Mr. Reid: Mr. President, we have exhausted the last unanimous consent order that has been entered here. We have a lot of Senators who have indicated a desire to speak, and they have the right to do that. What I would like to do is this. Both cloakrooms have worked to come up with a list of speakers. We have a very long list, but we have learned from sad experience here this week that we should not make it a really long list.
So what I suggest to my colleague, Senator McCain, is that we go down the list for four or five Senators and then we will come back again and try to get another list. We have a long list, but rather than enter it--we tried that earlier this week, and everyone should understand it will not work because people do not use all their time so others are not here when it is time to start. But if we have a few Senators, it works better.
I ask unanimous consent that the list of speakers start with Senator DeWine for 35 minutes.
Mr. McCain: For 45.
Mr. Reid: OK, that is fine.
Mr. McCain: Forty-five.
Mr. Reid: Senator Collins for 20 minutes. The reason we have this is we have had a long string of Democrats who have spoken: Senator Kohl, 7 minutes; Senator Harkin, 7 minutes; Senator Schumer, 30 minutes; Senator Specter, 45 minutes; and Senator Carper, 20 minutes. We would end it at that time--not end it, but we would be back to enter another list and find out if we have had any added to it or taken from it.
The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?
Mr. McCain: I am sorry, I will not object, but I couldn't hear.
Mr. Reid: What I said is we will come back after this list is completed and see if there are any additions or deletions and try to get another list. We have a very long list here but, believe me, it will not work to stick it in from top to bottom.
The Presiding Officer: Would the Senator from Nevada repeat the list again?
Mr. Reid: DeWine, 45 minutes; Collins, 20 minutes; Kohl, 7 minutes; Harkin, 7 minutes; Schumer, 30 minutes; Specter, 45 minutes; Carper, 20 minutes.
The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Reid: I would say to everyone within the sound of my voice, everyone has time to speak if they can get the floor. We have a list here to make it so people are not trying to get the attention of the Chair.
I hope Senators will be considerate. There is only 30 hours. If somebody comes and takes an hour, it does not leave time for others. Some have already spoken. I think those who have spoken--I hope they will be considerate of a lot of Senators who have not spoken.
The fact that we have allotted all this time doesn't mean everyone has to use every minute of the time allotted. So those Senators who are in this queue, if they would be around in case someone doesn't show up or is stuck in traffic or whatever the case might be, we could finish a lot quicker.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
Mr. DeWine: Mr. President, I would like to begin by thanking all my colleagues who have participated in this very crucial and historic debate. I must say I was struck last Friday by the magnificent debate between Senator Byrd and Senator Warner. I think their debate on Friday represented what the Senate is all about, and I congratulate both of them. Really, every Member who has come down here has had something to contribute.
It is clear that each Member who came down here has thought long and hard about this very important vote.
Throughout my Congressional career, I have believed that the United States must lead in foreign affairs. In doing so, our foreign policy must reinforce and promote our own core values of democracy, free markets, human rights, and the rule of law. And, I am not at all ashamed to say that our most important export to the international community is our ideals and our ideas.
The first U.S. President I remember as a child is Dwight D. Eisenhower. We know that he ran for President because of his strong belief that the United States needed to lead in the world. He believed that by leading and by being involved in the world--and not isolated from it--we would have the best chance of guaranteeing peace, freedom, and stability. As President Eisenhower said in his January 1961 farewell address:
America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.
He understood that we have a moral obligation, as the leader of the Free World, to use our power to promote freedom and stability and to help alleviate suffering around the globe. And in that process, he understood the importance and the necessity of working with our partners through organizations, such as NATO.
And though it is vital that we be engaged in world affairs and work with other nations whenever possible, ultimately we cannot escape the fact that when the world looks for leadership, it can look to only one place--and that place is, of course, the United States of America.
History has put us here. And, if the United States does not lead, there is no one else who can lead--and frankly, no one else who will lead.
That is why, in the 1980s, when I was in the House of Representatives, I supported efforts to establish stability and democracy in Central America. The United States led--and it made a difference. Significant progress was made in Central America. Democracies emerged.
And, significant progress was made throughout the Western Hemisphere. In 1981, 16 of the 33 countries in our hemisphere were ruled by authoritarian regimes. Today, all but one of those nations--Cuba--have democratically elected heads of government.
They are certainly not all perfect and maybe those nations don't conform exactly with how we see democracy, but they certainly are better off than they were 25 years ago.
The United States led. It made a difference. It paid off.
That is why, throughout my career, I have supported U.S. leadership efforts--efforts to export our democratic values to other areas of the world, using tools, such as foreign trade and foreign aid.
Speaking of foreign aid, though I wasn't in Congress at the time, I supported U.S. leadership through NAFTA. I voted in favor of Trade Promotion Authority to give the President fast track or enhanced trading abilities with our global partners. I voted in favor of the Andean Trade Preferences Act to expand the economic benefits of trade with the nations of the Andean region. I voted in favor of the African Growth and Opportunity Act and the expanded Caribbean Basin Initiative. And, I support efforts to negotiate free trade agreements within our Western Hemisphere.
All of these efforts require strong U.S. leadership. So, too, does an underutilized tool of our foreign policy--and that is foreign aid.
First, we don't utilize it enough. Currently, our foreign assistance budget comprises less than one percent of our overall budget, and is barely 0.1 percent of our Gross Domestic Product.
Second, we aren't creative enough with the limited resources we do have in our foreign assistance budget. And so, here, too, the United States needs to lead.
There are things we can do with this assistance. We can and we must do more to help end suffering throughout the world. We can and we must do more to help alleviate the worldwide AIDS pandemic. We can and we must do more to feed starving children worldwide. We can and must do more to help implement the rule of law in developing democracies. We can and we must do more to foster agricultural and economic development in poverty-stricken, disease-ridden, war-ravaged parts of our world. And, as the leader of the Free World, we also have a moral obligation to bring stability and peace to volatile, violent regions around the globe.
Candidly, sometimes the only way to do that is through the use of our military. That's why I supported military action in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. The simple reality is that the job could not get done without U.S. leadership. We had to go in. We had to lead. It was the right thing to do, and we did it.
And so, Mr. President, it may seem paradoxical now that I have found the decision concerning this Resolution to be very, very difficult. It is difficult, I believe, principally for two reasons.
Let me outline them for the Senate.
First, the resolution before us is an authorization of force to be used by the President--at his discretion--at some point in the future. It is not a declaration of war. And, it does not say that war will take place.
But, it does authorize the President "to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to: Defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq."
While unusual, this type of resolution is not without precedent. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, which said this:
Congress approves and supports the determination of the President as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
I went back to the Congressional Record of 1964 and read some of Senator Gruening's and Senator Morse's remarks to get a better understanding of why they dissented--why they voted against this resolution. I also read comments from those who voted "yes."
However, it is noteworthy that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was not the first time Congress had passed a resolution to give the President the authority to use force--at his discretion--at some point in the future. Actually, Congress passed two such resolutions during the Eisenhower Administration: one in 1955 regarding Formosa and one in 1957 regarding the Middle East.
So while there is precedent, this type of resolution to grant the President the authority to use force, at his discretion, at some point in the future, is certainly unusual, and so we have an obligation to treat this matter with great caution. Granting the President this kind of power is indeed a very grave matter.
The second reason this decision, for me, has been so difficult is that the consequences of war would be so serious. A possible war against Iraq would have very real and very serious consequences, many of them unforeseen today.
I believe the American people need to understand this. My colleague, Senator Biden, who preceded me, made that point very well. I believe we have an obligation during this debate to explain to the American people what war with Iraq might mean. We have an obligation to be brutally frank in telling the American people about these consequences of war.
What are they? What are the risks of war with Iraq?
First, Saddam Hussein may very well use chemical and biological weapons against our troops. If we went to war, we would be attempting to remove Saddam from power. Therefore, unlike the Persian Gulf war, this time he is likely to actually use those chemical and biological weapons against our troops, or at least attempt to.
Second, we know that war with Iraq dramatically increases the possibility of attacks against United States troops stationed in other places abroad and United States civilians throughout the world.
Third, we know that war with Iraq increases the possibility of attacks against Americans right here at home, in our mainland.
This has already been read on the floor and discussed, but I would like to read to my colleagues some information recently declassified by the CIA. In a letter to Senator Graham dated October 7--Monday of this week--the CIA released the following:
Baghdad, for now, appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or biological weapons against the United States.
Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions. Such terrorism might involve conventional means, as with Iraq's unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or [through] chemical or biological weapons.
Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a weapons of mass destruction attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.
This information is certainly chilling.
We also know that war with Iraq increases the likelihood that Saddam will launch Scud missiles against Israel, this time maybe with biological or chemical agents attached to the missiles. In fact, Iraq has admitted to the weaponization of thousands of liters of anthrax, botulinim toxin, and aflatoxin for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft.
Furthermore, if attacked, what would Israel do? Would Israel, this time, retaliate? In the Persian Gulf war, Israel held back, but would they this time? And if they did not, in such a scenario, what would other countries do? What would Syria do, for example? What are the chances of the entire Middle East literally going up in flames?
At the conclusion of a war with Iraq--we would win the war; we know that--but at the conclusion of a war with Iraq, there very well may be bloody, fractious battles among the different ethnic groups residing in Iraq. Pent up hostilities among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds--just to mention a few--would be difficult to restrain, easily resulting in families warring against families and neighbors against neighbors, all fighting village to village and house to house. And there simply would not be enough United States troops or allies you could place into Iraq to stop that from happening.
What are the unintended global consequences of the United States using preemptive action? How does this change the dynamics of the world? What would it mean for the India-Pakistan nuclear standoff? What would it mean for China and Taiwan? Would these nations be less restrained in using preemptive strikes? These are questions to which we do not know the answers.
Finally, what will Iraq look like after the war? What kind of humanitarian assistance will be needed? How many people will we have to feed? What is our plan now for reconstruction? What does it cost? Who will help? What other countries will we be able to involve in helping us?
We can expect to pay for a large part of this. And we can expect our troops to be involved for an extended, indefinite period of time--not days, not months, but years. And there could be no doubt about that.
So, yes, Mr. President, there are grave consequences of going to war with Iraq. We cannot predict the future. We do not know exactly how Saddam would react. But it is vital that the American people understand the sobering reality of a war with Iraq; that all Americans understand the uncertainty and the risks and the dire consequences.
Yet we also know that inaction is not a choice when it comes to the situation in Iraq. Inaction is just not a choice. We know the status quo is unacceptable. We know things have languished too long. We know Saddam Hussein's regime is in possession of chemical and biological weapons. And we know they are working, as frantically as they can, to develop nuclear weapons.
The fear is, also, that Saddam Hussein would eventually put these weapons into the hands of other terrorist groups, terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, terrorist groups that have no qualms about targeting U.S. citizens anywhere in the world, terrorist groups that have networks already established around the world. When that handoff would be made, the consequences would be unbelievable.
President Bush made very clear in his speech on Monday night in Cincinnati:
Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace, and he must disarm.
So I commend President Bush for putting Iraq back on the world stage in his very forceful speech at the United Nations. He has taken Saddam Hussein's evil regime by the throat and dragged it back in front of the eyes of the international community. And he has forced the United Nations to confront Saddam's rampant and flagrant disregard of 10 years' worth of U.N. Security Council resolutions. He has forced the U.N. to confront its failure to enforce past resolutions regarding weapons inspections. And, rightly so, President Bush has forced both the U.N. and our own country to confront this global threat and to deal with it. I commend the President for his leadership.
None of us in this body disagrees about what Saddam Hussein is. We know he is a power-hungry dictator, the embodiment of pure evil. The litany, ably recited here day after day, detailing Hussein's thirst for power, is by no means exaggerated, nor is it understated. And there is simply no logic to his actions. Just think back to his attempt to assassinate former President Bush shortly after President Clinton took office. Even in his perverse view of the world, what in the world could that have accomplished from his point of view?
Clearly, Saddam is ruthless. He is diabolical. He is a cold-blooded killer. He has launched Scud missiles against his neighbors. He has diverted much of the $10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year--money he gets from oil--he has diverted that money he is supposed to use for humanitarian purposes, to help his own people, to develop weapons of mass destruction.
He has murdered his own people. He has killed or injured more than 20,000 Kurds with mustard gas and sarin.
In short, Saddam is a 20th century Adolf Hitler, straddling 21st century weapons of mass destruction. No one in this body disagrees Saddam Hussein is an evil despot, but reasonable people can still disagree about our policy for disarming Hussein; reasonable people can disagree with the wording of the resolution we are debating; reasonable people can disagree about the timing; and reasonable people can disagree about how we proceed at the United Nations.
This is a very difficult decision. There are very legitimate issues of controversy.
Yes, the costs will be high, very high, if we go to war. Again, that is why this decision has for me been so very difficult. It is the most serious vote I have cast in the 8 years I have been in the Senate.
None of us take the gravity of this vote lightly. Over the last several weeks I have spent many hours in Intelligence Committee hearings and briefings and other briefings gathering as much intelligence and information as humanly possible. I have met with numerous current and former high-ranking officials from the military, the CIA, the State Department. I met personally with President Bush.
At the end of the day, we still must weigh all of the costs and all of the consequences of a potential war with Iraq against the potential for peace and stability and lives saved that will come with the disarmament of Saddam Hussein.
Let's be honest, though. The fact is, the ghost of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution haunts this Chamber, just as the tragedy of Vietnam and the over 58,000 U.S. lives that were lost hang heavy in the heart of America. We should be haunted by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and we should be haunted and troubled by the Vietnam war.
However, it is instructive, as I mentioned earlier, to remember that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was not the first time Congress gave the President the authority to commit U.S. Armed Forces at his discretion at some time in the future.
In January 1955, when Dwight Eisenhower was President, the Chinese Communists were threatening to take over the Chinese nationalists in Formosa. It was a very serious time in our history. Believing that the time had come to draw the line--those are President Eisenhower's words--to draw the line and hold back the Communist aggression, President Eisenhower asked Congress to pass a resolution giving him the authority "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa against armed attack."
Congress granted President Eisenhower this authority with an overwhelming vote, 410 to 3 in the House, and 85 to 3 in the Senate. Later President Eisenhower said that while he went to Congress for several reasons, his real reason was "to serve notice on the Communists that they are not going to be able to get away with it."
Because of that resolution, the Chinese Communists in 1955 did not act. War was avoided. There have been problems. There have been tensions ever since. But war at that crucial time was avoided.
By passing the Formosa resolution, Congress sent a clear, unequivocal signal to the Chinese Communists that the United States would defend Formosa, that Congress would support President Eisenhower, and that our country was, in fact, united.
It is instructive that during that debate, there was an attempt in the Senate, in the Congress, to change the wording and to be more specific and to mention President Eisenhower, in defending Formosa, had the specific authority to defend Quemoy and Matsu, two little islands close to mainland China, far away from Formosa, but controlled by Formosa at the time. President Eisenhower said, no, do not do that; do not be that specific in the resolution.
President Eisenhower was looking for the authorization to protect Formosa, but he also wanted the discretion to decide how to do it. And he also did not want to tell the Communist Chinese exactly what he would do.
With the flexibility and discretion to use force as he deemed necessary, President Eisenhower left the Communists guessing about the ways in which the United States would act, but they had no doubt that we would act.
That is why I believe we must pass the resolution before us. We need a tough resolution that gives the President the authority he needs to disarm Saddam Hussein. We need a tough resolution that also gives the President flexibility and discretion. We have that before us. We need a tough resolution that does not tie the President's hands.
Through the resolution before us, this Senate and this Congress is saying to Saddam Hussein that he is on notice. Saddam Hussein, we are saying, you are not going to be able to flagrantly disregard U.N. Security Council resolutions any more. You are not going to be able to get away with building weapons of mass destruction. You are not going to be able to threaten our lives and the lives of our children and the lives of our grandchildren and the peace and security of the world.
In the final analysis, we are left with the sober realization that when it comes to Saddam Hussein, there really are no good choices. When it comes to him, lives are being lost in his own country now, and many more could be lost around the world in the future if we allow him to continue his weapons of mass destruction obsession. Left unrestrained, Saddam Hussein will only become more dangerous, more diabolical, and certainly more deadly.
So I believe when you weigh the risk of action versus the risk of inaction, we, as the leader of the free world, simply have a moral obligation to act. As I already said, we simply cannot, as a nation, escape the fact that when the world looks for leadership, it can look to only one place today. That place is the United States of America.
We have an obligation to lead the efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein. In the process, we may tragically end up at war with Iraq. But my prayer, my prayer is that by passing this resolution, we will not have to go to war against Iraq. My prayer is that congressional unity will signal to Saddam Hussein and to the international community that we do, in fact, mean business.
My hope is we can get a tough new U.N. Security Council resolution passed, giving weapons inspectors unfettered access to every mile, every square foot, every inch of Iraq. We increase the chances for peace by telling Saddam Hussein and his evil regime that our Nation is united and that we do, in fact, speak with one voice. We increase the chances for peace by giving the President the strongest possible hand, while at the same time giving him flexibility.
Finally, I must say I am convinced President George Bush will do absolutely everything he can to avoid war.
Mr. President, I do not know if war can be avoided, but I do know if we are serious about disarming Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction, our best chance of avoiding war is through the passage of a tough resolution. That is why I will vote in favor of this resolution.
I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. Collins: Mr. President, before I give my speech, I commend my friend, the Senator from Ohio, Senator DeWine, for a very thoughtful presentation this evening. He and I have had many discussions about how difficult this decision has been for both of us. We have reached many of the same conclusions. But I just want to salute him for a very thoughtful and thorough analysis of the resolution and the challenges before us.
The decision to authorize the use of military force is the most significant vote that a Member of the Senate can ever cast. The Constitution clearly vests this responsibility in Congress, a duty that rests heavily on the shoulders of each and every Member.
As a Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am keenly aware of the sacrifices and dangers faced by our young men and women in the military. They are ready to answer the call to combat, ready to fight the war against terrorism, ready to defend our freedoms around the globe.
In the wake of the attacks on our country on September 11, the Senate vote to authorize the war against terrorism was rapid, unanimous, and clear-cut. By contrast, whether to authorize the use of military force against Iraq is a far more difficult and complex question. It requires a thorough analysis of the nature and urgency of the threat and an evaluation of all possible responses.
As a member of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, and the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security and Proliferation, I have received many briefings on the dangers posed by lawless regimes in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea during the past 5 years. And during the past 2 months, I have attended several highly classified, in-depth briefings on Iraq from the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the White House. I have questioned the experts--I have questioned them closely--including former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and former National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, as well as Secretary Rumsfeld, at public hearings before the Armed Services Committee.
I have read studies and assessments, both classified and public, conducted by the administration, the British Joint Intelligence Committee, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and many others. I talked at length with Secretary Colin Powell about the appropriate strategy to respond to Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction.
Let me first discuss my conclusions about the nature and the extent of the threat posed by the Iraqi regime and its continued defiance of the United Nations resolutions. In 1991, Iraq accepted a cease-fire agreement in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, to end the gulf war. The Iraqi regime was required to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless under international supervision of all of its chemical and biological agents.
In addition, the resolution prohibited Iraq from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons and required the destruction of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. From a series of Iraqi declarations to the U.N. subsequent to this resolution, we know that Iraq, by its own admission, had by 1991 produced thousands of tons of deadly chemical weapons, such as mustard gas, sarin, and VX, as well as very large quantities of biological agents, including anthrax and ricin. Most experts believe Iraq's declarations grossly understated the true sense of its chemical and biological programs. But even the admitted amounts were sufficient to kill hundreds of thousands of people.
For a time in the 1990s, the U.N. inspectors succeeded in destroying quantities of these weapons, as well as the associated production facilities, ballistic missiles, and much of the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Subsequently, however, the Iraqi regime's harassment, obstruction, and deception made it impossible for the inspectors to continue their work, and they were withdrawn.
At the time they left in 1998, the inspectors were unable to account for very large discrepancies between the weapons that were declared and the amounts that were destroyed. For example, at least 1.5 tons of the deadly nerve agent VX were unaccounted for. Just under 10 milligrams of VX can cause a quick and painful death.
The CIA has concluded all key aspects of Iraq's offensive biological and chemical weapons program, including research and development, production and weaponization, are active and, in some cases, larger and more advanced than before the gulf war.
In addition to the weapons unaccounted for in the post-gulf war inspections, there is significant evidence that since 1998, Saddam has expanded his stockpile of chemical and biological weapons; rebuilt and expanded manufacturing sites, including mobile biological production facilities; developed more effective delivery systems, such as unmanned drones; and sought to procure materials for a nuclear bomb.
The reports demonstrating Iraq's violation of U.N. resolutions are numerous, compelling, and indisputable. They are based on the findings of U.N. weapons inspectors, credible reports from Iraqi defectors, sophisticated surveillance equipment, and other strong evidence.
Even more troubling is the evidence compiled by the American and British intelligence agencies that Iraq has converted its L-29 jet trainers to allow them to be used as unmanned aerial vehicles, capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area.
While the evidence of Iraq's pursuit of biological and chemical weapons is overwhelming, it is more difficult to determine the state of Iraq's development of nuclear weapons. Numerous reports suggest, however, a renewed determination by Saddam Hussein to obtain the materials for a nuclear bomb.
A September report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies paints a chilling picture of Saddam's quest for nuclear weapons. Had the gulf war not intervened, Iraq "could have accumulated a nuclear stockpile of a dozen or so weapons by the end of the decade," according to the report.
It further concludes that the scientific and technical expertise of Iraq's nuclear program remains intact, and the British Government has revealed that Iraqi nuclear personnel were ordered to resume work on nuclear projects in 1998.
According to British intelligence, Iraq has also attempted to obtain uranium from Africa. This is extraordinarily troubling. Since Iraq has no active civil nuclear power program or nuclear powerplants, it simply has no peaceful reason to attempt to secure uranium.
In addition, the Iraqi Government has attempted to procure tens of thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes that could be used in centrifuges designed to enrich uranium to produce the fissile material necessary for a nuclear bomb.
How soon could Iraq acquire nuclear weapons? The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that Iraq is probably years away from producing nuclear weapons if it has to rely on indigenously produced material. It points out if Iraq were to acquire nuclear material from a foreign source, the timeframe could be reduced to a matter of months.
This is the scenario the institute calls the nuclear wild card. An independent assessment conducted by Professor Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, confirms the growing threat posed by Iraq. The professor states that Saddam Hussein seeks weapons to offset American superiority and high-tech weaponry. In other words, while the United States has developed conventional weapons to be as surgical as possible and to limit unintended casualties, Iraq develops its weapons to be as blunt and as destructive as possible, to instill fear in its enemies and its neighbors.
In short, Saddam Hussein has continued to develop a stockpile of the deadliest chemical and biological agents known to mankind and has continued to seek nuclear weapons in defiance of his international obligations.
The more difficult question is whether the growing and serious threat posed by Saddam Hussein is sufficiently imminent to warrant the authorization of a military strike by the United States and its allies should diplomatic means of disarming Iraq fail.
The President correctly noted in his recent speech that the passage of this authorization does not mean that war is imminent and unavoidable. In fact, the resolution before us represents a considerable improvement over the administration's earlier draft which I would have opposed because of its insufficient emphasis on pursuing diplomatic means first and working through the United Nations Security Council.
The bipartisan resolution, by contrast, specifically requires a Presidential determination that further reliance on diplomatic or other peaceful means alone would not adequately protect our national security or lead to the enforcement of the relevant U.N. resolutions. But nevertheless, the difficult question remains of whether the threat is so urgent that a military strike may be required and should be authorized by this resolution.
The evidence of Saddam's massive buildup of the most dangerous weapons is compelling, but as Mr. Berger pointed out in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the threat is not defined by capability alone. We have to probe Saddam Hussein's intentions, as well as his capability, to determine the threat. In that regard, if, as Shakespeare tells us, the past is prolog, the history of Saddam's regime gives us great cause for concern.
While none of us can predict for certain whether or when Saddam would strike, there are simply far too many warning signs in his past behavior and in his present undertakings. His coldblooded willingness to use chemical weapons against his own people, as well as his enemies; his aggressive invasion of two nations; his blatant defiance of international sanctions; his continued efforts to procure the materials to build a nuclear bomb; and his determined progress to develop a more effective means of delivering chemical and biological weapons all strongly suggest an intention and an ability to use these weapons.
As the assessment of the British Government states, the evidence shows that Saddam Hussein does not regard these weapons of mass destruction as only weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them and determined to retain them. In fact, British intelligence reports that some of the weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them.
The history of Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq is a history of war and aggression against his enemies, his neighbors, and his own people. Throughout the decade of the 1980s, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons to kill thousands of civilians, and Iraq has the means, through billions of dollars in oil revenues, to continue to develop, procure, or steal the materials necessary for its weapons.
The risks are simply too catastrophic for the world to allow Iraq to continue on its present course, but is a military response the only answer?
From the beginning of this debate, I have emphasized my belief that military force must be the last resort, not the first alternative. Today I still hold out the hope that military action will not prove necessary to disarm this dangerous regime. A strong United Nations resolution to compel Iraq to declare its weapons and to accept unfettered, rigorous inspections may well be successful in convincing Saddam that he must disarm.
I believe our policy should be focused on disarming Iraq rather than on regime change, much as I would like Saddam Hussein to be deposed.
In making what has been a very difficult decision, I was persuaded ultimately to support this resolution by an extensive discussion with Secretary Powell. He has convinced me the process for effective action by the United Nations to disarm Iraq depends on the credible threat of the use of force, and that is the reason ultimately that I will decide to cast my vote in favor of this resolution.
Secretary Powell told me his ability to secure a strong resolution from the U.N. Security Council will be strengthened enormously by a strong, bipartisan congressional vote for this authorization.
Similarly, as Secretary Schlesinger testified, the greater degree to which the President and the Congress are united in purpose with respect to Iraq, the greater is the likelihood the United Nations will take a firm and appropriate stand toward Iraq.
Only if Saddam understands we are prepared to use military force will a peaceful means of disarming him have any chance to succeed. All Americans share the goal of eliminating this threat without war, but we differ on how to achieve that goal.
In my view, there are times in dealing with a tyrant when the best, indeed perhaps the only, chance to avoid war is to express, in unmistakable terms, our willingness to wage it. And this is one of those times.
Some understandably ask: Why now? Has not our current policy contained Saddam?
It has, only if allowing him to acquire the capability to kill and destroy on a scale that far exceeds his past efforts means that we have contained him. No, the truth is we have not really contained Saddam. We have largely ignored him, a strategy that simply delays the inevitable while the stakes grow ever higher.
The reason we must deal with this threat now is both clear, convincing, and chilling. Given Saddam's insatiable desire to possess chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, this danger will not disappear on its own, and the price we may have to pay today to eliminate this threat will prove modest compared to the price we will have to pay tomorrow.
As difficult as the decision to authorize military action is, one need only consider how much more difficult it will be when Saddam has a nuclear bomb.
Finally, let me emphasize my strong belief that the United States should act in concert with our allies, as we pursue a new Security Council resolution, or in the event we have to resort to military force. While the United States must always retain the right to defend itself, our prospects for dealing effectively with the Iraqi threat, our standing in the community of nations, and our ability to continue to wage an effective global effort against terrorism depend on our forging a multilateral coalition.
The President deserves great credit for putting together a coalition of some 90 nations to combat terrorism. That same kind of effort must be devoted to building a coalition to confront and disarm the Iraqi regime.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator's time has expired.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Nevada has the floor.
Mr. Reid: On the continuing saga of speeches, there have been a couple of changes. Senator Cantwell will speak in place of Senator Harkin for 10 minutes. Instead of 30 minutes, Senator Schumer will speak for 25 minutes, and Senator Specter will speak for 30 minutes rather than 45 minutes.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCain: Mr. President, I want to make a very brief comment. I thought Senator Collins' and Senator DeWine's statements were outstanding. They are to be congratulated. I think it added a great deal to this debate and discussion.
I do not object to the change in the lineup.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. Kohl: Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution before the Senate. There is no more serious vote we as Senators take than to authorize war. To do so, we must believe that there is great cause--a great threat to America. I cast my vote today with the great hope that this show of unity from the American Government and from the American people, along with the actions of the international community, will achieve our stated goal of disarming Iraq without war.
I will vote for this authorization because, after great consideration, I believe Saddam Hussein's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is a great threat. I believe disarming Saddam is a great cause. And I believe that moving to disarm Saddam--in concert with the international community--is the President's great goal.
There is no doubt that the threat Saddam Hussein and his weapons pose to this country and to world peace is real. More than a decade has passed since we defeated Saddam, but he has not changed. He is the same repressive dictator, willing to overrun his neighbors, and to use weapons of mass destruction against his own people.
We know that Saddam's regime has produced and is continuing to produce massive quantities of biological and chemical agents. We know much less about his current nuclear capabilities. But there can be no doubt that he is doing everything in his power to acquire nuclear weapons.
While there is good reason to believe that Saddam Hussein is not interested in jeopardizing his hold on power, we cannot predict what Saddam will do with these capabilities should he have them. The best we can do is to rely on the past as a guide to what the future may hold. And, the future is now colored by the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks of last year. These have given us a disturbing glimpse at a possible worst case scenario. Given Saddam Hussein's track record--his ejection of weapons inspectors and his murderous ways--I believe the security of our nation depends on disarming Iraq and containing this regime notorious for its deceptions and ruthlessness.
Let me be clear on that point. My vote today is a vote for disarmament, not a vote for regime change. While it is clear that Iraq is a rogue regime of the worst kind, going into overthrow it would be enormously destabilizing. There are many repressive governments around the world, some of which have access to weapons of mass destruction. There are many ruthless and aggressive nations around the world that have threatened their neighbors. Yet, we cannot be the world's policeman, offering to make the world safe by eliminating each and every tyrant. Should the President choose to use force against Iraq, it should be for the purpose of ensuring unfettered weapons inspections and full disarmament. If Saddam Hussein no longer rules as a result of our actions, then I say--find--but for us to take action with the primary purpose of overthrowing the Iraqi government would be wrong.
The President has vowed to seek the support of the international community against Iraq, and my vote today is cast accepting and supporting that position fully. I Believe we should not commit U.S. troops abroad without the support of the international community. The costs are too great for us to take unilateral action unless we have no other choice. International involvement will strengthen our hand against Saddam Hussein, increasing the likelihood that we will be able to resume inspections and disarm Iraq.
In order for the President to use force, the resolution requires the President to make a formal determination that relying on diplomatic and peaceful means will not adequately protect our national security, or lead to the enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions. I am confident that this administration is doing everything in its power to engage the international community, and to work with our allies to contain Iraq. I am comforted to see the Administration working with the United Nations on a stronger resolution. The President has rightly challenged the U.N. to put some teeth in the Security Council resolutions which have been flouted by Iraq, and he has given the international community notice that there must be accountability for the U.N. resolutions to have any meaning.
Mr. President, my vote today is a vote to support the President in his efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein. My vote is not an endorsement of a policy of preemptive war, whether it is initiated by the United States or any other country. My vote today is to authorize the President to gather a world force against the threat of a dangerous regime armed with chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons, and to disarm that regime. And finally, my vote today is to authorize the President to go to war, in the hope that this strong statement of our commitment to disarming Iraq will enable us to do so without war.
Mr. Reid: I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged to Senator Cantwell.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
