War." That is unacceptable, but it is also possible that it could be stopped short of war.
In recent weeks, in briefings and in hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have seen no persuasive evidence that Saddam is not today deterred from attacking U.S. interests by America's overwhelming military superiority.
I have heard no persuasive evidence that Saddam is on the threshold of acquiring the nuclear weapons he has sought for more than 20 years.
And the Administration has offered no persuasive evidence that Saddam would transfer chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaida or any other terrorist organization. As General Joseph Hoar, the former Commander of Central Command told the members of the Armed Services Committee, a case has not been made to connect al-Qaida and Iraq.
To the contrary, there is no clear and convincing pattern of Iraqi relations with either al-Qaida or the Taliban.
Moreover, in August, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft wrote that there is "scant evidence" linking Saddam Hussein to terrorist organizations, and "even less to the September 11 attacks." He concluded that Saddam would not regard it as in his interest to risk his country or his investment in weapons of mass destruction by transferring them to terrorists who would use them and "leave Baghdad as the return address."
Some who advocate military action against Iraq assert that air strikes will do the job quickly and decisively, and that the operation will be complete in 72 hours. But there is again no persuasive evidence that air strikes alone over the course of several days will incapacitate Saddam and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. Experts have informed us that we do not have sufficient intelligence about military targets in Iraq. Saddam may well hide his most lethal weapons in mosques, schools and hospitals. If our forces attempt to strike such targets, untold numbers of Iraqi civilians could be killed.
In the gulf war, many of Saddam's soldiers quickly retreated because they did not believe the invasion of Kuwait was justified. But when Iraq's survival is at stake, it is more likely that they will fight to the end. Saddam and his military may well abandon the desert, retreat to Baghdad, and engage in urban, guerrilla warfare.
Many believe that our armed forces may need to occupy Baghdad, which has over 5 million residents. In our September 23 hearing, General Clark told the committee that we would need a large military force and a plan for urban warfare. General Hoar said that our military would have to be prepared to fight block by block in Baghdad, and that we could lose a battalion of soldiers a day in casualties. Urban fighting would, he said, look like the last brutal 15 minutes of the movie "Saving Private Ryan."
We know that the senior military leadership is concerned about the long-term consequences of an occupation. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld testified in September that if force were used in Iraq, disarmament would take some period of time. As he said, "one would think there would have to be a military presence, undoubtedly a coalition presence or a U.N. presence, for a period of time.
In fact, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cost of an occupation force would be $1 billion to $4 billion a month, depending on the size of the force, and military experts have suggested that up to 200,000 peace keepers might be needed for the occupation. However, and let me emphasize this, the Congressional Budget Office concluded that current U.S. Army forces would be unable to support the needed troop rotations for a prolonged 200,000-person occupation.
I do not accept the idea that trying other alternatives is either futile or perilous--that the risks of waiting are greater than the risks of war. Indeed, in launching a war against Iraq now, the United States may precipitate the very threat that we are intent on preventing--weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. If Saddam's regime and his very survival are threatened, then his view of his interests may be profoundly altered: He may decide he has nothing to lose by using weapons of mass destruction himself or by sharing them with terrorists.
Indeed, in an October 7 letter to Senator Graham, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence committee, CIA Director George Tenet stated this risk. He said, "Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or C.B.W. against the United States."
In discussing the scenario of a military attack, the CIA Director said, "Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions . . . Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a W.M.D. attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.
In the same letter, the CIA declassified an exchange between Senator Levin and a senior intelligence witness. When asked about the likelihood of Saddam using weapons of mass destruction without provocation, the intelligence witness said, "My judgment would be that the probability of him initiating an attack . . . in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think would be low." When asked about the likelihood that Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction if he thought his regime was in danger, the witness said, "Pretty high, in my view."
Before the Gulf War in 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with the Iraqis and threatened Hussein with "catastrophe" if he employed weapons of mass destruction. In that war, although Saddam launched 39 Scud missiles at Israel, he did not use the chemical or biological weapons he had.
If Saddam's regime and survival are threatened, he will have nothing to lose, and may use everything at his disposal. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has announced that instead of its forbearance in the 1991 gulf war, this time Israel will respond if attacked. If weapons of mass destruction land on Israeli soil, killing innocent civilians, the experts I have consulted believe Israel will retaliate, and possibly with nuclear weapons.
This escalation, spiraling out of control, could draw the Arab world into a regional war in which our Arab allies side with Iraq, against the United States and against Israel. And that would represent a fundamental threat to Israel, to the region, to the world economy and international order.
Nor can we rule out the possibility that Saddam would assault American force with chemical or biological weapons. Despite advances in protecting our troops, we may not yet have the capability to safeguard all of them. The Congressional General Accounting Office published a report on October 1 which clearly suggests that our forces are not adequately prepared for a chemical or biological attack, even though the Defense Department has been taking significant actions to provide such protection.
The GAO emphasizes the importance of chemical and biological defense training, the medical readiness of units to conduct operations in a contaminated environment, and the critical need for an adequate supply of required protective gear.
Our forces are already stretched thin in other ways. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are serving their country with great distinction. Just under 70,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen have been mobilized for the war against terrorism. Many reservists who were initially recalled for the war in Afghanistan have been either de- mobilized or extended for a second year. They are concerned about the impact a war against Iraq will have on their families and on their jobs. Many employers who are struggling in the current sagging economy are also deeply concerned about the stability of their workforce. These patriotic Americans are willing to sacrifice, but they deserve to know that all reasonable alternatives to war have been exhausted.
If we embark upon a premature or unilateral military campaign against Iraq, or a campaign only with Britain, our forces will have to serve in even greater numbers, for longer periods, and with graver risks. Our force strength will be stretched even thinner. If in the end we must go to war, the burden should be shared with allies, and an alliance is less likely if war becomes an immediate response.
Even with the major technological gains demonstrated in Afghanistan, the logistics and manpower required in a war with Iraq would be extraordinarily challenging if we could not marshal a real coalition of regional and international allies. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, told the Senate Armed Services Committee two week ago that because of the high demand placed on some of our forces, coalition partners would be necessary to mitigate the risk of war in Iraq.
President Bush made the right decision on September 12 when he expressed America's willingness to work with the United Nations to prevent Iraq from using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The President's address to the General Assembly challenging the United Nations to enforce its long list of Security Council Resolutions on Iraq was powerful, and for me, it was persuasive.
The President reports important progress has been made in urging many nations to join us in insisting that Saddam Hussein's regime be held accountable. The meetings already held between the U.N. and the Iraqi government on resuming inspections reflects the new international resolve to ensure that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are identified and destroyed. Yet, the resolution before us would allow the President to go it alone against Iraq without seeing our U.N. initiative through, and without exhausting the alternatives.
To maintain the credibility he built when he went to the U.N., the President must follow the logic of his own argument. Before we go to war, we should give the international community to chance to meet the President's challenge, to renew its resolve to disarm Saddam Hussein completely and effectively.
Some have argued that inspections have already been tried, and that they have failed. They argue that the international community has exhausted the option of inspections, and that immediate war is now justified. I disagree.
I have spoken to former inspectors and non-proliferation experts who are convinced that 7 years of inspections significantly impeded Saddam's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they are convinced that inspections can work effectively again.
According to Rolf Ekeus, who served as the executive chairman of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq from 1991 to 1997, inspectors ensured that not much was left of Iraq's once massive weapons programs at the time they departed.
In fact, the seven years of inspections that took place until 1998 succeeded in virtually eliminating Saddam's ability to develop a nuclear weapon in Iraq during that period. Even with Iraq's obstructions, those inspections resulted in the demolition of large quantities of chemical and biological weapons. The inspection program, before its forced termination in 1998, had accomplished far more disarmament than the gulf war itself.
President Bush acknowledged the successes of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or I.A.E.A., in thwarting Saddam's nuclear ambitions in his October 7 address to the Nation. He said, "Before being barred from Iraq in 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities, including three uranium- enrichment sites."
A CIA assessment, released to the public in October 2002, says: "Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides toward dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program and unearthing the nature and scope of Iraq's past nuclear activities."
Even the assessment of Iraq's WMD program published by the British Government to demand action in the United Nations against Iraq acknowledges the success of inspections. It says: "Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both, the UN, and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq's biological weapons program and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles as well as the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme."
Among the U.N.'s significant achievements cited in the assessment are: The destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tons of chemical precursors, and 411 tons of chemical warfare agent. The dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development production complex. The destruction of 48 Scud-type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56 sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical agents, and 20 conventional warheads. The destruction of the al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a range of production equipment. The removal and destruction of the infrastructure of the nuclear weapons program, including a weaponization and testing facility.
Experts on inspections advise that it would be extremely hard for Iraq to carry on an active and even secret WMD program while inspections are being conducted, especially with the inspection technology that has been developed over the last ten years. One former nuclear inspector told me that he found it hard to keep Iraqi scientists quiet about Iraq's nuclear program, once they started to talk.
Given these assessments, there is every reason to believe that unrestricted and unconditional inspections can again be effective in ensuring the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. It is an option that must be given a clear chance before going to war again.
So this should be the first aim of our policy, to get U.N. inspectors back into Iraq without conditions. I hope the Security Council will approve a new resolution requiring the Government of Iraq to accept unlimited and unconditional inspections and the destruction of any weapons of mass destruction.
The resolution should set a short timetable for the resumption of inspections. I would hope that inspections could resume, at the latest, by the end of October.
The resolution should also require the head of the U.N. inspection team to report to the Security Council every two weeks. No delaying tactics should be tolerated, and if they occur, Saddam should know that he will lose his last chance to avoid war.
The Security Council Resolution should authorize the use of force, if the inspection process is unsatisfactory. And there should be no doubt in Baghdad that the United States Congress would then be prepared to authorize force as well.
The return of inspectors with unfettered access and the ability to destroy what they find not only could remove any weapons of mass destruction from Saddam's arsenal. They could also be more effective than an immediate or unilateral war in ensuring that these deadly weapons would not fall into terrorist hands.
Before going to war again, we should seek to resume the inspections now--and set a non-negotiable demand of no obstruction, no delay, no more weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
We know that our actions against Iraq do not occur in a vacuum. The world is watching. The Administration's decisions to abandon the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and to reject ratification of the Treaty on the International Criminal Court have left the unmistakable impression across the globe that the United States wants to write its own international rules.
In February, Secretary of State Powell testified that there was significant concern among the Europeans earlier last year about "unbridled U.S. unilateralism," because "the U.S. was going off on its own without a care for the rest of the world." Further unilateral action on our part, especially on the all-important issue of war, could trigger a new global anti-Americanism that causes peoples and governments to question our motives and actions on a wide range of issues.
We should not embark on a unilateral war, without fully considering the potentially destabilizing impact on our allies in the region.
If we insist on attacking Iraq alone without the clear support of the international community, we could inflame anti-Americanism in the predominantly Muslim countries throughout the Middle East and South Asia. In an article this month in the New York Times, an expert at the Brookings Institution wrote that regardless of our real objectives, most Arabs and Muslims will see "American imperialism" in a war with Iraq.
This expert says that a war with Iraq would "render the Middle East more . . . unstable than it is today." Middle Eastern leaders could be faced with mass street protests over a highly unpopular American strike.
Jordan's King Abdullah, who is a trusted friend of America, is deeply concerned that war will inflame the large Palestinian population and inflame Islamic views. Iraq is one of Jordan's largest trading partners, and King Abdullah is understandably concerned about a potentially devastating impact on the Jordanian economy. Some experts have suggested that King Abdullah may lose power if war breaks out. Already the Jordanian Government is working actively to discourage popular outbursts against war with Iraq.
In Egypt, President Mubarak is concerned that war with Iraq will further ignite strong Islamist sentiment.
We also need to consider the possibility that Iran would try to increase its strength and influence in Southern Iraq in a post-Saddam era. More than 50 percent of the Iraqi population is Shiite, just as in Iran, and if the Iranian Government senses a vacuum, it very well might try to increase its influence in Iraq.
The United States must clearly act to defend our national security against an imminent threat. In doing so, the President will have the full support of Congress and the American people. But when an imminent threat does not exist, and when reasonable alternatives are available, as they are now, we must use them before resorting to war.
What can be gained here is success and in the event of failure, greater credibility for an armed response, greater international support, and the prospect of victory with less loss of American life.
So what is to be lost by pursuing this policy before Congress authorizes sending young Americans into another and in this case perhaps unnecessary war?
Even the case against Saddam is, in important respects, a case against immediate or unilateral war. If Prime Minister Blair is correct in saying that Iraq can launch chemical or biological warheads in 45 minutes, what kind of sense does it make to put our soldiers in the path of that danger without exhausting every reasonable means to disarm Iraq through the United Nations?
Clearly we must halt Saddam Hussein's quest for weapons of mass destruction. Yes, we may reach the point where our only choice is conflict with like-minded allies at our side, if not in a multilateral action authorized by the Security Council. But we are not there yet.
The evidence does not take us there; events do not compel us there and both the war against terrorism and our wider interests in the region and the world summon us to a course that is sensible, graduated, and genuinely strong--not because it moves swiftly to battle, but because it moves resolutely to the objective of disarming Iraq peacefully if possible, and militarily if necessary.
In his October 7 address to the nation, President Bush said Congressional approval of a resolution authorizing the use of force does not mean that war with Iraq is "imminent or unavoidable." The President himself has not decided that our nation should go to war. Yet, Congress is being asked to authorize war now. He may decide not to use that authority. But this resolution leaves it to the President to make the decision on his own, without further recourse to Congress or to the American people.
The power to declare war is the most solemn responsibility given to Congress by the Constitution. We must not delegate that responsibility to the President in advance.
Let me close by recalling the events of an autumn of danger four decades ago. When missiles were discovered in Cuba--missiles more threatening to us than anything Saddam has today, some in the highest councils of government urged an immediate and unilateral strike. Instead the United States took its case to the United Nations, won the endorsement of the Organization of American States, and brought along even our most skeptical allies. We imposed a blockade, demanded inspection, and insisted on the removal of the missiles.
When an earlier President outlined that choice to the American people and the world, he spoke of it in realistic terms not with a sense that the first step would necessarily be the final step, but with a resolve that it must be tried.
As he said then, "Action is required . . . and these actions [now] may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of . . . war--but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced."
In 2002, we too can and must be both resolute and measured. In that way, the United States prevailed without war in the greatest confrontation of the Cold War. Now, on Iraq, let us build international support, try the United Nations, and pursue disarmament before we turn to armed conflict.
