Mr. Payne: Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), who has been a very active Member on this resolution.
Mr. Delahunt: Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend my colleague from New Jersey (Mr. Payne) for his perseverance. I know he has been here until the wee hours of the morning last night and this evening. And for those of us who oppose the underlying resolution, we are indeed in his debt. And I also want to thank him for his leadership within our caucus, not just simply on this particular issue but on many issues, particularly in terms of the continent of Africa. He is certainly someone who commands our respect.
Mr. Speaker, I think it is important to bring to the attention of the House disturbing reports that have recently appeared in the national press about alleged efforts to tailor intelligence information about Iraqi intentions and capabilities to fill the contours of administration policy. And I wish to note two particular stories from today's Washington Post and yesterday's Miami Herald.
Mr. Speaker, I will insert the articles now in the Record.
From the Washington Post, Oct. 9, 2002
"Analysts Discount Attack by Iraq"
By Dana Priest
Unprovoked by a U.S. military campaign, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States, intelligence agencies concluded in a classified report given to select senators last week.
However, the report added, "should Saddam conclude that a US-led attack could no longer be deterred," he might launch a chemical-biological counterattack. Hussein might "decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD [weapons of mass destruction] attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him."
The assessment was first made in a classified National Intelligence Estimate, which includes the analysis and opinions of all relevant U.S. intelligence agencies, that was given to the Senate intelligence committee last week. A declassified "white paper" on Iraq was released days later. At the urging of the committee, which is controlled by Democrats, additional portions of the intelligence report were declassified by the CIA Monday and released last night.
With lawmakers poised to vote this week on a resolution giving President Bush authority to attack Iraq, the new intelligence report offers grist both for supporters and critics of the administration's policy. The CIA assessment appears to suggest that an attack on Iraq could provoke the very thing the President has said he is trying to forestall: the use of chemical or biological weapons by Hussein.
But the CIA also declassified other elements of analysis that seem to back up the President's assertion that Iraq has active ties to al Qaeda--a growing feature of the administration's case for considering military action.
Among the intelligence assessments linking Iraq with al Qaeda is "credible reporting" that the group's "leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities," according to a letter to senators from CIA Director George T. Tenet.
Tenet added: "Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship" with al Qaeda, "suggest Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action."
In his speech to the nation Monday night, Bush said: "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints."
The letter's release shed light on a behind-the-scenes battle over Iraq-related intelligence. The CIA's detailed, unvarnished view of the threat posed by Iraq is central, say many lawmakers, to how they will vote on the matter. Yet an increasing number of intelligence officials, including former and current intelligence agency employees, are concerned the agency is tailoring its public stance to fit the administration's views.
The CIA works for the president, but its role is to provide him with information untainted by political agendas.
Caught in the tug of war over intelligence, say former intelligence officials familiar with current CIA intelligence and analysis on Iraq, have been the CIA's rank and file and, to some extent, Tenet.
There is a tremendous amount of pressure on the CIA to substantiate positions that have already been adopted by the administration," said Vincent M. Cannistraro, former head of counterterrorism at the CIA.
Tenet last night released a statement meant to dispel assertions that the letter contained new information that would undercut the case Bush made Monday night.
"There is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam's growing threat and the view as expressed by the President in his speech," the statement read. "Although we think the chances of Saddam initiating a WMD attack at this moment are low--in part because it would constitute an admission that he possesses WMD--there is no question that the likelihood of Saddam using WMD against the United States or our allies in the region for blackmail, deterrence, or otherwise grows as his arsenal continues to build."
In explaining why the items in the letter were not also released before, Tenet said he did not want to provide "Saddam a blueprint of our intelligence capabilities and shortcomings, or with insight into our expectations of how he will and will not act."
Still, he noted, the agency could nevertheless declassify further information not previously disclosed. Included in his letter were snippets of an Oct. 2 closed-door session.
Included in that was questioning by Sen. Carl M. Levin (D- Mich.), in which he asked an unnamed intelligence official whether it "is likely that [Hussein] would initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction?"
The official answered: "... in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think would be low."
Levin asked: "If we initiate an attack and he thought he was in extremis ... what's the likelihood in response to our attack that he would use chemical or biological weapons?"
The answer came: "Pretty high, in my view."
In his letter, Tenet responded to senators' questions about Iraq's connections to al Qaeda. "We have solid reporting of senior-level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda going back a decade," Tenet wrote. "Credible information" also indicates that Iraq and al Qaeda "have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression."
From The Miami Herald, Oct. 8, 2002
"Dissent Over Going to War Grows Among U.S. Government Officials"
By Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott
Washington.--While President Bush marshals congressional and international support for invading Iraq, a growing number of military officers, intelligence professionals and diplomats in his own government privately have deep misgivings about the administration's double-time march toward war.
These officials charge that administration hawks have exaggerated evidence of the threat that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein poses--including distorting his links to the al Qaeda terrorist network--have overstated the extent of international support for attacking Iraq and have downplayed the potential repercussions of a new war in the Middle East.
They charge that the administration squelches dissenting views and that intelligence analysts are under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the White House's argument that Hussein poses such an immediate threat to the United States that preemptive military action is necessary.
"Analysts at the working level in the intelligence community are feeling very strong pressure from the Pentagon to cook the intelligence books," said one official, speaking on condition of anonymity.
VIEWS ECHOED
A dozen other officials echoed his views in interviews with the Knight Ridder Washington Bureau.
They cited recent suggestions by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that Hussein and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network are working together.
Rumsfeld said on Sept. 26 that the U.S. government has "bulletproof" confirmation of links between Iraq and al Qaeda members, including "solid evidence" that members of the terrorist network maintain a presence in Iraq.
The facts are much less conclusive. Officials said Rumsfeld's statement was based in part on intercepted telephone calls in which an al Qaeda member who apparently was passing through Baghdad was overheard calling friends or relatives, intelligence officials said.
The intercepts provide no evidence that the suspected terrorist was working with the Iraqi regime or that he was working on a terrorist operation while he was in Iraq, they said.
In his Monday night speech, President Bush said a senior al Qaeda leader received medical treatment in Baghdad this year--implying larger cooperation--but he offered no evidence of complicity in any plot between the terrorist and Hussein's regime.
Rumsfeld also suggested that the Iraqi regime has offered safe haven to bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar.
While technically true, that too is misleading. Intelligence reports said the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, a longtime intelligence officer, made the offer during a visit to Afghanistan in late 1998, after the United States attacked al Qaeda training camps with cruise missiles to retaliate for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. But officials said the same intelligence reports said bin Laden rejected the offer because he didn't want Hussein to control his group.
NO IRONCLAD PROOF
In fact, the officials said, there's no ironclad evidence that the Iraqi regime and the terrorist network are working together, or that Hussein has ever contemplated giving chemical or biological weapons to al Qaeda, with whom he has deep ideological differences.
None of the dissenting officials, who work in a number of different agencies, would agree to speak publicly. But many of them have long experience in the Middle East and South Asia, and all spoke in similar terms about their unease with the way that U.S. political leaders are dealing with Iraq.
All agreed that Hussein is a threat who eventually must be dealt with, and none flatly opposes military action. But, they say, the U.S. government has no dramatic new knowledge about the Iraqi leader that justifies Bush's urgent call to arms.
"I've seen nothing that's compelling," said one military officer who has access to intelligence reports.
Some lawmakers have voiced similar concerns after receiving CIA briefings.
Sen. Richard Durbin, D-I11., said some information he had seen did not support Bush's portrayal of the Iraqi threat.
"Its troubling to have classified information that contradicts statements made by the administration," Durbin said, "There's more they should share with the public."
Florida's Sen. Bob Graham, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, last week expressed frustration with the information he was receiving from the CIA and questioned the need to elevate Iraq to "our No. 1 threat."
In his Monday night speech, Bush stressed that if Hussein gained control of radioactive material no bigger than "a softball" he could build a nuclear weapon sufficient to intimidate his region, blackmail the world and covertly arm terrorists. But a senior administration intelligence official notes that Hussein has sought such highly enriched uranium for many years without success, and there is no evidence that he has it now.
Moreover, the senior official said, Hussein has no way to deliver a nuclear weapon against a U.S. target.
"Give them a nuclear weapon and you have the problem of delivery. Give them delivery, even clandestine, and you have a problem of plausible denial. Does anyone think that a nuclear weapon detonating in a Ryder truck or tramp freighter would not automatically trigger a response that would include Iraq, Iran, North Korea?" the intelligence official asked.
Here are some other examples of questionable statements:
Vice President Dick Cheney said in late August that Iraq might have nuclear weapons "fairly soon."
A CIA report released Friday said it could take Iraq until the last half of the decade to produce a nuclear weapon, unless it could acquire bomb-grade uranium of plutonium on the black market.
Also in August, Rumsfeld suggested that al Qaeda operatives fleeing Afghanistan were taking refuge in Iraq with Hussein's assistance.
Rumsfeld apparently was referring to about 150 members of the militant Islamic group Ansar al Islam (Supporters of Islam) who have taken refuge in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. One of America's would-be Kurdish allies controls that part of the country, however, not Hussein.
WALKOVER NOTION
Current and former military officers also question the view sometimes expressed by Cheney, Rumsfeld and their civilian advisors in and out of the U.S. government that an American- led campaign against the Iraqi military would be a walkover.
"It is an article of faith among those with no military experience that the Iraqi military is low-hanging fruit," one intelligence officer said.
He challenged that notion, citing the U.S. experience in Somalia, where militiamen took thousands of casualties in 1993 but still managed to kill U.S. soldiers and force an American withdrawal.
Iraqi commanders, some officials warned, also could unleash chemical or biological weapons--although the American military is warning them they could face war crimes charges if they do--or U.S. airstrikes could do so inadvertently.
Hussein also might try to strike Israel or Saudi Arabia with Scud missiles tipped with chemical or biological weapons.
Mr. Speaker, the Herald story states, and I am quoting now, "that a growing number of military officers, intelligence professionals and diplomats within the administration have deep misgivings about the march toward war." The story continues, and again I am quoting from the Miami Herald, "These officials charge that the administration hawks have exaggerated evidence of the threat that the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein poses, including distorting his links to the al Qaeda terrorist network. They have overstated the extent of international support for attacking Iraq and have downplayed the potential repercussions of a new war in the Middle East. They charge that the administration squelches dissenting views and that intelligence analysts are under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the White House's arguments that Hussein poses such an immediate threat to the United States that preemptive military action is necessary. `Analysts at the working level in the intelligence community are feeling very strong pressure from the Pentagon to cook the intelligence books,' said one official speaking on the condition of anonymity."
The article goes on to note that, again, I am quoting, "a dozen officials echoed his views."
Now today's Washington Post discusses what it calls a "behind-the- scenes battle over Iraq-related intelligence." And, again, I am quoting: "The CIA's detailed, unvarnished view of the threat posed by Iraq is central, say many lawmakers, as to how they will vote on the matter. Yet, increasing numbers of intelligence officials, including former and current intelligence agency employees are concerned the agency is tailoring its public stance to fit the administration's views."
The article goes on to quote a former head of counterterrorism of the CIA, one Vincent Cannistraro, who says that "there is a tremendous amount of pressure on the CIA to substantiate positions that have already been adopted by the administration."
I submit, Mr. Speaker, that if these reports are accurate, they represent a dangerous state of affairs. When we began our debate on this resolution yesterday morning, we did not have the benefit of declassified intelligence estimates released only last night, which indicate that Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States unless he concludes that a U.S.-led attack is inevitable. Such contradictions between classified information in the administration's public statements make it very difficult for Congress to have a meaningful debate. It puts those few Members of Congress who have access to this information as members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in a truly awkward position and leaves the rest of us and the American people in the dark.
Senator Graham, who chairs the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that the classified information he has received does not tally with the public statements of the administration. But, of course, he is not permitted to explain why. Based on what he knows, he has described the focus on Iraq as a distraction from the war on terrorism that allows Syria and Iran, countries which should be at the forefront of any intelligence effort against state sponsors of terrorism, off the hook.
Let me conclude by saying that we cannot discharge our constitutional responsibilities by allowing the administration to control the flow of information and simply trusting that they know what they are doing. That is an unacceptable situation in a democracy, Mr. Speaker. And that is not what the founders had in mind when they gave Congress, not the President, the power to declare war.
Mr. Speaker, what is the responsibility of a great power? Sometimes it is to act when others cannot, or will not, do so. Sometimes it is to refrain from acting when others would, so as not to set a dangerous precedent that others might follow. Always it is to recognize that for better or worse our actions shape the rules by which the international system operates. The rule of law is a fragile thing. And through our actions, we either strengthen or erode it.
If you think this is merely a theoretical concern, let me share with you an article from last Sunday's New York Times. It is by Stephen Sestanovich, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor international diplomacy at Columbia University.
The article is entitled, "Putin Has His Own Candidate for Pre- emption." It described the efforts of senior Russian officials to co- opt the rhetoric of the Bush Administration in their war of intimidation against the neighboring Republic of Georgia, where some Chechen fighters have taken refuge. Allow me to quote a few lines:
"On the eve of President Bush's Sept. 12 speech to the United Nations on Iraq, Mr. Putin wrote Secretary General Kofi Annan charging that Georgia's passivity toward Chechen fighters on its territory violated Security Council resolutions. Russia might therefore have to act unilaterally. The chief of Russia's general staff insisted that Mr. Shevardnadze was `in no way' different from Mullah Omar of the Taliban."
"The Russian defense minister announced that no United Nations vote was needed to attack Georgia. One Russian newspaper published military plans to occupy all of Georgia--and thereby `dictate the terms' of its future existence as a state. The headline: `Pre-emption Moscow-Style.' "
Such are the dangers of unilateral assertions of power by the leader of the free world. Such are the risks that other nations with aggressive intentions may use stale evidence and ill-defined allegations to settle local grievances.
This is not to deny that there are times when it is necessary to strike first against an enemy who poses a "clear and present danger" to the safety and security of the Nation. The Constitution is not a suicide pact, as Justice Jackson famously said. And the same is true of the international legal order. We are not compelled to stand by and allow ourselves to be attacked before we can lawfully take action.
But any nation that engages in the preemptive use of force bears a heavy burden of showing that its actions were justified by the nature of the threat confronting it.
The principles that apply were formulated by none other than Daniel Webster, who was Secretary of State when the British launched a surprise attack on an American ship, the Caroline, in 1837.
Webster set forth the two conditions that must exist: first, the need for self-defense must be "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." And second, the degree of force used must be proportionate to the threat.
The resolution before us permits the President to take us into war without satisfying either of these requirements. It imposes no obligation upon him to show that the danger is truly immediate and the use of force truly necessary. Indeed, it speaks of a "continuing threat," which suggests an ongoing situation of indefinite duration. And it imposes no requirement that U.S. military actions be measured or proportionate to the threat we face.
In short, the resolution offers no rationale for the exercise of its broad grant of authority. Nor has the President provided one.
Last night, President Bush presented his case for a preemptive military strike against Iraq. I studied his speech with care, hoping that he would set forth clear and convincing evidence of the threat he perceives.
The speech offered ample evidence that Saddam Hussein is a bloodthirsty tyrant who has terrorized his own people and endangered his neighbors.
The speech offered ample evidence that Saddam Hussein has defied Security Council resolutions for 11 years by continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction.
And the speech made clear--in case anyone doubted it--that Saddam Hussein is deeply hostile to American interests.
What the speech failed to demonstrate is that Saddam Hussein poses a threat to America or vital U.S. interests that--Webster's words--is "instant, overwhelming, . . . leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."
In fact, it demonstrated just the opposite. The President did not say, "Saddam Hussein presents an imminent threat to the United States." He said, "The danger is . . . significant and it only grows worse with time."
That is an argument for containment. It is an argument for coercive measures, including unconditional inspections, disarmament, and the freezing of assets. It may even be an argument for sanctions. But it is not an argument for launching an unprovoked military attack.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The President stated that the Iraqi regime has continued to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, and could one day soon be in a position to threaten America or the Middle East. He cited the Cuban missile crisis as precedent for a preemptive strike to contain that danger.
But the missile crisis involved the imposition of a naval quarantine to interdict the delivery of nuclear missiles capable of hitting the United States--as clear an example of a proportionate response to an imminent threat as can be imagined. In the present situation, the CIA's best estimate is that Iraq "will probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade."
Perhaps anticipating that some future administration might one day cite the missile crisis to justify preemptive military action, President Kennedy's own legal adviser expressly distinguished the Cuban missiles from what he called "threatening deployments or demonstrations that do not have imminent attack as their purpose or probable outcome."
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
The President noted that Saddam Hussein has used chemical agents against civilian populations in his own country. This is true. It is also true that these attacks last occurred some 14 years ago--with the full knowledge of a U.S. government that did nothing to prevent them.
What is the imminent threat that such weapons might be used against the United States? The President didn't say. He said that Saddam Hussein "could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group." Indeed he could. So could any number of other nations, from Iran to North Korea.
But the historical record suggests that he can be deterred from deploying these weapons. One the eve of Operation Desert Storm, Secretary of State Baker notified Iraq that any use of its weapons of mass destruction would result in a devastating American response. And the weapons were never used.
In fact, according to declassified intelligence estimates released only last night, Saddam is unlikely to initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States unless he concludes that "U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred." In other words, Saddam will unleash his arsenal only when he is facing annihilation--with nothing left to lose.
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
The President claimed that Saddam Hussein has links to international terrorism that justify a preemptive strike against his regime. What is the evidence? The President offered four arguments. First, he said that Iraq and al-Qaida "share a common enemy--the United States of America." Well, the United States and Iraq share a common enemy--Iran. But that's hardly evidence that we support Iraqi aggression.
Second, he said that the Iraqi regime "gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America." This is hardly admirable, but it is also hardly evidence that they were behind the attacks. Any more than others who shared such sentiments elsewhere in the Arab world.
The President's last two arguments are more serious: that Iraq is continuing to finance terror in the Middle East and has continued to associate with leaders of al-Qaida, offering them safe harbor, medical treatment, and training in terrorist techniques. Yet assuming that these allegations are correct, they argue, not for invasion, but for treating Iraq as we treat the many other countries that provide various kinds of support for terrorism but against whom we are not making plans for war.
I do not mean to minimize these concerns. They are serious and deserve to be addressed, whether they occur in Iraq or in any other country--especially one in which internal repression, the appetite for conquest, and the possession of advanced weaponry go hand in hand.
I applaud the President's demand for immediate Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions. I would support a resolution that authorizes the limited use of our Armed Forces in support of international efforts to locate and dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction should Iraq fail to comply.
Such a resolution would achieve the President's desire that we "tell the United Nations and all nations that America speaks with one voice."
Instead, the President insists on a resolution that goes further. That authorizes the President to "use the Armed Forces as he determines to be necessary and appropriate."
The President says that "approving this resolution does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable." If so, I am relieved to hear it. But if military action is imminent or unavoidable." If so, I am relieved to hear it. But if military action is not imminent, then the broad language that would authorize it premature.
If the American people are satisfied that our cause is just and war is forced upon us, they will do what needs to be done. But before we risk the lives of our soldiers and countless innocent Iraqi civilians, before we divert untold billions of dollars from our other battles, before we forfeit the moral authority that has distinguished America among the family of nations, we had better be sure we've taken every reasonable step to resolve this crisis without bloodshed.
Until then, I cannot support a resolution that gives the President a blank check to launch a military strike that meets none of the legal requirements for preemptive action. We have been down that road before. It is not a lesson we should have to learn again. And it's not the kind of example that the United States should set for the world.
