The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Michigan has 6 minutes remaining.
Mr. Byrd: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my amendment No. 4868 to remove paragraph 2, and further I ask consent to modify my amendment No. 4869 to change the references to Sec. 3(a) to 4(a).
Mr. Reid: Reserving the right to object, could the Senator from West Virginia tell us what these changes mean?
Mr. Byrd: Yes. The second one is just a technical change in paragraphs, from 3(a) to 4(a). It makes no change in the substance of the amendment.
The other change, I asked unanimous consent to modify my amendment No. 4868 to remove paragraph 2. This amendment is not affected by germaneness, no matter what happens. As submitted to the desk earlier, paragraph 2 is as follows--I want to take this out. Here is what I am moving to do. I can best clarify it by reading the entire amendment, and then I will state to the Senate where I want it cut off.
My amendment would be Sec. 5. Statutory Construction.
Nothing in this Joint Resolution--
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authorities of the Congress to declare war, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, or other authorities invested in Congress by Section 8, article I of the Constitution; or
that is straightforward.
Now, the part I wanted to take out says:
Or,
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President to use the United States Armed Forces for any purpose not directly related to a clear threat of imminent, sudden, and direct attack upon the United States, its possessions or territories, or the Armed Forces of the United States, unless the Congress of the United States otherwise authorizes.
I am asking to lop off that second paragraph. I had some concerns expressed by several of my colleagues on this side with respect to that part.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, respectfully and regrettably, I object.
The Presiding Officer: Objection is heard.
Is there objection to both requests?
Mr. Warner: The Chair is correct, to both requests.
The Presiding Officer: Objection is heard.
Mr. Byrd: Mr. President, I hope the Senator will reconsider that.
I withdraw my request for the moment.
Mr. Reid: Mr. President, it is my understanding the time of the Senator from West Virginia has not been off the time of the Senator from Michigan.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator is correct.
Mr. Reid: The Senator from Michigan now has 6 minutes. Is that right?
The Presiding Officer: That is correct.
Mr. Levin: I understand my friends have some questions which I would be happy to try to answer on my 6 minutes.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague for permitting my colleague from Connecticut and myself to ask questions. I think the Senator from Connecticut can go first with his question.
Mr. Lieberman: I thank my friend from Michigan.
Let me ask this question. The Senator's amendment provides the Senate not adjourn this year and return to session at any time before the next Congress convenes to consider promptly proposals relative to Iraq if, in the judgment of the President, the United Nations Security Council fails to adopt or enforce the resolution described in paragraph 2.
My question to the Senator from Michigan is whether he has decided under those circumstances whether he would support a resolution authorizing the President to use force and the Armed Forces of the United States to enforce the United Nations resolutions.
Mr. Levin: I think the circumstances would determine the answer to that question that exists at the time. But the risks of going it alone are so much greater than going multilateral support. It seems to me we should consider those risks before reaching a decision. Tonight I have laid out some of those risks which I believe are serious risks of going it alone. That is what I think we would all need to consider at great length before authorizing going-it-alone authority.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I say to my good friend, regrettably we have to very forcefully object to your amendment before the vote. But I say that our President, at the urging of everybody who said go to the United Nations, went to the United Nations. He gave a brilliant speech. The Secretary of State met with us yesterday. I met with him personally. The Secretary of State is doing everything possible to avoid a two-step process. I say regrettably to my good friend, were we to adopt this amendment, it would completely dislodge the efforts ongoing at this time in the United Nations to get, if possible, one single No. 17 resolution and put it in place.
Mr. Levin: I turn that into a question, whether or not I agree. It seems to me the opposite is true. We are asking the United Nations to take action. We want them to do it with one step. My resolution urges one step--impose the obligation on Saddam Hussein, and authorize force to enforce that mandate. It is one step in my resolution.
If we go to the U.N., as we are now doing, and say we really need you, it is really important we have United Nations support, that is what we are saying, the President said we want you to be credible, it is totally inconsistent at the same time in your resolution to say, by the way, if you do not do it, we will. It just takes the United Nations off the hook. It sends the opposite message to the U.N. from what we should be saying to the United Nations and I thought the President was saying to the United Nations: We want you to be credible. We need the world to come together for Saddam Hussein.
The resolution that the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Connecticut supports is basically to say, if you do not do it, we will go it alone.
That is the wrong message to the world for many reasons.
Mr. Lieberman: Will the Senator yield?
Mr. Levin: I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Lieberman: I thank the Senator.
My friend from Michigan knows one of the reasons I cosponsored the resolution underlying it is I believe the best way for us to get the United Nations to act to enforce its own resolutions is if we make clear we are prepared to do so ourselves, although that is not our preference.
Here is my question: In section 3(3) of the Senator's amendment, you do affirm under international law the U.S. has at all times the inherent right to use military force itself. You argued tonight that is an indication that those who have said your amendment gives a veto to U.N. over U.S. actions are not correct. But isn't it true the section just below, section 4(a) of your amendment, says the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the U.S. to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons material, ballistic missiles, et cetera, only pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council as described above?
So while you recognize the inherent right of the U.S. to defend itself, to take military action in self-defense, isn't it true your amendment does give the United Nations a veto over the authority of the United States to take action to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations?
Mr. Levin: It is quite the opposite. The good Senator from Connecticut read the language which makes it clear there is no veto. We can always have the inherent right to use military force in self- defense, period. We never will yield that to the United Nations or to anyone else.
My good friend from Connecticut was the author of a resolution back in 1991. He led the way on this authorization in the gulf war. The Senator was correct in his analysis, that we should move in the gulf war, and my good friend from Virginia was as well. That resolution the Senator from Connecticut offered to support military action in the gulf war said the following: The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.
The Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Virginia in the gulf war resolution had language which was adopted by a close majority, but nonetheless adopted, which said the President is authorized to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to the United Nations Security Council resolution. Nobody suggested then that the Senator from Connecticut was giving the United Nations a veto over U.S. military force. That was a grant of authority to enforce a United Nations resolution. That is the same language we are using.
Mr. Lieberman: The Senator from Michigan is quite correct. The difference, I want to respectfully suggest, is in the context--in the historical context. There was an invasion by Iraq of Kuwait. There had already been a United Nations Security Council resolution. That is why the authority was as described.
Here, this resolution by Senators Warner, McCain, Bayh, and I have introduced is based on a record now of 11 years in which everything else has been tried to get Iraq to comply with those resolutions, and they haven't.
I think the difference here--I ask the Senator if he would react--is that the Senator has acknowledged the obvious inherent right of the United States to act in self-defense. That is a higher standard than the question of acting to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions. In other words, it may be I might argue that is not in self-defense because I believe if we do not disarm Saddam Hussein, he will eventually strike us and our allies. But, in any case, in affirming a right of self-defense, the Senator has set a standard that is not carried out in a later section which makes our ability to enforce those resolutions pursuant to United Nations authorization.
So to that extent, your amendment would give the United Nations a veto over whether the President of the United States could take action against Iraq to enforce outstanding U.N. resolutions.
Mr. Levin: I will put that in the form of a question.
I vehemently disagree. I urge the Senator from Connecticut to read the language, which flat out says: We affirm "the United States has at all times the inherent right to use military force in self-defense. . . ." We affirm that.
The Senator from Connecticut, in the resolution in 1991, did not even affirm that. It just simply authorized the President to use military force pursuant to the United Nations Security Council resolution. No one suggested then that anyone was ceding the power to use our force to the United Nations. Yet in our resolution, the alternative resolution, the multilateral resolution, for some reason, the folks who are supporting the go-it-alone resolution are suggesting we are ceding something to the U.N. when we explicitly reaffirm our right to self- defense.
Mr. Lieberman: I do not think we will ever go it alone because we are going to the United Nations. But how then does the Senator read section 4(a) of his amendment, which says clearly that the President can only use the Armed Forces of the United States to destroy, disarm Iraq's weapons of mass destruction if there is U.N. permission?
Mr. Levin: Where does the word "only" appear in that resolution?
Mr. Lieberman: I will read it:
Pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council described in section 3(2) that is adopted after the enactment of this joint resolution . . . the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States. . .
Mr. Levin: Where does the word "only" appear in this resolution? That is my question to my dear friend from Connecticut. The Senator added a word that is not in the resolution and ignores a paragraph, saying we have an inherent right of self-defense, that is in the resolution.
Mr. Lieberman: Now we have joined the issue.
Then I ask the Senator this final question: Would it be the Senator's opinion that enforcement of outstanding U.N. Security Council resolutions would amount to an act of self-defense and, therefore, the President of the United States could do that without an authorizing resolution from the United Nations?
Mr. Levin: We have an inherent right to use military force in self- defense, and that means, under law which is well established, that if there is an imminent threat to the United States, we do not have to wait for that threat to be implemented. We can act against any imminent threat whether or not there is a U.N. resolution covering that threat. If it is an imminent threat, we may act in self-defense.
Mr. Lieberman: In that case, is it not true the Senator from Michigan is adding a word, which is the word "imminent"?
Mr. Levin: No. You have asked me to interpret the words "inherent right of self-defense." What I am saying is, under international law, self-defense requires that a threat be imminent.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. Lieberman: I thank the Senator.
Mr. Levin: I thank my friend from Connecticut.
Mr. Sarbanes: Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator will state his inquiry.
Mr. Sarbanes: What is the parliamentary situation?
The Presiding Officer: Under the previous order, the Senator from Maryland is to be recognized for up to 30 minutes.
Mr. Sarbanes: I thank the Chair.
Mr. Reid: Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I ask unanimous consent that the time not run against the Senator from Maryland for a unanimous consent request that we would like to have adopted.
Mr. Sarbanes: Mr. President, I yield to the Senator for the purposes of his unanimous consent request, with the understanding I not lose my right to the floor.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Reid: I would also say we have a number of people who want to speak. It is a little bit difficult because we have Senator Levin and Senator Sarbanes for an hour. So I know that some of my colleagues on this side have been waiting a long time. But we have also had people over here waiting a long time.
So this would be my suggestion as to the time: That following the statement of Senator Sarbanes, Senator Hutchinson be recognized for 25 minutes; following that, Senator Thompson be recognized for 20 minutes; following that, Senator Murray be recognized for 20 minutes; Senator Enzi for 20 minutes; Senator Reed for 40 minutes; Senator Chafee for 7 minutes; and then Senator Durbin for 30 minutes.
The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Reid: Now, if my friend from Maryland would withhold, we have a unanimous consent request that I gave to be copied, and it has not shown up. Here it comes. I would really like to get that done.
Mr. Sarbanes: Mr. President, I understand, under the unanimous consent agreement, this time is not being charged against my time.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator is correct.
Mr. Reid: I suggest the absence of a quorum. As soon as the quorum call is called off, I will do the unanimous consent request and give the time to the Senator that he is entitled to anyway.
The Presiding Officer: The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. Reid: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Reid: Mr. President, let me, just as a background, indicate that Senators Levin, Boxer, and Durbin have been most cooperative. They have amendments that have been filed in the appropriate form. They have indicated they will offer each amendment tomorrow. Senator Levin's is pending tonight. We will dispose of these amendments, and they will offer no other amendments tomorrow.
Senator Boxer's is going to be disposed of at some length. She is always very deliberate in what she does. She recognizes this amendment is good, recognizes that the best way to handle this, though, is to have a colloquy tomorrow. I have spoken to the minority manager on this matter. He has agreed to enter into a colloquy with her. We have discussed what that would be.
Mr. Warner: That is correct. Senator McCain and I will engage in a colloquy.
Mr. Reid: I therefore ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of Senator Byrd's amendment No. 4868, the Senate resume consideration of Senator Levin's amendment No. 4862; that the amendment be in order notwithstanding the provisions of rule XXII; that there be 50 minutes under the control of Senator Levin and 45 minutes in opposition divided as follows: 15 minutes for Senator Biden, 15 minutes for Senator Warner, and 15 minutes for Senator McCain--this would be in opposition to the Levin amendment--that upon the use or yielding back of that time, the Senate vote without any intervening action on, or in relation to, Senator Levin's amendment; that upon disposition of his amendment, Senator Durbin be recognized to call up amendment No. 4865; that Senator Durbin control 40 minutes for debate and 10 minutes for Senator Biden and 15 minutes for Senators Warner and McCain in opposition, a total of 35 minutes, plus the 10 minutes for Senator Biden--it would be 10 minutes for Senator Biden, 15 minutes combined for Senators Warner and McCain--that upon the use or yielding back of that time, the Senate vote without any intervening action on or in relation to Senator Durbin's amendment; that no second-degree amendments be in order to either of these above-listed amendments.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The Presiding Officer: The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. Reid: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Reid: The only change I would make in the request I just made is that Senator Durbin have an up-or-down vote on his amendment.
The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Reid: Mr. President, having done that, I really appreciate very much Senator Sarbanes yielding. I would ask that after Senator Sarbanes finishes his statement, Senator Chafee, who has agreed to speak for only 7 minutes--rather than his waiting at the bottom of the list, I wonder if we could get him up at the top of the list to speak, and hopefully maybe Senators Hutchinson or Thompson may not use all their time. That may work out OK anyway.
My question is, Does anyone object to Senator Chafee speaking first?
Mr. McCain: Reserving the right to object--I won't object--I wanted to take a second to thank Senator Reid for arranging the disposition of this very difficult issue in an equitable fashion to all. I thank him for a masterful job that a few hours ago did not seem likely.
The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?
Mr. Warner: May I join Senator McCain. Also, there is reference in here to time allocated to Senator McCain and myself. We will assure our distinguished Senator from Connecticut that that time will be given to him as allotted between Senator McCain and myself.
Lastly, Mr. President, we still have a number of Members who have been attempting to make statements relative to the underlying bill. I assure Senators DeWine, Collins, Specter, and others that we will be working with them with regard to scheduling tomorrow.
Mr. Reid: I would also say, I appreciate very much the cooperation of everyone. But before we start doing too much back slapping here, tomorrow is going to be a really difficult day. We have to be prepared for that.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, we recognize that.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Washington.
Mrs. Murray: Reserving the right to object, would the Senator clarify the list of speakers following Senator Sarbanes with the change regarding Senator Chafee?
Mr. Reid: Senators Chafee, Hutchinson, and Thompson would be before you, and Senator Chafee has 7 minutes. Senator Hutchinson has 25, and Senator Thompson has 20. I would say to my friend from Washington, you have been here for at least 4 hours that I know of. But the point is, we are using up a lot of time with Senator Levin and Senator Sarbanes. They are really entitled to that time only from an equitable standpoint, not from the fact that anyone could object to it.
The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?
Mr. Reed: Reserving right to object----
Mr. Reid: You are already in the queue.
Mr. Reed: You did agree to the list?
Mr. Reid: Following Senator Thompson, Senator Reed is recognized for 40 minutes, Senator Enzi, 20 minutes, and then Senator Durbin for 30 minutes.
The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Maryland is recognized under the previous order.
Mr. Levin: Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
Mr. Sarbanes: I yield to the Senator.
Mr. Levin: I ask unanimous consent that Senator Akaka be added as a cosponsor of our amendment.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. Sarbanes: Mr. President, I first want to commend, in the very strongest terms, the very able Senator from Michigan, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, for the powerful statement he just made and for the analysis he has brought to this critically important issue.
In my judgment, he has drawn the essential lines of distinction and differentiation. They are reflected in the amendment that is now before us, which I hope will be adopted tomorrow when it is offered as a substitute to the pending Lieberman proposal.
At the end of World War II, the United States stood astride the world like a colossus. We were preeminently the most powerful nation--in some respects, more powerful even than we are today, although we are once again certainly the most powerful nation. At the end of World War II, the United States had an overwhelming military capacity and overwhelming economic strength, but at that time we chose to act multilaterally, to make our way in the world on the basis of cooperation, to help found the United Nations. The United States played a leading role in creating the U.N. framework and has exercised extraordinary influence within it ever since.
The question of how we are to exercise our power is a critically important question. We need to recognize that, for it is at issue here. We face a real dividing line: are we going to seek to exercise our power in cooperation, in coordination with others, which in the current context means working through the United Nations; or are we going to move down the path of asserting a unilateral preemptive prerogative, in effect, asserting our right to do what we want anywhere, anytime, to anyone. The comprehensive strategic doctrine that the administration issued only a short while ago would take us down that unilateral path.
It goes without saying, as the able Senator from Michigan pointed out, that the United States has an inherent right of self-defense; this right is recognized in his amendment. In fact, international law and the United Nations Charter both recognize that inherent right to use military force in self-defense.
But as the Senator very carefully pointed out in his most thoughtful statement, under international law that inherent right to use military force in self-defense is justified in response to an imminent threat. Now we have an effort to change that standard. I think such a change is fraught with danger both for our position in the world and for our leadership status.
We have to re-affirm the long-standing principle that the most effective way to accomplish our goals is to work in concert with others. No one is proposing to give away our ultimate authority to act. The President can always come back to us to seek such an authorization. In fact, if the Senator from Michigan will yield for a question----
Mr. Levin: Yes.
Mr. Sarbanes: As I read the amendment, the Senator provides that the President could come back to Congress to seek authority if he decided it was necessary to proceed on the unilateral path; is that correct?
Mr. Levin: The Senator is correct.
Mr. Sarbanes: On the other hand, his amendment provides an authority to act in support of multilateral action, as reflected in the adoption of a U.N. resolution, which would seek to deal with the threat Saddam Hussein presents to the region and to the world; is that correct?
Mr. Levin: The Senator is absolutely correct.
Mr. Sarbanes: Mr. President, this is an extremely important point. It is not enough to be strong; you have to be smart as well. You have to be both strong and smart. If we insist on acting alone, the potential consequences are obviously very great.
First of all--although it has been asserted by some to the contrary-- many believe it will impede and adversely affect the war against terrorism. Why do they believe that? Because the war against terrorism, as Brent Scowcroft has pointed out in a number of articles, requires the cooperation of other nations, the broadest possible coalition of nations. We need the contributions of their intelligence services. We need their cooperation in tracing and cutting off money that is going to fund terrorist activities. We need other nations to help us monitor and control the movement of people across frontiers and borders. If the United States says to the rest of the world that we are just going to go our own way, we will be hard put to turn around and expect a high degree of cooperation and participation when we need it badly. We have to work with others. There is no question about that.
Efforts are underway at the U.N. now to develop a very strong resolution as the basis for sending the inspectors back into Iraq. I support that effort. I don't understand those who seem to just dismiss the possibility of what the inspectors might accomplish. Others have said that the inspection system was futile, that Saddam played games with the inspectors and made it impossible for them to see the total picture. I don't differ with that. But I want to emphasize that the inspectors did a very good job. They discovered and destroyed a lot of weaponry, and they very substantially reduced Saddam's capabilities.
I fail to understand why, if we have the opportunity to send them back under terms that will enable them to do their job, we would not pursue that option before resorting to military force. Why would we not do that? Why would we not explore to the limit the possibility of resolving the situation without having to resort to war?
Think of the experience of the past fifty-plus years. International cooperation has worked brilliantly for the United States for over half a century. President Truman, President Eisenhower, and their successors, faced grave provocations at critical turning points but refrained from taking unilateral military action. There were some who argued at the end of World War II that the United States should attack the Soviet Union, at a time when the United States had a nuclear capability and the Soviet Union did not. That argument was rejected, rightly, by President Truman.
We had the foresight and the wisdom at the time to see the importance of cooperative international relationships to protecting our security broadly defined. Our security is not one-dimensional: it encompasses military matters, of course, but also economic and political matters. The United States must work in a world environment in which we seek to maximize cooperation. We run great dangers if we proceed unilaterally.
This amendment says, in effect, that at the present time the Congress is not going to provide an authority for unilateral action. It also says that if the President concludes that such action is necessary, he can come back to the Congress and request the necessary authority. This is an effort to support a multilateral effort.
Does anyone seriously contest the proposition that if we act in concert with other nations, if the U.S. action has the support of the international community, then the possibility of turbulence in other countries in the region, with which we have had important longstanding relationships, will be much less, and the support that will come from elsewhere in the world will be much greater?
Furthermore, consider for a moment the precedent we are setting if we adopt this model of unilateral preemptive action.
We have worked very hard to try to develop international law in the United Nations institutions which can check the danger that countries will seek to attack others, but if we assert our right to undertake preemptive action on a unilateral basis, act can do a unilateral preemption, what will keep other countries from doing the same, and using our action as their justification?
A very tense situation exists between India and Pakistan, and in other parts of the world. What message do we send by acting unilaterally? This is a very important question for us, especially as we are now so powerful.
Interestingly enough, the more powerful you are, the more urgent this question becomes. Stanley Hoffmann has made this point in a very thoughtful and provocative article, and I ask unanimous consent the article be printed in the Record at the end of my remarks----
The Presiding Officer (Mr Schumer): Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. Sarbanes: Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out it is precisely the most powerful state that has the greatest interest in links of reciprocity, international law, and mutual restraint; that a superpower must take special care not to provoke the united resistance of lesser powers. The challenge, and it is a challenge, is to work cooperatively, through the international institutions. In doing so we join with others to register a judgment of the entire international community, and we can then use our strength to carry out this judgment of the international community, again in cooperation with others. Failure to do that, I think, is fraught with dangers for our continued leadership position in the world.
It seems to me the distinction made in this amendment is a critical one. It reserves to the United States the power to act in self-defense. It provides authority to back a U.N. action and it leaves open, of course, the possibility of the President's coming back to the Congress to request an authority to act unilaterally, which would then enable us to assess the circumstances and the consequences under those circumstances of granting such an action.
We have an opportunity here to achieve our ends--the destruction of this program of weapons of mass destruction, assuming that is our end-- without resorting to unilateral military action, and I think that is the option we should pursue at this time.
As a matter of fact, the authority contained in the underlying resolution cites Iraq's violation of all previous U.N. resolutions as a basis for acting. Some of those previous resolutions did not deal with the issue of weapons of mass destruction at all. One dealt with violations of the oil embargo. Another dealt with accounting for missing prisoners of war. Is it intended that we authorize the use of military force to achieve the objectives of these and other resolutions not directed to the issue of weapons of mass destruction? I would hope not. But in fact that is precisely what the underlying resolution, the Warner-Lieberman resolution, provides, and what the administration supports.
I am not going to address the very broad resolution that the President originally sent here. I find it difficult to understand the administration's reasoning in sending such a proposal to the Congress, given the thinking it represented about the role of the Congress in making a decision with respect to the use of military force. On a matter as grave and momentous as this, it is a matter of great concern.
That resolution was apparently written in the White House counsel's office. It was not written at the State Department. It was not written by those who have had to deal with these difficult and complex issues. It created such concern when it was first sent to the Hill that efforts were subsequently made to modify it somewhat. But the basic difficulty remains: like its predecessor, the revised resolution posits unilateral and not multilateral action.
I think the United States at this point needs to focus all its energies on acting in concert with the international community to send a very strong message to Saddam Hussein. That message will be much stronger for having the support of the international community and representing the judgement of the international community. To those who say, Suppose they don't act? I would respond that we will consider the matter in the light of that circumstance. But the chances are better, I think, that the international community will act through the United Nations if the U.S. makes its case and calls upon other nations to join in the effort.
To those who say that by seeking multilateral, U.N. action we are giving the U.N. a veto over the right of the U.S. to use its military power to defend itself, I say that is absolutely not the case. Under international law the inherent right to self-defense is precisely defined and recognized. We seek a U.N. resolution to reflect the judgement of the international community, and through that resolution we seek to accomplish our objectives.
Congressman Houghton of New York had an interesting statement on the floor of the House last night. He said: The right decision at the wrong time is the wrong decision. I think we should keep that in mind as we think about how the United States ought to proceed.
Mr. President, I strongly urge my colleagues to think through very carefully the implications of a go-it-alone strategy. We need to work with others. We ought to join in a common effort. Other nations can be supportive in numerous ways. Anyone who talks about the situation knows that if force is eventually used against Iraq, there will have to be major reconstruction afterwards. Everyone acknowledges this. Who will do it? Will the U.S. do it alone? We can hardly draw much comfort from what we are doing in Afghanistan. We had an amazing, very successful military action, and yet we now run the risk of having success turn into failure. Afghanistan is in the very earliest stages of reconstruction: its entire infrastructure needs to be rebuilt; the central government has no effective control of the country and barely of the capital. Its elected President Hamid Karzai is a man of great courage. He has asked for continuing international support. He said over the weekend:
I believe the presence of the international forces here should be for as long as the Afghan people need them. The essential thing here is to help Afghanistan stand back on its feet to defend itself and defend against terrorism and radicalism.
And then the rest of the world can go and we will be able to manage on our own."
International forces are in Afghanistan, and the world has registered a judgment there. I frankly think the United States could and should be doing more than it currently is to assure the progress of the Afghan reconstruction. We have an important stake there, much too important to relegate to a back seat. On the contrary, we must remain focused, to make sure that it is carried through to success.
Mr. Lieberman: Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. Sarbanes: How much time do I have?
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Maryland has 6 minutes and 56 seconds.
Mr. Sarbanes: I will yield briefly.
Mr. Lieberman: First, I want to say I agree with the Senator totally concerning his comments about Afghanistan, and I hope if the time comes, as I hope and pray it will, that there is a post-Saddam Iraq, we will learn from the mistakes that were made in post-Taliban Afghanistan and devote ourselves to broad peacekeeping which will be necessary in the economic and political redevelopment of the country internationally. But my question----
Mr. Sarbanes: Let us keep the focus on the situation in Afghanistan. That chapter is far from finished. We have an opportunity to correct at least some of the mistakes we have made in Afghanistan, but unfortunately we are not doing so. The administration is very resistant.
Mr. Lieberman: In Afghanistan?
Mr. Sarbanes: In Afghanistan, absolutely.
Mr. Lieberman: I agree with the Senator from Maryland. And, of course, I agree with his----
Mr. Sarbanes: If we do not meet our commitments in Afghanistan, what lessons will we draw with respect to our obligations in Iraq?
Mr. Lieberman: That we must do it in Iraq.
Mr. Sarbanes: By ourselves? Is it your view that we do not need the efforts of the international community alongside our own?
Mr. Lieberman: We do, and that is the question. I view the underlying resolution I have introduced with Senators Warner, McCain, and Bayh as an international resolution. It is all about enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations. It acknowledges, appreciates, encourages the President to go forward at the United Nations, but it is based on the premise that if we indicate a willingness to lead, even in leading an international coalition, to enforce U.N. resolutions if someone exercises a veto against doing that at the Security Council, that others will follow. I think the strength in our underlying resolution is the best way to guarantee that either through the U.N. or after----
Mr. Sarbanes: My perception of the underlying resolution is that it says to the world the following: we are here, we want to get this resolution, we want to work together, but if you will not do it our way, then we are going to do it unilaterally, and in any event we assert the right to act unilaterally. It is part and parcel of the new strategic doctrine that has just been announced.
For the life of me I do not understand why the administration chose this particular moment to proclaim this doctrine, which obviously raises ll sorts of additional red flags about what their intentions with respect to the U.S. role around the world.
There is no question that the United States is the most powerful country in the world. I do not recall the precise figure, but the American military budget is more than the sum of I do not know how many countries that follow along behind us. Yes, we have incredible military resources and power. We can go around the world and whack anybody we choose. We can brush almost anyone aside.
But is that what we want for our nation? Is that the way we choose to conduct ourselves? Why would we make such a choice when we have an opportunity, if we are smart and skillful and have the underlying military strength, to work in a way that brings the rest of the international community into concert with us?
We have an opportunity to help formulate the judgement of the international community against someone who has clearly violated international norms and standards, and to have that judgement carried out. Why would we not seek to do so?
That is the path the Levin proposal lays out. It avoids the downside of having the United States asserting a unilateral right as the basis for its action. We should not throw away the opportunity to work through the United Nations and in concert with others to accomplish our objectives with respect to disarming Iraq, and also to set very important precedents and standards for the international community in dealing with problems of this kind. It is frustrating to think that we might not avail ourselves of this opportunity.
What will we say when some other country decides to engage in pre- emptive action on a unilateral basis? If we condemn the action, arguing that it aggravates tensions and creates chaos in the international world, the response will be that we have no basis for criticism--if we did it, why should other countries be kept from doing it? What message will our actions send to countries in other parts of the world where tensions run very high?
I close with a plea to my colleagues to recognize the fundamental distinction between unilateral and multilateral action. I ask my colleagues to consider how important it is for our future, in so many ways--not just in military and security terms, but also for our economic and political and indeed the whole range of our interests-- that we seek to work with others and not set out on a path of unilateral action. That the U.S. has such great military resources at its command makes the decision that much more urgent. It may seem paradoxical, as Stanley Hoffman has observed, so powerful a nation should choose to work in concert with other nations rather than through willful imposition of its power on others. But that principle has served our national interests well, and that is where our long-term interests lie.
I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
From the American Prospect, Sept. 23, 2002
America Alone in the World
By Stanley HoffmannThe horrors of September 11 confronted the United States with an extraordinary challenge and an extraordinary opportunity. The challenge was to increase our "homeland security" by measures that might have averted disaster, had they been implemented before the attacks, and that would minimize the risk of similar assaults in the future. The opportunity was to build on the sympathy and shock of other nations in order to construct a broad coalition against the sort of terrorism the United States had suffered.
Alas, it cannot be said that the year was well used. As the great Oxford and Yale historian of war Sir Michael Howard predicted, the notion of a "war" on terrorism proved a pernicious one. The very word "war" suggests military measures and, of course, victory--rather than the difficult, slow and partly clandestine operations that fighting terrorism entails. So, too, does war allow for suspending or violating citizens' liberties, holding foreigners without due process and resorting to other arbitrary new forms of justice.
Moreover, by defining the fight as one against global terrorism--including the supposed axis of evil--President George W. Bush was able to endow his controversial and highly partisan agenda with a heroic dimension. Using his new popularity and his global war, he sought to silence or enlist the opposition. It's not exactly the newest trick in politics. The problem, however, was twofold. Conceptually, global terrorism is the sum of many individual terrorist acts (most of them local) with very different inspirations, dynamics and scopes. One size does not fit all. Indeed, some of our allies against al-Qaeda had been terrorists or had encouraged terrorists in the past--or even the present. Useful as it was against the Taliban, the idea of taking action against not only terrorists but also the states that harbored them posed insoluble political problems with some allies (such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) that had supported terrorism. It also posed problems with democratic countries that had tolerated terrorists on their soil (Germany, Spain and the United States itself).
The strategy posed yet another set of problems with nations that used the American war and its rhetoric as a pretext for getting dangerously tougher with their own enemies. These enemies were charged (often correctly) with terrorism, but their circumstances were radically different from those under which Osama bin Laden deployed his rabid theological and anti-Western global network. In the case of Kashmir, the cynical exploitation of the antiterrorist cause put the United States in an embarrassing position, especially given Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf's indispensable role in the assault on Afghanistan. In the case of the Palestinian intifada, the logic of antiterrorism pushed Bush into supporting Ariel Sharon--a stance that shored up Israeli repression and helped justify Sharon's clever policy of destroying the Palestinian Authority while accusing it at once of impotence and of encouraging extremists.
By the end of the Clinton era, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators in Taba, Egypt, had been very close to an agreement on all important issues. Indeed, the Israel- Palestine conflicts is one that cannot be resolved without strong American input and pressure. Washington's post-9-11 tilt toward Sharon, however, has rendered the United States ineffectual on this crucial issue--one that many friendly Muslims regard as a test of American goodwill. The ability to resolve the Palestinian issue was one casualty of the relentless anti-terrorism priority. But there were at least two others that Harvard professor and journalist Michael Ignatieff has noted. An administration that had already declared its distaste for "nation building" and for humanitarian interventions (except on narrow calculations of national interest) has become even more indifferent toward humanitarian considerations. To be sure, the administration spouts pro-democracy rhetoric. But it views humanitarian concerns as mere distractions from the war on terrorism. Similarly, the concern for human rights that has occasionally animated U.S. foreign policy would have embarrassed or annoyed many of our allies in the war, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. A foreign policy that took human rights seriously might have helped, in the long run, to limit the appeal of terrorism; but human rights are no longer even an ornament of U.S. diplomacy.
The coherence and consistency that the war was supposed to lend U.S. foreign policy have not materialized. The attempts to link Saddam Hussein's regime to 9-11 and other terrorist plots have failed; a rational for attacking him and had to be sought elsewhere. The administration is still looking for a convincing one.
Iraq's quest for weapons of mass destruction is not unique. But the new doctrine of preventive action against countries that work on acquiring such weapons and are hostile to the United States is very different from other breaches of state sovereignty as sanctioned by modern international law. In the past, collective efforts to curb excessive aggression on the part of sovereign powers have been pursued with the benediction of the United Nations. In the current instance, we risk acting on our own and creating a dangerous moral and political precedent.
Deterrence worked well against the Soviet Union, a much more potent and, at one point, malevolent adversary. If applied consistently, energetically and with the support of allies, deterrence could still work against Iraq. Replacing deterrence and collective humanitarian efforts with unilateral, preemptive intervention is a license for chaos. Henry Kissinger's acrobatics in his Washington Post article of Aug. 12, which attempts to reconcile a U.S. doctrine of preventive attack with the notion of world order, can only be described as pitiful.
This brings us to the most distressing aspect of the year since 9-11: America's growing isolation in the world. The war against terrorist networks that threaten the United States, its allies and even non-allies such as Russia, cannot be won by the United States alone. For one thing, we need the cooperation of other governments in arresting, trying or delivering to use suspects and possible plotters. And if military action becomes necessary, as it did last year in Afghanistan, we need the participation and endorsement of as many countries as possible. Bush Senior succeeded in obtaining that kind of cooperation in the Gulf War. A coalition is both a help and a constructive source of restraint. For a short while immediately after 9-11, the current Bush administration seemed to understand that it unilateralism was an obstacle. This did not last.
Instead, the administration has alienated allies and inflamed adversaries repeatedly over the last year. The multiple, half-baked rationales for action against Iraq have confused and disturbed even old allies such as Germany and Britain. The notion that the United States retains a prerogative to act alone in its own purported interests or those of the whole "world community" is clearly incompatible with the UN charter and international law. The self-perception of a unique and benevolent American empire charged with maintaining order in the world irritates allies and adversaries alike. And the oft-expressed contempt for international institutions except those controlled by the United States--the view that only weak powers should be constrained by them or could benefit from them--has alienated and exasperated many of our best friends.
The fact is that the United States took the lead in creating these institutions of collective security after 1945, precisely when it was the strongest superpower. That generation understood that it is the hegemonic state, paradoxically, that has the greatest interest in links of reciprocity, international law and mutual restraint.
Imperial hubris on issues such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court have further isolated the United States just when it needs allies most. The administration's case against the court is based on an offensive assumption that a UN institution will necessarily be unfair to the United States-- and on an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that places it above international law. Worse, we have bullied other countries to prevent them from signing or applying the protocol establishing the court.
This "we don't need you" posture is very risky for the United States, insulting to others and mistakenly based on the premise that others can never really proceed without us. A superpower must take special care not to provoke the united resistance of lesser powers. But the Bush administration fails to appreciate the importance of what Harvard professor Joseph Nye calls America's "soft power"--a power that emanates from the deep sympathies and vast hopes American society has inspired abroad.
The shift from beacon to bully is rife with potential disaster. Because a hegemon cannot rule by force alone, it is vital for the United States to take an interest in other societies and cultures. Since 9-11, that interest has grown only with regard to Islam and terrorism. But an American foreign policy guided exclusively by narrow self-interest is not one our allies find terribly reassuring; and it is downright offensive to assert that the United States alone can decide what is good for others.
Particularly frightening to outside observers is the impression that U.S. foreign policy has been captured by a small group of hawks who, frustrated in 1991, are now ideologically committed to changing "evil" regimes--even in countries that have no past experience of democracy and where repressive regimes face no experienced or cohesive opposition. There were comparable fears after the election of Ronald Reagan, but divisions within his administration preserved a kind of balance. Today's pragmatists are singularly weak and seem to lack the president's ear.
Bush continually describes himself as a patient man who will consult and listen. Let us hope that he means what he says and isn't just trying to prevent a real debate until all the important decisions have been made. Because one year after 9-11, three things are clear: First, the war against terrorism cannot be the alpha and omega of a foreign policy; second, it cannot be waged by military means alone; and finally, even a state endowed with overwhelming superiority in all the ingredients of "hard" force cannot substitute that for eyes, ears and brains. Decisions based on dubious assumptions, overconfidence and intelligence reports risk ending in imprudence and fiasco.
