The Presiding Officer: Who yields time?
The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. Levin: Madam President, I yield myself 15 seconds. There may not be an inference in their rhetoric, but there is more than an inference in the resolution they support. It says resolutions of the U.N. It identifies them all, including the one on Kuwaiti prisoners. I am afraid while they may want to ignore the language in their own resolution, that is more than an inference that is there; that is authorized there.
It is amazing to me that language is inserted into my resolution, which is not there, by the opponents of my resolution, while ignoring the language in their own resolution which is there.
I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Vermont.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. Warner: Madam President, I should point out it also includes the return of an American prisoner, an accounting of him.
Mr. Levin: That part I support.
Mr. Warner: Fine.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. Jeffords: Madam President, the vote on the Levin substitute amendment is one of the most important votes we will cast in this process. I commend the Senator from Michigan for his fine work on this alternative. The Levin amendment urges the United Nations to take strong and immediate action to pass a resolution demanding unrestricted access for U.N. arms inspectors in Iraq. It also urges the United Nations to press for full enforcement of its prior resolutions on Iraq. The Levin substitute language makes it clear that the United States will stand behind the U.N. Security Council, even authorizing the use of U.S. military force to support the Security Council directives if necessary.
At the conclusion of World War II, the United States had a vision of a world body that would be a forum for resolving future disputes with means other than war. There were many important initiatives that needed multilateral coordination by an international body. For more than half a century, the United States has poured diplomatic energy and considerable resources into the United Nations system. During the cold war years, the U.N. languished, weakened by the divisive United States- Soviet confrontation. But following the demise of the Soviet Union, the United Nations has regained considerable authority, and as the world's lone superpower, the United States is now finding that it has considerable use for the United Nations.
Our decade-long struggle with Saddam Hussein is one example of how working with the United Nations serves our interests. We partnered with the United Nations very effectively during the Persian Gulf War. Sanctions have prevented any significant rebuilding of Iraq's conventional military capabilities. We maintain U.N. no-fly zones over Iraq that have restricted military reprisals against the Iraqi Kurds and Shiites. United Nations inspectors on the ground in Iraq learned a great deal about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program immediately following the gulf war. But things fell apart in subsequent years.
Once again, we need a strong United Nations to step up to Saddam Hussein. The United Nations must take the lead in enforcing its demands that Iraq give up its biological and chemical weapons stockpiles and production capabilities. The United Nations also demanded that Iraq dismantle its nuclear weapons program. I am pleased that last month, President Bush decided to take his case against Saddam Hussein to the United Nations. The U.N. Security Council has responded with vigorous debate, and is considering a strong U.S. proposal for enforcement of a strict U.N. inspections regime. I urge the Security Council to act now, and act decisively.
The Levin amendment puts us squarely behind this United Nations effort. It is the only language that does so. It is critical that we give the U.N. our full support at this time, and give the Security Council the opportunity to take bold action as proposed by the United States. If we undercut the United Nations here today, we are depriving ourselves of the best chance to peacefully achieve the most important goal of disarming Saddam Hussein.
As the world's lone super power, we need a partner in the United Nations. Many of the critical tasks before us are actually international tasks. For instance, degradation of the environment is a global problem and requires a global solution. The crisis of climate change can hardly be addressed by the United States alone. Improving the quality of our water and air requires internationally coordinated efforts. Economic, employment and health problems are increasingly becoming global issues, as people move across national boundaries in search of jobs and opportunity. We need a strong partner in these efforts, and the United Nations system is our best hope.
We are becoming increasingly aware of the disparities in the economic wealth and use of resources around the globe. Addressing these problems will require a great deal of creative thinking and financial resources. While we are the world's strongest nation, we cannot solve these problems alone. Nor do we want to. We need a strong partner in this effort. A reinvigorated United Nations is the most likely venue for progress.
The spread of weapons of mass destruction has clearly become a threat to our national security. There is much more that the United States can do to stop this proliferation. But in order to have much success at these efforts, we must work in concert with the international community. We need a strong United Nations as a partner in this effort.
The effect of the Levin substitute is to give the United Nations a chance to prove it is up to the task. If we are to have a strong and effective partner in confronting the many problems facing the United States, then we must stand squarely behind the United Nations today. I urge my colleagues to support the Levin amendment.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: Who yields time?
Mr. Levin: I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. Durbin: Madam President, I rise in support of the Levin resolution. I salute my colleague from the State of Michigan because I think what he has captured in this resolution is, frankly, what the American people believe.
There is no one in this Senate Chamber making apologies for Saddam Hussein or his weapons of mass destruction. There is no one who wants to ignore the peril which that man could pose to the Middle East or to the United States of America. But what Senator Levin is suggesting is, frankly, to follow what the President is suggesting.
On September 12, President Bush went to the United Nations and he said to them, if their organization means anything, then they have to stand up to this man. We have to have unconditional inspections. For 5 years we have been standing by the sidelines, and we want to know what is happening in Iraq.
Senator Levin says that is the first place we should go, and I agree with him. And it is not as if the United Nations has ignored this. Secretary of State Colin Powell, a man I respect very much--one of the leaders in this administration--has been in New York working with the United Nations for this resolution. That is the best course of action. To have the United Nations behind us, as President Bush's father had the United Nations behind him in the Persian Gulf war, to have a coalition of allies representing countries from all around the world; countries that have joined us in the war on terrorism would now join us in a meaningful inspection regime in Iraq. That is what Senator Levin suggests.
What a contrast it is from the President's own resolution. The President's resolution talks about continued discussion with the United Nations. But make no mistake, the President's resolution gives him unconditional, go-it-alone authority to launch a land invasion in Iraq with or without an ally. There is a world of difference between what Senator Levin and I support and what the President has asked for.
Doesn't it make more sense for us to work with the United Nations for unconditional inspections to make certain we have inspectors on the ground looking at every square inch of Iraq, and if there is resistance from Saddam Hussein, if he obstructs us, if he creates obstacles, we then have the force of the United Nations behind us in enforcement? We do not stand alone. We stand with other nations and with the United Nations. That is what President Bush's father did, and it was the right thing to do. That is what we should do because, frankly, bringing this force together is a validation of this organization, the United Nations, which the United States, as much as any other nation in the world, helped to create.
After World War II, we said: Let's come together in collective security to work together to solve the problems of the world and to deal with war and peace.
Time and again, in over 100 instances, the United Nations has risen to that challenge. We should give them that same opportunity and responsibility with the Levin resolution. That is the better course of action. As Senator Levin says clearly in his resolution, nothing in the resolution ever diminishes in any way whatsoever the power of the President of the United States to defend this country, its people, its territory, its Armed Forces, against any threat of aggression. That is part of what we expect of the Commander in Chief, the President, and Senator Levin preserves and protects that.
I urge my colleagues to support the Levin amendment. The Levin amendment is the best way for us to approach this challenge.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Arizona has 1 minute.
Mr. McCain: Madam President, I may be in the debate on the Durbin amendment. We can discuss the comparison between this situation and Kosovo. The United Nations Security Council never acted in Kosovo. The United States of America was not imminently threatened--was not threatened--but genocide was going on in Kosovo where thousands of people were being ethnically cleansed. If we had passed the Levin amendment at the time of Kosovo, when those of us supported then- President Clinton, we would have waited to find out whether the Security Council acted or not and then we would have come back and considered whether Kosovo was a threat to the United States of America. Kosovo is not today, was not then, and will not be tomorrow a threat, but the United States of America had an obligation, and because the United Nations Security Council did not act did not hamstring us.
The reading of this amendment says the Congress will come back into session in case of certain Security Council actions. There is no other way to read it. This amendment should be resoundingly defeated.
I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Michigan controls the remaining 5 minutes.
Mr. Levin: Madam President, that Saddam Hussein is a threat, must agree to inspections and be disarmed is something on which I hope we all agree. The only question here is: What is the best way to do that? Do we do that by going to the world community, as the President has, and saying we want the world community to enforce its resolution relative to weapons of mass destruction? And do we mean it? Do we go there, and are we serious when we say to them: We want you to act because it makes a difference, when force is used, as to whether or not it has the credibility and strength of the United Nations and the world community behind it? It makes a difference.
It did not make a difference in Kosovo. It makes a difference here. The ramifications of going it alone here are major. In the short term, our troops are going to be more in danger if we go it alone without the U.N. authorization.
We have been told by the Saudis and other countries we are not going to have access to their bases, their airspace, their support, unless there is a U.N. resolution. We have been informed of that.
We know that the war against terrorism can be weakened unless we act as a world community. We cannot act unilaterally and expect that other nations are going to join us in a war on terrorism the way they would if there were a U.N. resolution supporting it.
If we go it alone, there are both short-term risks as well as long- term risks. The long-term risks in going it alone are that without an imminent threat--if there is one, we can move in self-defense. No U.N. resolution is ever needed to act in self-defense. But to act without an imminent threat, to attack another nation, raises some significant precedent problems for other threatening parts of the world. India and Pakistan can easily say there is a continuing threat and use this kind of a precedent to justify attacking each other. That is not the kind of precedent we should set.
So there are real risks that we should recognize in using force unilaterally. We should see the advantage of doing this multilaterally with the support of the world community. We should go to the world community, focus all of our efforts there, and tell them we are serious.
We say we are. Let's mean it, not just say that we want them to be credible but mean it, and to tell them in advance: Oh, by the way, if you do not do it, we will anyway.
It takes them right off the hook. Instead of putting a focus on the need for world community action to authorize this action and the advantage of it, our focus becomes blurred. It is an inconsistent message to the world. Now it is a message of unilateralism. We say: We need you, but whether you do it or not, we are going it alone.
This resolution--and here I must say I agree with my friend from Arizona. He agrees with me that it would be better if we got authority from the U.N., and I am glad he does. And then when he says we must not delegate our security policy to the U.N., I agree with him. We never will; we never would. This resolution explicitly eliminates any such implication by the reiteration of the right to act in self-defense.
Mrs. Boxer: Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. Levin: I would be happy to yield for a question. How much time do I have remaining?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator has 50 seconds.
Mrs. Boxer: This is a quick question. Some of our colleagues on the other side have basically said the Senator is relying totally on the United Nations. I have read the Senator's resolution over and over. He is so clear on the point that at any time the President can take action in self-defense and, in addition, at any time the President can come back and make the case for unilateral action. Am I correct on that reading, that at any time he can come back and answer the questions he has yet to answer and lay out what it would mean to us to go it alone? Is that correct?
Mr. Levin: The Senator is very much correct. I thank the Senator for the support and for her kind words earlier this afternoon.
Madam President, is there any time remaining?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator has 3 seconds.
Mr. Levin: I yield back the entire length of my remaining time.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. Reid: Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Reid: Madam President, my good friend, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, has questioned some of the things I have done today. I am disappointed he feels that way.
Last night we worked for a long period of time. It was not a matter of minutes; it took a long time. The Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Arizona, the Senator from Connecticut, and others, including the people offering these amendments--I personally spent time on the phone calling Senators who had amendments. The result, after a long period of time, was that Senators who have amendments--Senator Boxer, Senator Durbin, Senator Levin, Senator Byrd--we worked out an arrangement where they could offer their amendments. Senator Dayton always was going to offer his amendment and he withdrew it and decided not to offer it. His was nongermane.
In an effort to get this done, we allowed some amendments to be voted on today that were nongermane. That is how compromises are made in legislation. As part of the deal, the Senators who had other amendments would withdraw those amendments. There was clearly never any question about that. It is in the Record last night, "and they will offer no other amendments tomorrow."
In the rush of things, they were not withdrawn last night. They should have been. They were not. Just like the problem we had with Senator Byrd today, he understood there was a unanimous consent request that had never been made that was in the Record.
First, we did not need consent to withdraw this. Every Senator had the right on their own to withdraw this. That is a right. They did not need unanimous consent.
My good friend who understands the rules as well as anyone here had the right at any time to file a first-degree amendment. For reasons he knows, he decided not to do so. He indicated he had second-degree amendments that he wanted to pin to some of the amendments, that the arrangements were made to not be part of the proceedings today.
I also say to my friend, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, he said: Well, I will not agree to any of your unanimous consent requests.
I don't make unanimous consent requests for me. Rarely. I bet out of 100 unanimous consent requests, there is not three-tenths of 1 percent that I make for myself. I will try during this vote and the rest of the evening to see if we can work something out for the Senator from Pennsylvania that will satisfy him. We always try to do that. Both the majority and the minority floor staffs work very hard. We will try to do that. I don't want him upset and disappointed.
I want the Record to indicate that what they did last night was for the good of this body. We did our best. It may not have been a perfect arrangement, but I think it was fair. Senators were allowed to offer an amendment and in exchange for that they withdrew the others. Technically, they didn't do that last night. I didn't do it on their behalf. We did it this morning. It is done. That was the fair thing to do.
I repeat for the second time that I will be happy to work with the Senator from Pennsylvania to see if we can arrive at the conclusion he wants. We will see what we can do.
Mr. McCain: Will the Senator yield?
Mr. Reid: I would be happy to yield.
Mr. McCain: Along with the Senator from Virginia, the Senator from West Virginia, and other Senators, negotiations were conducted in good faith, in fairness, with full consultation. Many, many Senators are unhappy that they were unable to perhaps propose more amendments or perhaps do other things.
I attest to the fact that the Senator from Nevada, fulfilling his duties of getting this legislation achieved with the consideration due every Senator, in my view, did a fair and unbiased job.
I thank the Senator.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. Warner: I associate myself with the----
Mr. Specter addressed the Chair.
Mr. Warner: The leader is to be recognized.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Virginia is the manager and is recognized.
Mr. Warner: I associate myself with the remarks of my colleague, Mr. McCain. I attest to the accuracy of the statement the Senator made.
I further add that the distinguished Republican leader, Mr. Lott, from time to time visited with the floor managers, so he, likewise, was very much aware of the procedures.
Mr. Reid: I kept the majority leader advised of everything that we did.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Specter: Mr. President, I have sought recognition to respond to the Senator from Nevada, over the Senator from Virginia, because what the Senator from Virginia has said and what the Senator from Arizona has said does not bear on this issue.
I am not upset. I think I have been treated unfairly. I did not offer a first-degree amendment to the so-called Biden-Lugar amendment because I had expected Senator Biden to offer that amendment. He did not do so up until 1 p.m. yesterday. Having found that out, I consulted with the Parliamentarian and found out that I could offer a second-degree amendment to some seven pending first-degree amendments. I worked it out very carefully and elaborately with the Parliamentarian this morning. The word was out that I was offering the Biden-Lugar amendment.
Other Members of the Senate from the other side of the aisle approached me, liked the fact I was doing it, and wanted an opportunity to vote on it. I got a call from a ranking member of the State Department saying the White House was concerned that I offered the amendment. The word was out that I had moved ahead to offer the Biden- Lugar amendment as a second-degree amendment. I had done that because, after extensive conversations with Senator Biden last week, I had decided to cosponsor it. When it was not offered, I decided to offer it. I was under no illusion of its being successful. It seemed to me on a matter of this importance, going to war, that matter ought to be before the Senate. So I worked it out. When I walked off the floor, I was told by an aide that the Senator from Nevada had asked unanimous consent to withdraw not only the Levin amendment, the Durbin amendment, and the Boxer amendment, but also the Dayton amendment. That was done in my absence. I thought that was unfair. I approached the Senator from Nevada and said so. It seems to me that I ought to have an opportunity to offer that amendment.
Now, I read the Record from last night that is referred to with respect to three of the Senators, Senator Levin, Senator Boxer, and Senator Durbin. Senator Dayton is not mentioned. I know he has the right to withdraw the amendment. Senator Dayton does not like the resolution. Perhaps he would not have. There is an issue as to whether Senator Dayton's amendment was germane. I am advised by the Parliamentarian that my second-degree amendment being germane cures whatever infirmity there may be on the Dayton first-degree amendment.
I have been in this body for 22 years, and I do not think I have objected to any unanimous consent agreement. However, there are plenty of Senators who do. I am not talking about the percentage the Senator from Nevada offers on his own behalf. This is part of my objection to the way this entire debate is being run. There is cloture filed. I understand the rules. Seventh-five Senators voted against it. I have already heard comments from some who voted against it who are sorry they did so.
We are about to go to war and a Senator does not have a right to offer an amendment. A unanimous consent agreement is asked in my absence and I do not think that is fair.
I yield the floor.
Mr. Warner: I ask for the yeas and nays.
The Presiding Officer: Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The Presiding Officer: The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin:
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. Nickles: I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett) is necessarily absent.
The Presiding Officer (Mr. Nelson of Nebraska). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 24, nays 75, as follows:
| Roll Cal vote No. 235 Leg | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| YEAS--24 | ||||
| Akaka | Bingaman | Boxer | Byrd | Chafee |
| Conrad | Corzine | Dayton | Durbin | Feinstein |
| Harkin | Inouye | Jeffords | Kennedy | Kohl |
| Leahy | Levin | Mikulski | Reed | Rockefeller |
| Sarbanes | Stabenow | Wellstone | Wyden | |
| Nays--75 | ||||
| Allard | Allen | Baucus | Bayh | Biden |
| Bond | Breaux | Brownback | Bunning | Burns |
| Campbell | Cantwell | Carnahan | Carper | Cleland |
| Clinton | Cochran | Collins | Craig | Crapo |
| Daschle | DeWine | Dodd | Domenici | Dorgan |
| Edwards | Ensign | Enzi | Feingold | Fitzgerald |
| Frist | Graham | Gramm | Grassley | Gregg |
| Hagel | Hatch | Helms | Hollings | Hutchinson |
| Hutchison | Inhofe | Johnson | Kerry | Kyl |
| Landrieu | Lieberman | Lincoln | Lott | Lugar |
| McCain | McConnell | Miller | Murkowski | Murray |
| Nelson (FL) | Nelson (NE) | Nickles | Reid | Roberts |
| Santorum | Schumer | Sessions | Shelby | Smith (NH) |
| Smith (OR) | Snowe | Specter | Stevens | Thomas |
| Thompson | Thurmond | Torricelli | Voinovich | Warner |
| NOT VOTING--1 | ||||
| Bennett | ||||
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: It is the understanding of the Senator from Virginia that the Durbin amendment is next under the order.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator is correct.
Mr. Warner: And will the Chair state the allocation of time?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Illinois controls 40 minutes; the Senator from Delaware, Mr. Biden, controls 10 minutes; and Senators Warner and McCain share 15 minutes.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, we are ready to proceed. I would like to just address the Senate momentarily, and I say to my distinguished friend and floor leader, that on this side, the following Senators have indicated a desire for some time to speak: Senator DeWine, Senator Collins, Senator Specter, Senator Sessions, Senator Ensign, Senator Smith, Senator McConnell, Senator Gramm, Senator Fitzgerald, and Senator Shelby.
Now, we have progressed very well through this debate to allocate the speakers going from one side to the other. I would hope we could do that. And in due course we could work together, I say to my good friend, who has been so helpful to move this piece of legislation, to get a UC to put speakers in line so as to sequence the times so that Senators can go about their duties today on other matters more conveniently.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. Reid: Mr. President, I say to my friend from Virginia, we also have a list of people who want to speak. Under the rules, we have 30 hours postcloture. We have used some of that time today. We have 100 Senators. A number of Senators have already spoken. I have looked at our list. I heard the Senator briefly mention his list. I would hope those Senators who have already spoken would allow some who have not the opportunity to speak. But that is a personal choice they have to make.
During this next debate, I will be happy to direct our floor staff, as you will, to see if we can work out--I think if we do more than four at a time, it creates a problem. So we will work on that and see if we can come up with some speakers after we dispose of this next amendment.
Mr. Warner: I thank the leader. So we shall work together.
Senator McCain and I will require additional time on this side, both of us, to address various issues. Having managed the bill, there are areas of this debate we believe need to be put in the proper context in which questions arose and were answered.
Mr. Reid: After the two leaders, you have the right of first recognition, so you would certainly be able to do that.
Mr. Warner: If I understand, I say to my leader, following disposition of the Durbin amendment, the parliamentary situation is that we are now on the balance of the 30 hours remaining under cloture; am I correct?
Mr. Reid: Since cloture was invoked this morning. I don't remember exactly when it was invoked.
Mr. Warner: About 11:10 is my recollection.
Mr. Reid: The 30 hours started running at that time.
The Presiding Officer: The time was 11:38 a.m.
Mr. Warner: Just to inform Senators what the parliamentary situation is.
I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: Under the previous order, the Senator from Illinois is recognized to offer an amendment.
Mr. Durbin: Mr. President, if I am not mistaken, the Senator from Mississippi was seeking unanimous consent to speak at this time. I yield to him before I call up the amendment.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. Cochran: Mr. President, over the last several years the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services has monitored weapons systems development in Iraq and elsewhere. We have held numerous public hearings on the threat these developments pose to our national security.
For the information of all Senators, I am putting in the Record an unclassified description of the subcommittee's findings from the testimony presented to us by the intelligence agencies at our hearings. I firmly believe we are confronted with a dangerous threat to our forces who are now deployed in that area of the world. I am also convinced the President has outlined a strategy for dealing with this threat and with the dangers faced by our homeland which involves the United Nations and the Congress in the decisionmaking process, and we should support him.
This support would be clearly illustrated by approval of the Lieberman-Warner-McCain amendment. We should let our friends and adversaries alike know that, as a nation, we are united in our resolve to do whatever is necessary to protect our national security and the safety of our citizens, including the use of military force.
I ask unanimous consent that the outline of findings from my subcommittee which I described be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Facts About Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Iraq's program to develop weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them has been underway for over three decades. Although it suffered setbacks during and immediately after the Gulf War, the program has since been reconstituted and has achieved significant progress in recent years. The following key facts about Iraq's program to acquire and employ weapons of mass destruction are drawn from publications and testimony of intelligence officials.
In an October 2002 report entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," the Central Intelligence Agency reached these key judgments:
Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Iraq has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.
Iraq hides large portions of its WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf War starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny the world information about its programs.
Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons efforts, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled.
Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.
Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.
How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.
If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.
Iraq has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced during United Nations inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf War, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.
Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of chemical weapon (CW) agents.
The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess chemical agents for ballistic missile warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds.
All key aspects--R&D, production, and weaponization--of Iraq's offensive biological weapon (BW) program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.
Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, Scud missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the U.S. Homeland.
Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf War.
Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.
Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggests that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 short- range ballistic missiles, which are capable of flying beyond the U.N.-authorized 150-km range limit.
Iraq's UAVs, especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents, could threaten its neighbors, U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the U.S. Homeland.
Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.
Iraq's effort to extend the reach of its ballistic missile force is not limited to medium-range missiles capable of striking its immediate neighbors. Iraq has pursued long-range ballistic missiles in the past and has even tested a rudimentary space launch vehicle (SLV).
In testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Robert Walpole, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs stated, "Iraq's goals of becoming the predominant regional power, and its hostile relations with many of its neighbors, are the key drivers behind Iraq's ballistic missile program."
According to the Department of Defense's report "Proliferation: Threat and Response," Iraq in December 1988 attempted to launch the Al Abid 3-stage space launch vehicle, which used 5 Scud missiles clustered together as a first stage.
The Intelligence Community's unclassified summary of the "National Intelligence Estimate on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015" states:
After observing North Korean missile development the past few years, Iraq would be likely to pursue a three-stage Taepo Dong-2 [TD-2] approach to a ICBM, or space-launched vehicle, which would be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon-sized payload to the United States.
Iraq could develop and test a Taepo Dong-2-type system within about ten years of a decision to do so.
If Iraq could buy a TD-2 from North Korea, it could have a launch capability within a year or two of a purchase.
It could develop and test a TD-1-type [Taepo Dong-1] system, within a few years.
Iraq could attempt before 2015 to test a rudimentary long- range missile based on its failed Al-Abid SLV . . .
If it acquired No Dongs from North Korea, it could test an ICBM within a few years of acquisition by clustering and staging the No Dongs--similar to the clustering of Scuds for the Al-Abid SLV.
Mr. Cochran: I thank the distinguished Senator from Illinois.
