The Presiding Officer: Who yields time?
Mr. Levin: I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from California.
Mrs. Boxer: Mr. President, I thank Senator Carl Levin for his amendment. I thank the State of Michigan for sending Senator Levin to the Senate. His independence, his courage, his clear thinking, his love of country are evident in the work he has put behind this important amendment. I believe his answer to Iraq's challenge is, indeed, the right course for this country.
To me, the issue of Iraq should be approached in the following way. Iraq must be held to its word that it will submit to thorough inspections and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction. Let me repeat that: Iraq must be held to its word that it will submit to thorough inspections and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction.
The United Nations should pass an updated resolution ensuring unfettered inspections and disarmament, and that should take place or there will be dire consequences for Iraq. The weapons they have are a threat to the world. The world must respond. If we handle this matter correctly, the way Senator Levin is suggesting, I believe the world will respond. If we handle it wrong--and I think the underlying resolution is the wrong approach--if our allies believe we have not made the case, they believe somehow this is a grudge match, or if they believe they are being manipulated for domestic political reasons, that is going to hurt our Nation and that is going to isolate us.
Indeed, this rush to pass unilateral authority--I have never seen anything quite like what has happened in the Senate. The rush to pass unilateral authority, the rush to say to the President, go it alone, don't worry about anybody else, is hurting this debate, and this debate looks political. It looks political.
If there are those in the administration who believe this debate could hurt Democrats, they may be surprised. Democrats do not walk in lockstep. We are independent thinking. I believe the people want that.
Remember, this administration started out thumbing its nose at the Constitution and the role of Congress in terms of war and peace. This administration did not want to bring the debate on this war to Congress. We have many quotes I have already put in the Record on that subject. They did not want the President to go to the United Nations. Indeed, they said he did not have to go there; he did not have to come here; he did not have to do anything. Also, as The Presiding Officer knows, they wanted a resolution that gave the authority far beyond Iraq. They wanted to give the President authority to go anywhere in the world.
Now that idea is gone from the underlying Lieberman resolution. So checks and balances do work. I think what we ought to do is continue those checks and balances by passing the Levin amendment.
The Levin amendment puts America front and center in a way that will win over the civilized world. This is what it does.
No. 1, it urges the U.N. Security Council to quickly adopt a resolution for inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the dismantlement of those weapons.
No. 2, this new U.N. Security Council resolution urges that we will back up the resolution with the use of force, including the United States. And the President gets that authority in Senator Levin's resolution.
No. 3, it reaffirms that, under international law and the United Nations Charter, the United States has the inherent right to self- defense. So anybody who says, my God, we are giving everything over to the U.N., has not read the resolution.
Last, it states the Congress will not adjourn sine die so that in a moment's notice we can return if the President believes we need to go it alone.
Some have said that the Levin amendment, again, gives veto power to the U.N. Security Council. That is not true. Again, under the Levin amendment, if the President cannot secure a new U.N. resolution that will ensure disarmament of Iraq, he can come back, he can lay out the case and answer the questions that have not been answered.
I have looked back through history. I never have seen a situation where the President of the United States asked for the ability to go to war alone and yet has not told the American people what that would mean. How many troops would be involved? How many casualties might there be? Would the U.S. have to foot the entire cost of using force against Iraq? If not, which nations are ready to provide financial support? Troop support? What will the cost be to rebuild Iraq? How long would our troops have to stay there? What if our troops become a target for terrorists?
We have seen in Kuwait, a very secure place for our people; we have had terrorist incidents already against our young people there.
Will weapons of mass destruction be launched against our troops? Against Israel? If you read the CIA declassified report--declassified report--they are telling us that the chance that he will use them is greater if he feels his back is up against the wall. Everybody knows the underlying resolution implies regime change. It implies regime change. What I think is important about the Levin resolution is that it goes to the heart, the core of the matter, which is dismantlement of the weapons of mass destruction.
If Saddam knows his back is against the wall, he will use these.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator has 1 minute remaining.
Mrs. Boxer: I thank the President.
So let's be careful. Why not take the conservative approach, the two- step approach of the Levin resolution, when it comes to the life and death of our people? There are more questions that have not been answered, and I have put them in the Record. Yet the President wants the authority to go it alone and he has not answered even one of those questions to Members of this Senate, let alone to the American people.
I cannot vote for a blank check for unilateral action. I cannot vote for a go-it-alone approach before any of these fundamental questions have been answered. Twice in the past 4 years I voted to use force: once against Milosevic, once after September 11. So it is not that this Senator will never vote for force, but in this case, when the President is proposing to go it alone, I think we have the right on behalf of the people we represent to have the questions answered.
In closing, the Levin resolution gives us that two-step approach. It says to this President: If you want to go as part of a world force and make sure that we get the dismantlement of these weapons, we give you the authority and the blessing. If not, come back and ask us and we will debate then and we will vote then. I hope we will vote for the Levin resolution.
I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: Who yields time? The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCain: I understand I have 15 minutes.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator is correct.
Mr. McCain: Mr. President, at the outset, let me state that I agree with the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee: U.S. policy would be stronger if we received the unequivocal support of the United Nations Security Council. Of that, there is no doubt.
But that does not mean that our country must delegate our national security decisionmaking to the United Nations. It is neither morally necessary nor wise to give the U.N. Security Council veto power over our security.
I am a supporter of the United Nations. I have supported efforts to pay U.S. arrears to the organization. The U.N. does many good deeds around the world.
However, we should not kid ourselves: the Security Council is not a repository of moral goodness. It is not some supranational authority on international law, world peace or transnational justice. It is a collection of nation-states, each of whom makes decisions based on their national interests. Five nations have veto power. Ten more can vote up or down, or abstain on a given matter. Individual states may cloak their decisions in grand rhetoric of global interest, but they are driven by cool calculations of self-interest.
As my friend from Michigan knows, the atmosphere before a Security Council vote often resembles a Middle Eastern bazaar more than it does a somber courtroom. Deals are cut, resolutions are watered down, and statements are made based on the national interests of the five permanent Security Council members. That is as it should be, but we should not fool ourselves that there is some innate moral authority once 15 nations negotiate a deal.
Russia is engaged in vicious human rights abuses in Chechnya. Russia continues to undermine the sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia. Russia is owed billions of dollars from its ill-advised arms deals with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Russia has long advocated easing and even lifting of sanctions against Iraq. Russia abstained on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284 in December 1999, creating the current weapons inspections regime in Iraq--apparently because it believed the regime was too tough.
China also abstained from supporting U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284. China has good reason to be concerned about international opinion. China has engaged in serious proliferation activities. China severely represses its own people. Gaining the diplomatic acquiescence of the People's Republic of China may be desirable but it does not add any moral stature to our position.
And then there is France. France has armed Saddam Hussein for years. French President Chirac was Prime Minister when France sold a nuclear reactor to Iraq. In the words of the former head of Iraq's nuclear program, Khidhir Hamza, Saddam "knew Chirac would eat old tires from the Tigris if it got him our nuclear deal, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, along with the prospect of cheap oil."
For years, French businessmen have been regular visitors to Baghdad, seeking commercial advantage despite U.N. sanctions. No one in this body should be under any illusions about French motivations.
If President Bush and his team can gain French, Chinese and Russian support for a strong U.N. Security Council resolution, I applaud them. Recent signs are promising. Their support will help in the political and diplomatic realms. But their support will not make our case more just, or more right.
In fact, the U.S. position in making progress at the U.N. precisely because of our determination. If this body were to pass the Levin amendment, we would set our cause back in New York. We would send a signal of indecision that would embolden those who oppose a tough resolution. They would see that the U.S. Senate is deferring judgment to them, virtually inviting them to harden their opposition to the U.S. position.
Let me address some real concerns I have about the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague. It urges the U.N. Security Council to adopt a particular resolution--one limited solely to inspectors' access to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. I don't think we should try to put the U.S. Senate in the role of drafting the parameters of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Such a unilateral position by one legislative body in one U.N. member state seems a little bit out of keeping with his oft-stated desire for multilateralism.
The U.N. Security Council resolution urged by the Levin amendment is silent on the real issues facing the U.S. government in New York right now. Does the amendment accept or reject the U.N. Secretary General's 1998 deal with Saddam Hussein to leave huge swaths of Iraqi territory under separate rules? Does the amendment take a position on the need to interview Iraqi scientists outside of Saddam's control--and with their families so the regime cannot hold them hostage?
The Levin amendment is silent about many issues raised in U.N. Security Council resolutions--issues that the U.N. Security Council may see fit to address in the future as they have in the past: support for terrorism; threatening conventional military moves against Kuwait, and protection of the Iraqi people from Saddam's tyranny. Each of these has been addressed by U.N. Security Council resolutions in the past. Each of these has been addressed by the United States in the past. Why are they ignored in the Levin amendment.
Even more troubling is the narrow authorization for the use of force in the Levin amendment. Right now, American and British pilots are risking their lives enforcing the northern and southern no fly zones in Iraq. They are being shot at. They are defending themselves by attacking Iraqi radar and SAM sites that target them. These zones were erected to prevent Saddam from continuing to slaughter the Iraqi people--not to engage in search and destroy mission for weapons of mass destruction. They are authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, passed on April 5, 1991. By omitting any reference to the ongoing Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch, one could construe the Levin amendment to not authorizing no fly zone enforcement. I am sure that is not its intent, but it could be its effect.
The same is true of U.N. Security Council Resolution 949, passed on October 15, 1994, which prohibits Saddam from reinforcing his conventional forces in southern Iraq. This resolution was necessitated by Saddam's massing of thousands of troops--including at least two Republican Guard divisions--near the Iraq-Kuwait border. By limiting the authorization to only weapons of mass destruction, the Levin amendment's silence on the conventional threat to Kuwait could send the wrong signal to Iraq and undermine existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. Again, I am sure that is not its intent but it may be the effect.
Finally, there is the issue of what to do if the U.N. Security Council does not act. It may be, at the end of the day, that the individual nations making decisions in the U.N. Security Council do not agree with the compelling case that President Bush has laid out. It may be that they will decide that U.N. Security Council resolutions are not to be enforced, that the worst violator of U.N. Security Council resolutions should not be confronted. It may be that other nations choose to appease, accommodate, or ignore the clear and present danger posed by Iraq. Under the Levin amendment, what is the United States to do if the U.N. proves to be as unable to deal with Iraq as it was to deal with genocide in Rwanda and mass murder in Bosnia committed under the nose of U.N. peacekeepers?
Under the Levin amendment, Congress would reconvene to "consider promptly proposals relative to Iraq if in the judgment of the President, the U.N. Security Council fails to adopt or enforce the resolution" called for in the amendment. It is not sufficient to claim the Levin amendment affirms the U.S. right of self-defense and, therefore, there is not U.N. veto. If the U.N. vetoes action on Iraq, Congress will come back to "consider proposals." Why? Why should we not decide now about the issue? Why should we wait and see?
Does the Senator believe the administration is pursuing the wrong resolution in New York? If he does, he should say so. Does the Senator believe the administration is not seriously committed to pursuing a resolution? If he does he should say so. But if he believes the U.S. is seriously pursuing a serious resolution in New York, there is no need for this amendment. Unless he wants to grant bargaining power to those who oppose the U.S. position in the U.N. or unless he disagrees with the U.S. position, there is not need for his amendment. The diplomatic process will continue. We may succeed. We may fail. But I believe we have enough information to act now. I believe we do not need to wait for the U.N. to act. I believe that even if the U.N. does not act, America should--as we did in Kosovo in 1999.
The case of NATO's preventive attack in Kosovo is instructive. I supported the NATO intervention. It was an intervention designed to stop ethnic cleansing and mass murder by a government against its own people. Milosevic had no weapons of mass destruction. The threat he posed was to citizens in his country, not his neighbors. In Kosovo, the U.N. Security Council could not pass a resolution because of Russian opposition. Yet NATO, under U.S. leadership acted. Indeed, in 1998, Senator Levin noted with approval the Administration's position "that the Security Council's authorization was desirable but not required for NATO action to intervene in Kosovo." Remarks on the Senate floor, July 8, 1998. This was 8 months before hostilities began. This was before any serious effort had been made at the U.N. This was before any veto was cast. It seems to me that if my distinguished colleague from Michigan could reach that kind of judgment that far in advance concerning the use of force against a far less threatening adversary, he should be able to do the same today.
In summary, the Levin amendment sends the wrong signal at the wrong time. It could give a green light to Saddam to repress his own people or use conventional forces to Kuwait while giving a red light to our diplomatic efforts at the U.N. This body should allow the executive branch the leeway to conduct diplomacy at the U.N.--not try to micromange it from the Senate floor. I urge the rejection of the amendment.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The Presiding Officer (Mrs. Carnahan). The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. Levin: Madam President, I will yield myself 30 seconds to, first of all, assure my good friend from Arizona that my amendment means what it says, that we reserve the right of self-defense at all times. There is no ceding of our security policy to the United Nations. We are very explicit on that.
If I could also point out to my friend from Arizona, back in the gulf war time--and I will yield myself 30 additional seconds--the exact authorization in the gulf war was: The President is authorized, subject to such and such section, to use the Armed Forces of the United States pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions.
And my friend from Arizona said at that time: I think we should get approval from the United Nations to use force, if necessary. And we should then, and if it could be done shortly, get approval from Congress to use force, if necessary.
I am not suggesting--I am not suggesting--nor did I suggest then that the Senator from Arizona was ceding the policy of the United States to the United Nations just because he wanted to go to the United Nations first before we voted to get authority from the United Nations. I never suggested that because it was not true. He would never cede authority over our security policy to the United Nations, nor would I, nor would any Member of this body, nor does the resolution on which we are going to vote.
I yield 3 minutes to our friend from Maryland.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. Sarbanes: Madam President, I commend again the able Senator from Michigan for this proposal that he has before us. The strength of the proposal, and the care with which it has been crafted, is made manifest by the tortured argument of the Senators from Connecticut and Arizona against his resolution. They are in a convoluted posture to try to misinterpret this in order to try to make an argument against it. It is just incredible what has happened. We need some intellectual integrity here as we deal with this issue.
Let me ask the Senator from Michigan if he would answer a question or two.
The Senator from Connecticut said earlier that you were precluding the use of military force to exercise our inherent right of self- defense because we would have to have a United Nations resolution before, as I understand--before--we could exercise such force.
I read in your resolution a specific affirmation under international law of our inherent right to use military force; is that right?
Mr. Levin: The Senator is correct. It specifically "affirms that . . . the United States has at all times the inherent right to use military force in self-defense." It explicitly preserves that right.
Mr. Lieberman: Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. Sarbanes: On your time.
Mr. Lieberman: Is there time remaining, I ask the Senator from Arizona--the Senator from Virginia?
Mr. Warner: Yes. Madam President, may I inquire as to the remaining time of the Senator from Arizona?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Arizona has 3 minutes remaining.
Mr. Warner: Three minutes. And for the Senator from Virginia?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Virginia has 3 \1/2\ minutes.
Mr. Biden: Parliamentary inquiry, Madam President: How much time is under my control?
The Presiding Officer: Fifteen minutes.
Mr. Biden: Madam President, I would be happy to yield time for the Senator to respond.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. Lieberman: I thank the Senator from Delaware very much.
I want to ask my friend from Michigan or my friend from Maryland to explain how you relate two parts of the Levin amendment. One, yes, does say you affirm the right of the U.S. to self-defense, but then, two sections lower, it seems to me, you cut a very big exception, and you say "pursuant." And because you say "pursuant," I assume it means only pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution can the President authorize the use of "the Armed Forces of the United States to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, ballistics missiles . . . and related facilities. . . ."
So it is one thing to affirm the general right of self-defense, but then the amendment takes it away with regard to what we all acknowledge is the most serious threat that Iraq constitutes to the U.S., which is weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Sarbanes: The Senator did this last night, and he is doing it again today. He has inserted into the authorization to use force pursuant to a U.N. resolution the word "only." The word "only" is not there. These are two separate sections. One provides an authority under a U.N. resolution; the other preserves the inherent right of military--I want to say to my good friend from Connecticut, it is painful to me to see a former able and distinguished attorney general of the State of Connecticut twist and turn to try to do this, what he is trying to do, to the very well-crafted amendment of the Senator from Michigan. It is painful. It is painful to see this.
Mr. Lieberman: Well, let me relieve you of your pain.
Mr. Sarbanes: Will you withdraw the use of the word "only"?
Mr. Lieberman: This comes directly from my experience as an attorney and attorney general. If you are saying "pursuant," how else--I ask the Senator from Michigan, do you believe, under your amendment, and if there is no resolution of the United Nations regarding destruction of weapons of mass destruction of Iraq, that the President could authorize the use of force?
Mr. Sarbanes: Of course.
Mr. Levin: Of course he could. Pursuant to----
Mr. Lieberman: Then why require that the President come back a second time to seek such authorization?
Mr. Levin: Because we are explicitly saying, pursuant to the right of self-defense, he may always, at any time, without authority from anybody. But the United Nations----
The Presiding Officer: The 3 minutes yielded to the Senator from Maryland has expired.
Mr. Levin: I wonder if the Senator from Delaware would yield a couple minutes for me to answer.
Mr. Biden: I am happy to.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. Levin: This is a grant of authority. The word "only" is not in there. The Senator from Connecticut sought to add it last night.
Mr. Sarbanes: And again here.
Mr. Lieberman: And I am adding it----
Mr. Levin: If I could finish my answer, when the Senator from Connecticut, in 1991, introduced and supported a resolution, which passed this Congress in a close vote--and the Senator from Connecticut was a leader in that effort; and I commend him for it--the resolution relative to the gulf war said:
The President is authorized subject to this subsection to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.
Did that mean because that grant of authority pursuant to a U.N. resolution was present, that the President could not operate in self- defense? Did you, somehow or other, by granting that right intend to eliminate the right of this Nation to act in self-defense? I know the answer is no. I know the answer is no.
Yet in our resolution, when we explicitly preserve that right, somehow or other the Senator from Connecticut is finding it inconsistent with the pursuant grant.
Mr. Lieberman: Since the Senator from Maryland has questioned my legal capacity, I want to----
Mr. Sarbanes: I said it just pained me to see it at work here on the floor.
Mr. Lieberman: I want to assure the Senator from Maryland----
The Presiding Officer: Who yields time at this point?
Mr. Biden: Madam President, how much time is under the control of the Senator from Delaware?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator has 13 minutes remaining.
Mr. Lieberman: I will bring this to a close.
Mr. Biden: Madam President, I will yield 2 more minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. Lieberman: I want to assure the Senator from Maryland this is not a tactic. I am genuinely puzzled, for two reasons.
You give the grant of authority, and then you say "pursuant." It seems to me logical the grant of self-defense, and then you spell out that pursuant to only a U.N. resolution can the President use the Armed Forces. But then here is the second. Only----
Mr. Levin: Only?
Mr. Sarbanes: Where is the word "only"?
If the Senator will yield to me, I think the Senator----
Mr. Lieberman: No. I think I will just finish because I am taking Senator Biden's time.
I am reassured but still puzzled about why you then have the second part of your amendment, I say to Senator Levin. And it is this: If you believe you are not saying the "only" way the President can use America's military forces to disarm Iraq, then why do you require a return to the Congress for that authorization later?
It seems to me your affirmation of self-defense is very broad, and in spelling out the pursuant clause, you are limiting it. If you are not, then your language is effectively a nullity.
Mr. Levin: It is a very significant section. What it says is, if the President does not get the resolution and if he cannot act in self- defense because the threat is not imminent, then he would come back to this Congress to seek unilateral authority. What the President has done is laid out a course of action which says even though the threat is not imminent, the President wants the authority to use unilateral action.
As a matter of fact, the amendment which will be offered later on today by Senator Durbin will add the word "imminent." I am quite sure the administration and the sponsors of the underlying amendment are going to fight very hard against adding that word "imminent" which has always, under international law, been required in order to attack based on a theory of self-defense.
So all our language does is protect the opportunity for the President, in the absence of a threat which rises to self-defense, an imminent threat which would justify self-defense, in the absence of a U.N. resolution, it specifically says, we are not going to adjourn sine die. This is too important.
If there is no threat that is imminent, if the U.N. does not act pursuant to this resolution, we would say to the President, we will come back to consider a unilateral authority. You don't need it, if it is self-defense. You don't need it, if the U.N. acts. But if it is not an imminent threat and the U.N. does not act, then we will be here to consider that request.
Mr. Lieberman: I thank my friend. This exchange has clarified for me the intentions of the amendment. If I may briefly state it, you are saying the President can only take--forgive me for using the word "only," but I will clarify it--action against, can only use the Armed Forces of the U.S. to take action against the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq without a U.N. resolution if he determines the threat from those weapons is imminent.
Mr. Levin: Is not imminent.
Mr. Lieberman: If he determines the threat is not imminent, then he cannot take action against those weapons without the U.N. resolution, unless he returns to the Senate.
Mr. Levin: We are not saying what he cannot do here. This is an authority, if I may repeat.
I assume this is coming out of the time of the Senator from Delaware; is that correct?
The Presiding Officer: Yes.
Mr. Biden: Then I will not yield any more time. How much time do I have?
The Presiding Officer: Who yields time?
Mr. Biden: If I may, how much time remains under my control?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator has 9 minutes.
Mr. Biden: I yield another 2 minutes to the Senator to finish his answer, but then I would want to speak briefly to this, if I may.
Mr. Levin: If I could complete that thought, this is a grant of authority. It is not a limitation of authority. That is a critical difference which, as lawyers, I think we understand. We are not saying what the President cannot do. We are saying nothing in here is in any way affecting the inherent right of self-defense. We are reiterating the inherent right of self-defense to avoid the kind of argument the Senator from Connecticut is now making, to preclude the argument. It has not worked. The Senator from Connecticut is still making the argument. But to make it clear that in no way are we affecting the inherent right of self-defense, we reiterated that right.
Secondly, there is a grant of authority to act pursuant to a U.N. resolution.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator has used an additional minute.
Mr. Levin: Could I have 30 seconds?
Mr. Biden: Sure.
Mr. Levin: If there is neither an imminent threat, which has been the traditional definition of self-defense, if there is neither a threat which is imminent, which would justify traditionally acting in self- defense, or if there is not a U.N. resolution authorizing member states to use force to go with those weapons of mass destruction, then we are saying we will be in session to consider a Presidential request.
The Presiding Officer: The additional time has been used.
Mr. Sarbanes: Will the Senator yield me 10 seconds?
Mr. Biden: Madam President, I yield myself 3 minutes of the remaining 9 minutes I have, and I yield 10 seconds of that to my friend from Maryland.
Mr. Sarbanes: I thank the Senator from Delaware.
I strongly commend the Senator from Michigan for how carefully thought-out and reasoned and constructive his amendment is, as was just reflected in the exchange which he had with the Senator from Connecticut.
Obviously, this amendment, which is before us and which I support, has been very carefully thought through to deal with all these eventualities. I commend the Senator from Michigan for it.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. Biden: Madam President, I rise to explain why three brilliant lawyers can be all right at the same time--because they all started from a different premise, part of the confusion for the debate that listeners will find on the floor.
I join my friend from Arizona and my friend from Virginia in being opposed to this amendment, but for reasons different than theirs. Let me try to explain as briefly as I can.
The point about whether or not there needs to be an imminent threat to justify the President taking action is what is at stake. I am of the school that suggests the President need not, if the underlying amendment passes, have to show there is an imminent threat. He is enforcing a peace agreement in effect. He is enforcing, not preempting. And he is not responding to imminent threat.
I do not believe there is an imminent threat in the next day or two or week or a month. The reason why I oppose my friend from the State of Michigan is because I believe there is an inevitable threat. We are either going to have to react, if not tomorrow, we will have to in the next 5 years. If this man is unfettered, with $2 billion per year in revenues, on the course he is on, I guarantee you, we will be responding. I guarantee you, we will.
Is it imminent now? No. Is al-Qaida involved now? No. Is all this talk about the likelihood of cooperation with terrorist groups a real immediate threat? No. I don't believe any of that now. But I do know we are going to have to address it. So the question is, do we address it now or do we wait a year or two or three.
The reason I oppose the amendment of my friend from Michigan is because the basic premise upon which I began is consistent with where my friend from Connecticut began, and that is the threat need not be imminent for us to take action. That is because we would be enforcing Security Council resolutions. That is authority we are about to delegate to the President.
I can understand why my friend from Maryland is upset about the way it is characterized by the Senator from Connecticut.
The bottom line is I believe if, in fact, we do not get a U.N. resolution, we are in a position we were in with regard to Kosovo. My friend from Arizona and I stood shoulder to shoulder on Kosovo trying to encourage the previous President of the United States to use force against the Serbs in Kosovo. I will submit for the Record at the appropriate time, after we had gone through an effort to get the U.N. to support it. The U.N. would not support it. And then we went.
The bottom line was, the Senator from Arizona and I felt strongly we had to go. We had to move. Were the Serbs an imminent threat to the United States of America? No. Was it a threat to our security interests? Yes. The stabilization of southeastern Europe. And so I think part of the thing that confuses people here--anyone listening to the debate, myself included, as part of the debate--is this notion of the place from which you began.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. Feingold: Mr. President, I rise to briefly comment on Senator Levin's alternative proposal relating to Iraq. Some of my colleagues for whom I have tremendous respect have tried to address the fact that the administration's proposal is simply not good enough by emphasizing the desirability of a United Nations resolution, thus transforming this dangerous unilateral proposal into an internationally sanctioned multilateral mission. But while I recognize that international support is a crucial ingredient in any recipe for addressing the weapons of mass destruction threat in Iraq without undercutting the fight against terrorism, I will not and cannot support any effort to give the United Nations Security Council Congress's proxy in deciding whether or not to send American men and women into combat in Iraq. No Security Council vote can answer my questions about plans for securing WMD or American responsibilities in the wake of an invasion of Iraq. It is for this reason that I must oppose the proposal of the distinguished Senator from Michigan.
Mr. Corzine: Mr. President, I rise in support of the Levin amendment to the underlying resolution and am proud to be counted as a cosponsor. I believe Senator Levin's legislation represents a rational and measured approach to military action against Iraq's tyrannical regime.
The Levin amendment emphasizes the importance of multilateralism and understands that the cooperation of the world community is an important component of American success in disarming Iraq and in Iraq's eventual reconstruction. As I said in my statement last night, if the world community is not with us when we take off, it will be hard to ask for their help when we land.
Although the administration at times appears to believe otherwise, multilateralism is not an unnecessary inconvenience, but an important precondition for success not just for actions to disarm Iraq but more importantly is prosecuting our war on terrorism. We rely on other countries for logistics, intelligence, and overflight rights. We have called on other countries to help cover the costs of previous military engagements. And we rely on other countries to provide peacekeepers to help restore law and order around the globe, including most recently in Afghanistan. And we most certainly depend on the 90-odd countries in our global coalition to combat terrorism at home in the post 9-11 government.
However, if we adopt a unilateral approach, we undermine cooperation of the world community we have so often enjoyed.
Furthermore, the Levin amendment wisely stops short of codifying the Bush preemption doctrine, a dangerous and reckless new development in American foreign policy.
Many countries have adversaries who they believe present continuing threats, maybe even imminent threats, to their security. If we establish a precedent of preemption, how in the future can we criticize Russia for attacking Georgia, stop India from taking action against Pakistan, or oppose a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the court of world public opinion.
Nothing in the Levin amendment precludes unilateral action by the United States in self-defense where imminent and immediate threats exist. And nothing in the Levin amendment prevents the Congress from authorizing force at a later date if the U.N. does not take action.
I urge my colleagues to support the Levin amendment. I believe that it presents an excellent balance between the desire to contain and eliminate potential threats to American interests while demonstrating leadership in the post-cold-war world, and the value of devising a multilateral approach.
Thank you and I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCain: Madam President, I believe I have 3 minutes remaining. In all due respect to the Senator from Michigan, as Paul Harvey would say, "Let's hear the rest of the story." The reason I said in 1991 that the U.N. Security Council should approve it is because the U.N. Security Council had already acted and approved. Never, at any time in my entire history, would I believe we are dependent upon the good will or the approval or disapproval of the U.N. Security Council. So I resent, slightly, the Senator from Michigan taking me out of context there.
The fact is, in Kosovo, if we took the same course of action the Senator from Michigan is contemplating now, when butchery and genocide was going on there, we would have waited until the Security Council acted, or didn't act, and then we would have gone back into session to determine what we should do about Kosovo.
How many thousands of people would have been murdered, butchered, and ethnically cleansed had we taken the same route that the Senator from Michigan is advocating on this issue, as far as Iraq is concerned?
All I have to say about this amendment is--well, you can just read it:
. . . will not adjourn sine die and will return to session at any time before the next Congress convenes--
Et cetera, et cetera. If that isn't a dictate by the action of the U.N. Security Council, nothing is.
We have come a long way. John F. Kennedy, on October 22, 1962, said this:
This Nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace and our own proposals for a peaceful world at any time, and in any forum, in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful, without limiting our freedom of action.
The Levin amendment limits our freedom of action and contradicts the words of John F. Kennedy at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The Presiding Officer: Who yields time?
Mr. Levin: Madam President, I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Hawaii.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
Mr. Akaka: Mr. President, I rise to express my support for a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. I do so with two cardinal prerequisites: first, that all possible means be exhausted short of war to enforce United Nations resolutions concerning Iraq and, second, that any attack against Iraq take place as part of an international coalition. That is why I am pleased to cosponsor the amendment offered by my colleague from Michigan, Mr. Levin, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
Before the United States wages war against Iraq, President Bush and the Congress owe it to the young Americans who face death or injury in that conflict to ensure that every effort has been made to obtain our ends without endangering them. Every ounce of preparation must be taken to ensure a swift and efficient outcome should war become necessary. As another President, Herbert Hoover, once said, "Older men declare war. But it is youth that must fight and die." The burden is on our leaders to justify why young men and women need to risk their future now.
Defense analysts suggest that anywhere from 100,000 to 400,000 troops will be necessary for an attack. There are already approximately 75,000 Reservists and National Guard troops on active duty, and even more may be needed to deal with the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan while not degrading military missions elsewhere in the world. An occupation force in Iraq might require at least 75,000 troops plus a civilian counterpart to the military presence. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the war will cost between $6 billion to $9 billion a month on top of an initial deployment cost of $9 billion to $13 billion and that an occupation force would cost $1 billion to $4 billion per month. Remember in the first Persian Gulf War, it was our allies who paid for the war. The cost of the war this time will be borne largely by the American treasury, unless we are supported by an international coalition. With a battered economy, it will be difficult to fund two wars at once for an indefinite period of time. Already our funds are stretched. The head of the U.S. Special Operations Command has indicated that he requires an additional $23 billion over the next 5 years to maintain his global responsibilities.
The need to justify such a course of action is particularly critical in the case of Iraq as President Bush is advocating a preemptive strike against a potential threat to the American homeland. Traditionally, America has never sought war by striking first nor has America eagerly sought foreign entanglements. This would be a preemptive war and one in which we could have few allies. Not since the Spanish-American War would the United States be fighting a war so far from our borders with so few friends.
As we consider this war, we must also consider the implications of what we are doing. Saddam Hussein is not the only dictator who oppresses his people, attacks his neighbors, and is developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). North Korea's Kim Jong Il, Libya's Muammar Qadhafi, Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei, Syria's Bashar al- Asad, and others, all pose threats or have posed threats to American interests. All are known for their human rights abuses.
American troops stand eye to eye with North Korean troops on the DMZ. Libyan agents blew up an American commercial aircraft; Iran has imprisoned American diplomats; and Syria has supported terrorist groups who have attacked and murdered Americans. All have or are developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them. Some of these countries may already have nuclear weapons. Some have attacked--directly or indirectly through support for terrorist groups--their neighbors. In the case of Iran, recent reports indicate that it is sheltering and assisting al-Qaida leaders.
In the case of other countries, we are working diligently, through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, to constrain their efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. However, in regard to Iraq, the President argues that Saddam poses a unique threat. His argument is convincing concerning the extent of devastation that Saddam has wreaked on his own people and his neighbors. He is truly, as the President notes, a "homicidal dictator," but he is not the only dictator addicted to developing weapons of mass destruction. Nor is the policy solely a choice between invading Iraq or standing hopelessly by while Saddam becomes ever stronger. Since the Persian Gulf War, we and our allies have worked to make Saddam weaker and, according to all reports, including that of our own military, Saddam's military capability is much less now than it was in 1991.
Congressional testimony, reports by the intelligence community and outside analysts, state that Iraq's WMD capability is much less now than it was before the Gulf War. A recent CIA public report states that Iraq's chemical weapons capability "is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war . . . " Although it is probable that Iraq's biological weapons program is more advanced than it was before the war, its delivery capability, according to the respected London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, "appears limited."
I agree that we must neutralize Iraq's WMD threat. The question is how to do that most effectively while minimizing the loss in American lives. The argument that an inspection system cannot guarantee the elimination of Iraq's WMD program is certainly true but misses the point. There are few absolutes in this world. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld insists that we need American troops on the ground, rummaging through every Iraqi nook and cranny for evidence of WMD. Even with our troops doing so, there would be no guarantee that every item would be uncovered or how long it would take. We are still finding traces of chemical weapons left over from World War I in the backyards of homes in Washington, D.C. Nor have our troops in Afghanistan, despite heroic efforts, been able to eradicate every al-Qaida operative.
But what aggressive inspections can do is destabilize the Iraqi WMD program, keep it bottled up, frustrate efforts at gaining new technologies and additional supplies, and force Iraqi technicians to hide and keep moving constantly. It will not be disarmament, but, if implemented effectively, it will be dismemberment of the Iraqi WMD program, splitting it in parts and preventing it from becoming whole.
A new inspection regime has to be very aggressive, receive considerable support from the United States and its allies, have a fixed set of dates for marking compliance, and be backed by the threat of war. Iraq's record of evading inspections is well documented. Benchmarks for compliance will remove wiggle room for countries who argue for a softening of sanctions provisions. Putting in place an aggressive new inspection regime is not an insubstantial achievement, and it does not undermine necessary preparations to develop an effective war-fighting strategy and strengthen international backing for a conflict.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the administration tell us that time is not on our side. But we must make the time to ensure that we minimize American casualties. Time is not on Saddam Hussein's side either. Our patience has been exhausted and a new U.N. resolution must be firm in its deadlines. Some in the Administration believe Saddam's hold on those responsible for guarding him is so tenuous that in the event of an attack, they will turn on him and overthrow him.
The current discussion about Iraq has obscured the successes of American policy toward Iraq. A recent Congressional Research Service report by its distinguished Middle East expert, Kenneth Katzman, observes, the United States "has largely succeeded in preventing Iraq from reemerging as an immediate strategic threat to the region." A British Government intelligence report notes that the "success of U.N. restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process."
If war becomes inevitable because Iraq refuses to give inspectors the liberty they need to perform their mission, then the United States must have an effective military strategy for fighting a war.
Great uncertainty surrounds the President's post-war strategy. Remember the day the war ends, Iraq becomes our responsibility, our problem. The United States lacks strategic planning for a post-conflict situation. Retired General George Joulwan recently said that the U.S. needs "to organize for the peace" and design now a strategy with "clear goals, milestones, objectives." General Joulwan argues we did not have such a plan for Bosnia and we are late to develop one in Afghanistan. Our objectives in Iraq have not yet been made clear: is it our goal to occupy Baghdad and if so, for how long? A rush to battle without a strategy to win the peace is folly.
General Hoar observed that "there has been scant discussion about what will take place after a successful military campaign against Iraq. The term "regime change" does not adequately describe the concept of what we expect to achieve as a result of a military campaign in Iraq. One would ask the question, "Are we willing to spend the time and treasure to rebuild Iraq and its institution after fighting, if we go it alone during a military campaign? Who will provide the troops, the policemen, the economists, the politicians, the judicial advisors to start Iraq on the road to democracy? Or are we going to turn the country over to another thug, who swears fealty to the United States?"
As General Shalikashvili stated in testimony before the Armed Services Committee, "we were very fortunate in Afghanistan that in fact a government, interim government, emerged that seemed to have a modicum of support from its people. . . . We should not count on being lucky twice." Nor can we count on Iraq's oil funding reconstruction if wellheads are blown up as they were by retreating Iraqi forces in Kuwait.
Experts indicate that American troops will need to remain inside Iraq for many years in order to ensure stability. Iraq will require extensive economic assistance. As the current situation in Afghanistan indicates, the process of restoring viability to a nation--nation- building--after years of repression is a difficult one and made more difficult by the inability of other nations to sustain their support in the effort. Violent attacks are on the increase in Afghanistan. Afghan officials have received only about half of the $1.8 billion in aid promised last January. A study by the Army's Center of Military History has concluded that we would need to commit 300,000 peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan and 100,000 in Iraq if we are to have an impact comparable to that which we had in reconstructing Japan and Germany after the war.
The consequences of a long-term American occupation of Iraq needs to be carefully weighed. Anthony Cordesman, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has observed, "there has been a 'deafening silence' from the Administration about how Iraq will be run after Hussein." Historically, the United States has had a poor record in the Middle East. We supported Iraq in its war against Iran.
Nor does eliminating Saddam necessarily mean that the Iraqi people will welcome American occupiers or that they will have democratic leaders to govern. Secretary Rumsfeld asserts that he trusts the Iraqi people will be inspired to form a new government. But can we be assured that it would be a democratic government or a democratic government that is pro- American? Can we be assured that the new regime will be committed to getting rid of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, especially as Iraq's traditional adversary, Iran, has an even more advanced program of weapons of mass destruction?
Even though our military forces may be equipped to fight a war in Iraq and a war on terrorism in Afghanistan, there is a significant price to be paid. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, noted that certain unique units, such as intelligence platforms, command and control assets, and Special Operations Forces would need to be prioritized if the war on terrorism expanded. Richard Solomon, former Assistant Secretary of State in the first Bush Administration, refers to the "danger of over-stretch" in which the United States assets are deployed in multiple nation-building enterprises and are not able to respond if another crisis erupts.
All of these concerns point to the importance of international support as a critical ingredient of both our war-fighting and our peace-making strategy. Without the imprimatur of the international community, the President's war will be seen as a private vendetta by the United States.
The President was right to frame his speech at the United Nations in the context of restoring credibility to the United Nations through enforcement of its resolutions. This is the essential context of this conflict but it can be validated as such only if the international community joins it. Regional support will provide an allied force with the forward basing needed to mount a large-scale attack. Right now no country in the region contiguous to Iraq is volunteering to host American troops in a war. International support will help dampen hostility toward the United States by the peoples of the region and help build support among the Iraqi people. International support for the post-war, peace-making phase of the operation will reduce the American military's footprint and decrease the need for American financial resources. Secretary Rumsfeld has testified that the United Nations or an international coalition will run Iraq after Saddam. For that to be the case, the United Nations or some ad hoc international coalition will have to be formed before the war.
The President also must ensure our troops are properly prepared. Recently, the Pentagon's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Chemical and Biological Defense stated that American troops are not "fully equipped and prepared" against a bio-chem attack. Decontamination shelters are reported to be in short supply as is the decontaminant foam used to clean up following an attack. The General Accounting Office recently testified that 250,000 defective protective suits against a chemical or biological attack cannot be located and may remain in current Pentagon inventories.
We must take the threat of an Iraqi chemical or biological attack very seriously. According to the British Government's White Paper on Iraq, Iraq chemical weapons caused over 20,000 casualties in the Iran- Iraq War. Iraq used sprayers, bombs, artillery rockets, and artillery shells to deliver these weapons. Thousands of rockets and artillery shells filled with chemical weapons remain hidden in Iraq's arsenal.
Haste makes waste, affirms the adage, and in this case, haste means a waste of American lives. We may have an all-volunteer force but they are not mercenaries; they are citizen-soldiers and we owe it to each and every one of them and their families to proceed carefully when endangering their lives. Preparation is not the same as procrastination.
Constituent opinion in my home state is running strongly against any authorization of the use of force against Iraq. The President and his Administration need to make a clear and compelling case to the American people and to our allies abroad as to why this confrontation is necessary now.
For that reason, Mr. President, I support efforts to frame a multilateral approach to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. I support action by the United Nations in the form of a resolution calling for unconditional and unfettered inspections in Iraq. Only after we exhaust all of our alternative means should we engage in the use of force, and before then, the President must ensure we have a strategy and plans in place for winning the war and building the peace.
I yield the floor.
Mr. Biden: Madam President, how much time do I control?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. Biden: Madam President, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
The reason to go to the U.N. Security Council does not relate to sovereignty, it relates to security, and the security of the United States based upon the notion the President of the United States has recognized when he said he thought it was necessary to go to the U.N. Security Council.
I think the arguments made against the first part of the Levin amendment are specious. Why did the President of the United States go to the Security Council? Was he yielding our sovereignty? No more than our friend from Michigan is "yielding our sovereignty."
The President went to the U.N. because, as one White House official said to me, he had to do so. Why? For our security interests. If we did not go to the U.N. Security Council and check off the blocks, the moment any force crossed into Iraq, we would find every U.S. embassy burned down in every Muslim country in the world. He went for security reasons.
My only disagreement with my friend from Michigan is I do not think we need a two-step process. We should go to the United Nations, and the President says we should go to the United Nations. We should seek the authority to enforce the inspectors in disarming weapons of mass destruction. And if he fails, my friend says come back and get authorization to proceed anyway. I am prepared to give him the authorization now. That is the only disagreement we have.
I would disagree with those who argue against my friend from Michigan saying that by his making this contingent of going to the United Nations first, he is in no way yielding to American sovereignty, any more than the President has.
In the underlying resolution, it requires the President, in effect, to go to the United Nations and exhaust all diplomacy.
Nobody has suggested the President of the United States has yielded our sovereignty. No one should suggest the Senator from Michigan is, either.
Mr. Warner: Will the Senator yield for a brief question?
Mr. Biden: My time is up.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator has 20 seconds.
Mr. Warner: The Senator raises a key point on which I was going to conclude, and that is, as we are debating, the Secretary of State is working before the U.N. Security Council.
Mr. Biden: Correct.
Mr. Warner: He has made it clear to the Senator from Delaware, I am certain, as he has made it clear to me, that the two-step process will not achieve the goals a coalition of nations now working--Great Britain and the United States--desire to achieve; am I not correct?
Mr. Biden: Yes, with one caveat. He has expressed to me his ability to achieve a tough resolution would be enhanced by our not making it a two-step process. But he personally has told me and my committee he would consider and the President would consider a U.N. two-step process if they had to. The reason for my saying not two steps now is it strengthens his hand, in my view, to say to all the members of the Security Council: I just want you to know, if you do not give me something strong, I am already authorized, if you fail to do that, to use force against this fellow.
Mr. Warner: That is right. Were we to act now, we would substantially reduce his leverage and ability.
Mr. Biden: In response, I cannot honestly say substantially reduce it. I think it will reduce it some. This resolution, for example, reduces the possibility of getting a strong response compared to what Lugar-Biden would have done. The truth is it is marginal. Everyone has to make their own judgment. I think it would reduce his ability. I would be hard pressed to say it was substantial. He has a stronger hand having the authority granted to him after he exhausts the U.N. outcome to say to them: Look, if you do not give it to me, I now have the authority to move.
Mr. Warner: I say, Madam President, the distinguished majority leader said Congress should speak with one voice. We have in our resolution-- you recognize the problem of one body. This is a total substitute amendment. It strips out everything. As the Senator from Delaware knows, I say to the distinguished chairman, the Levin resolution just takes part of 687. It does not incorporate the previous resolutions, the 16 which we have time and again on this floor said Saddam Hussein has ignored.
I say to my friend, it is very important, as the leader said, that Congress speak with one voice, and the only way to do that is to retain our Lieberman-Warner-McCain-Bayh amendment and not have a substitute.
I yield the floor.
Mr. Biden: Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 30 seconds.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Biden: Madam President, if the President attempts to take this Nation to war over Kuwaiti prisoners, I hope to God that is not what you all mean by this underlying provision. If this President attempts to take this Nation to war over return of Kuwaiti property, if this President attempts to take this Nation to war based on this authority for any reason--any reason--other than weapons of mass destruction, I will be on this floor every day taking issue with this President attempting to stop the war. I cannot fathom anyone suggesting that Kuwaiti prisoners warrant us going to war. This is about weapons of mass destruction, in this Senator's view.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. Warner: Madam President, I totally reject there has been any inference on this side of such a nature, but we do incorporate in the preamble the other resolutions, and I think it important they be incorporated.
