The Presiding Officer (Mr. Nelson of Nebraska): The Senator from Nevada is recognized.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I see the distinguished assistant leader. I apologize to the Chair. I understand he has a unanimous consent request.
Mr. Reid: Yes. Thank you. I know the Senator from Kansas is to be recognized next.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the statement of the Senator from Kansas, Mr. Roberts, that Senator Dayton be recognized for 15 minutes; following that, Senator Frist be recognized for 15 minutes; following Senator Frist, Senator Domenici be recognized for 20 minutes; and, following that, Senator Levin be recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, there is no objection.
While the leader is in the Chamber--I had the opportunity to speak with the leader just a minute ago--the pending amendment is by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd. I hope, in order to keep the momentum going on this bill, that we can move forward towards debate on that amendment and its terms such that, should there be those on our side who wish to table or otherwise move along--we have 13 amendments here, and a number of them have been determined by the Parliamentarian to be germane. Given cloture tomorrow, of which the assistant leader is familiar, I am just suggesting strongly that the Byrd amendment be the pending amendment.
Is there a possibility in the assistant leader's mind that we might address that amendment tonight by way of a vote?
Mr. Reid: I will be speaking to Senator Byrd momentarily.
I also say--to make sure everyone understands--that the majority leader, after the last vote, announced that we are going to finish this legislation tomorrow. Tomorrow takes us into Friday morning. But he has indicated we are going to finish this. There is a lot of work to do. But it can be done--it will be done. There is no question but that we are going to do it. If any Senators are waiting around until next week to give their speech, there will be no next week.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, it is obvious to the leader, but the amendments, I respectfully say, are on his side of the aisle. Therefore, his assistance is vital in helping us move these amendments along so that they can be given a proper amount of consideration, and before they are acted upon by a vote, for those that require a vote.
Mr. Reid: The reason we have two Republicans is in order to balance out the time. The Senator from Massachusetts spoke for longer than others have spoken.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Nevada, the assistant leader, has been eminently fair in working with Senator McCain and myself in the management of this, as well as Senator Lieberman who also has taken quite an active role in the management. I think we have had a good debate. The pending amendment laid down by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia is a matter that I think should be addressed as early as we can possibly arrange, and possibly dispose of it tonight, one way or the other, so that we can move on with this volume of some 13 amendments, many of which are germane.
Mr. Reid: I will speak to Senator Byrd. Senator Lieberman has an amendment on which he has talked for about a week or more. We will have to get consent to set Senator Byrd's amendment aside, or dispose of Senator Byrd's amendment prior to that time.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I will work in consultation with leadership on that side.
Does the Senator think there is an option by which Senator Levin's amendment can be disposed of?
Mr. Reid: Yes. He follows Senator Domenici.
Mr. Warner: Just a rough calculation--would that be at approximately 8 o'clock?
Mr. Reid: No. That will be approximately an hour from now, or an hour and twenty minutes from now. It would be about a quarter to 7.
Mr. Warner: Give or take an hour here or there. Nevertheless, what the leader is indicating is that there is a possibility that amendment could be acted upon tonight by vote.
Mr. Reid: Senator Levin has indicated he would like to dispose of that tonight.
Mr. Warner: Once again, I think Senator Levin has several amendments. Do we know which one that might be in this batch of 13?
Mr. Reid: It is the amendment he has spoken about for several days. I don't know how to identify it more than that. But it is the alternative--I think is a good way to put it--to the Lieberman amendment.
Mr. Warner: Fine. Perhaps Senator Levin, through his staff or others, could indicate at the earliest possible time which of the several amendments it is so we can be prepared to reciprocate in an active debate and perhaps reach a conclusion.
Mr. President, I was going to direct a question to my colleague from Connecticut.
Mr. Reid: Was the unanimous consent request agreed to?
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, the previous unanimous consent request is agreed to.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I thank the leader for his assistance.
My respect for my colleague from Connecticut is predicated on many--
The Presiding Officer: The Chair reminds the distinguished Senator from Virginia that Senator Roberts is to speak next.
Mr. Warner: That is right. We are trying to encourage some colloquy and questioning. I will not take a long time.
Mr. Dodd: I will be brief in my answer.
Mr. Warner: I thank the Senator. That will be a salutary moment. We will get quickly to it.
I read to my friend a quote by President John F. Kennedy in connection with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962:
This Nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace and our own proposal for a peaceful world, at any time, in any forum, in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful without limiting our freedom of action.
In looking at the amendments, certainly one of them proposed by the distinguished Senator from Michigan says very clearly that authorization for the use of armed forces is predicated on action by the United Nations. To me, that contravenes what President Kennedy laid down as a form of this.
Does the Senator think there is any basis for subordinating the right of our President to use the Armed Forces, if he deems it necessary, to action by the United Nations?
Mr. Dodd: I do not know if my colleague was listening to my remarks.
Mr. Warner: I listened very carefully.
Mr. Dodd: I made the point. Certainly my point is that we should try to resolve this matter without conflict, if possible.
There was some confusion about that, when I listened to the Secretary of State and the President, as to whether it is regime change or weapons of mass destruction. There is a lot of confusion in the American public about that as well.
Let us assume they are going to come together and try to resolve that without any conflict. It ought to be done. I think the President's father did it well and right back in 1991 with a coalition. It worked better than imagined. It certainly set a precedent for how we are going to deal or should deal with matters in the future.
I have said the reason I am supporting the resolution is that I believe it will strengthen our hand at the United Nations to get them to act with some assertiveness. But I also have said, at the end of the day, if the security interests of the United States are in jeopardy and there is nothing else to be done in the United Nations, or if other coalitions would not support us, we will never leave the security of this country, this Nation, vulnerable and solely dependent upon the willingness of the international organizations to support us.
Mr. Warner: I thank my colleague. I share that view. I say to my good friend that acting on it now and not further delaying, with this Chamber and that of the House of Representatives, hopefully, acting on identical language, can in a strong voice say to the United Nations that we stand foursquare behind our President in his remarks and his request that the United Nations take strong action.
Mr. Dodd: Let me respond very quickly on that.
I understand the management of bills here. I spent 9 days on election reform with 46 amendments; 100 were offered. I think election reform is a pretty important issue. But I don't think it is more important than the issue we are discussing today.
My point simply was to say, on matters such as this, that the role of the Senate is so critically important and the Founders intended it to be such that if Members of this body, elected to this body, feel strongly and passionately about being heard on this matter and have ideas they wish to contribute to the debate, we ought to be most reluctant to deprive a Member of this body of the opportunity to be heard.
I understand the significance of moving quickly. But it is dangerous indeed on a matter of this gravity to curtail debate to merely try to get a resolution adopted quickly. I want to hear what my colleagues have to say. I know we are going to come to a conclusion on this fairly quickly. But to cut off debate prematurely I think would be a mistake.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I share that sentiment. But I remind my colleague, this Senator was privileged to be on the floor last Friday for 5 hours. You were present. You recall that debate. Senator Kennedy was present. And Senator Byrd was most active. And again there was debate another 5 or 6 hours on Monday and Tuesday. So there has been adequate opportunity. And there remains opportunity for Senators to be heard. I hope we do not cut off any Senator from the opportunity to speak to this important matter.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor. I know another Senator is about to speak.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. Roberts: Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their very learned colloquy to make sure all Senators have an opportunity to speak on this extremely important issue.
As we debate whether to authorize the President, basically, to use military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutralize his emerging weapons of mass destruction capability, I would like to offer several observations.
The first is that the United Nations, as an institution, has completely and unequivocally failed to disarm Iraq consistent with its own resolutions--the resolutions agreed to also by Saddam Hussein-- following the Persian Gulf war of 1991. The key word here is to "disarm."
During debate on this very crucial issue, I think we have concentrated too much on the concept of "inspections" and the possibility of trying to really somehow initiate a new inspections regime. As a matter of fact, if you read all of the newspaper accounts on this issue, and if you pay attention to the television, the radio, and the debate, it seems to me "inspections" becomes the key word. I don't think that is the case. The key issue is not inspections. The key issue is disarmament.
Again, both Iraq, under the heavy hand of Saddam Hussein, and the United Nations, have failed in the agreed-upon mandate to follow or take action consistent with resolutions following the Persian Gulf war over a decade ago. And we are talking about actual, transparent, real-- real--disarmament.
The second observation I would like to make is that one of the crucial reasons both Houses of Congress should support the Warner and the Lieberman resolution, on behalf of the President, as opposed to, I guess, 13 amendments we are going to be considering--and I do not challenge or wish to impugn any intent on the part of any Member who has an amendment on this important issue--but basically one of the crucial reasons we should really do our business and support this resolution is that it will, I think, strengthen the hand of Secretary of State Powell--he told that to us as of this week, both sides of the body--in his efforts to convince the U.N. Security Council to adopt new resolutions, resolutions whose goal would be to produce tangible-- again, not inspections--but inspections that would lead to disarmament. There is always that hope, and, obviously, that would be the preferred outcome as opposed to military action.
So it seems to me that is the goal of the resolution we are now considering.
In that regard, let me stress that we should act prior--prior--to the U.N. deliberations. We should act first. We should act in concert. To tie the hands of this President, or any future President with regard to matters of vital national security interests where war or peace hang in the balance, to subject him to U.N. approval or action, will constrain the freedom of action on the part of the United States by the very countries that are now responsible for a decade of U.N.--U.N.--inaction and almost irrelevance.
Let us be realistic. Let us be realistic. Saddam Hussein has demonstrated ad nauseam over the last 10 years that he will never permit the removal or destruction of his weapons of mass destruction capability. Here is my personal view on this. He cannot, and he will not. Now, why?
They are the very source of his authority in Iraq as well as the Persian Gulf. All of his ambitions--I perceive that he perceives himself as perhaps the heir apparent or maybe even the reincarnation of King Nebbuchadnezzar, Pan-Arabia. He has demonstrated a willingness to use weapons of mass destruction both against his own countrymen and against other nations. He is a student and protege and follows the example of Stalin. And he rules by fear.
So wishful thinking aside--and I have wishful thinking--but wishful thinking aside, I do not believe he is ever going to give up and disarm--ever.
Third, any notion that the United States itself is off limits to a massive attack by groups that are cooperating with or supported by Baghdad should now be gone. It is called sanctuary for further terrorist attacks against our homeland. We are not off limits. We are now terrorist targets, as proved by 9/11 and previous attacks.
Fourth, any notion that we have time left to coast along as governments in Iraq, Iran, or elsewhere continue to pursue their weapons of mass destruction programs with the possibility, if not intent, to distribute these technologies to fundamentalist terrorist cells should be gone as well.
I know, while "hard evidence" of an Iraqi role in the attacks of 9/ 11 may be hard to prove--the so-called smoking gun--I do not think we can afford to be naive. Particularly in the Middle East, terror groups and states work together when and where their interests are common. And their intent is the destruction of the United States, the murder of our citizens, and the elimination of our influence, real and perceived.
Just yesterday, in the continuing investigation of the September 11 attack, in an unclassified--let me stress, unclassified--and public hearing, I asked the panel of witnesses--the expert witnesses--what, after 9/11, still kept them up at night. And I asked them what policy drum they could or would beat to bring about a change in policy to safeguard our own country.
The answer was to take away the terrorists' sanctuary; that we mistakenly think that if we can only bring bin Laden to justice, render the al-Qaida harmless, then we can somehow go back to business as usual.
That simply is not the case. I think an error is being made in the debate on this most important topic when we say, now, on one hand, if we do not take action in regard to Iraq we can then continue the war against terrorism. The action against Iraq is to prevent further sanctuary for terrorism. It is inseparable.
The stark fact of the matter is that danger of another terrorist attack on this country is still not a matter of if, it is a matter of when. The distinguished then-chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, remembers full well creating a subcommittee called the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats. Three years ago we predicted this would happen, citing past attacks. It is not a matter of if, but when. That condition still exists today. It is transnational in terms of the threat. It involves many terrorist organizations and cells. And, yes, it is ongoing.
Yesterday, under the heading of lessons learned from past terrorist attacks, the Intelligence Committee once again heard from experts citing a common thread of transnational, interconnected terrorism. At our peril, difficult connect-the-dots intelligence analyses did not meet the threshold of a threat warning and were ignored. We were risk averse. The terrorists who conducted past attacks attacked again. There were warnings. They were not heeded. They did not meet the criterion of a threshold of a threat warning, and we suffered the consequences. They attacked at the 1993 World Trade Center, Khobar Towers, our embassies, the thwarted--thank goodness--attack in regard to the Millennium, and, finally, the U.S.S. Cole. The attacks are a microcosm of the challenge we face.
If Iraq and, indeed, other regimes are left unchallenged, my colleagues, it is only a matter of time before they transfer the capability for weapons of mass destruction to a terrorist cell that will use that capability against the United States.
Now, remember, the criminal justice model of gathering evidence and presenting a case does not apply here. By the time you have evidence, it is too late. We will not lose buildings and thousands of people when that happens. We will lose whole cities and hundreds of thousands of people.
Iraq is absolutely a component in the war against terrorism. Let me try to make that point. In light of the events of September 11, 2001, I believe this body has more reason to support action against Iraq than it had in the winter of 1991. That is a pretty strong statement. Because preventing weapons of mass destruction from being acquired by terrorist cells should be the No. 1 policy priority of this Federal Government. This means neutralizing regimes that possess or seek such weapons and are predisposed to harboring, assisting, sympathizing with the bin Ladens of the world. That is a real priority for us.
Yes, there is more than one fundamentalist maniac with a significant and diverse following.
I support the resolution endorsed by the White House and sponsored by Senators Lieberman and Warner because I think our President realizes-- most Senators realize--what leaders like Abraham Lincoln and Harry Truman realized: No matter what the short-term consequences would be in regards to politics, American survival must be assured. It is a first priority. It is our highest agenda.
There is reasonable concern about downside risk. You bet there is. I have those concerns. I share those concerns. I have been listening to these concerns during the debate on this subject. We have had several days of very good debate. The President and his national security team know that. All Members of the House and Senate and all thinking Americans know that. Yes, there is real concern.
I am a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence. I have asked question after question after question in the "what if" category. What if Saddam Hussein uses his weapons of mass destruction--of course, that means he has reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction capability, posing an ever-increasing threat--what if he uses those reconstituted weapons of mass destruction against our troops, against Gulf State partners that will support us, against Israel, or against his own people? He has done that before. Will Israel, if attacked, simply remain on the sidelines? Will we see prolonged combat? Will there be a violent upheaval in the Mideast, in the Arab nations?
What happens if we win? There has been a lot of discussion about that. How long will we have to stay? What kind of infrastructure improvements will we have to pay for if, in fact, that is the case? What do we win? How do you win a war against a tyrant who may well destroy his own country and kill his own people, blame us, or who would launch or sponsor a terrorist attack in the United States as a result of our involvement, all in the name of self-preservation?
Those are tough questions. Those are very real concerns. The distinguished Senator from West Virginia indicated we need more time to answer these concerns. How many casualties if, in fact, we go into military action against Iraq? Mrs. Boxer, the distinguished Senator from California, asked the question, how much will it cost? Maybe it was reversed. Maybe Senator Byrd asked that question, and Senator Boxer asked about casualties. What about military tactics? I must say that is probably the last thing I hope the Pentagon would share with the Congress, for obvious reasons. What about the sacrifices in regards to the American people? How much will it cost?
All of these concerns and all of these dangers are real. But, my colleagues, there are no specific and easy answers to these questions. As much as we would like otherwise, the intelligence community and the President and the administration, our military cannot provide absolute, specific answers. They can try to be specific, but absolute answers? I am sorry. They do provide estimates, based upon the best collection and analysis that is possible.
This debate and the issues at hand demand candor. President Bush has been candid. As the President said, the hope is we don't have to take military action. But if that becomes necessary, it will be difficult. Time after time in history, and in repeated testimony from those within our intelligence community, we see the greatest risk is to do nothing. We are not free unless we are free from fear. Americans have known fear--be it during the Cuban missile crisis or in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor or the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. We must not, however, accept fear as our destiny. We must be proactive in regards to national security.
We must be preemptive. Yes, preemptive, that new doctrine that is causing a rethink of our foreign policy, our military strategy, our politics, our foreign relations. It is a brand new world. It is an asymmetrical world. It is a world that was written about by Samuel P. Huntington when he wrote the book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order," the preemption doctrine. Here we are and we are debating it.
Make no mistake, this has nothing to do with partisan rivalry. This is about our future, both immediate and long term. This is the state of affairs we leave for our children and our grandchildren.
Senator Warner just made a statement on the floor I am going to quote again, almost 40 years ago to this date, when President John F. Kennedy addressed the Nation in regard to the Cuban missile crisis. He said:
This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum--in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful--
Here is the key phrase:
. . . without limiting our freedom of action.
In that regard, I hope we follow President Kennedy's advice. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution introduced by Senators Warner and Lieberman and to oppose the various 13 amendments that would weaken the resolution and our resolve.
I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled "A Chronology of Defiance" by Michael Kelly; an article called "The Myth of U.N. Support" by Charles Krauthammer; and an article, "The Weight of American Empire," which talks in detail about the new policy of preemption, by John Keegan, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
From the Washington Post, Sept. 18, 2002
A Chronology of Defiance
By Michael Kelly"U.N. Inspectors Can Return Unconditionally, Iraq Says," the headline reads. This, to put it mildly, and in the words of an old and apt phrase, shall not stand.
Consider the following darkly comic tale, mostly taken from the Congressional Research Service:
On March 3, 1991, the coalition forces of the Persian Gulf War signed the Safwan accords, ending hostilities in the insane conflict Iraq had forced. On April 3, the United Nations passed Security Council Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to end its weapons-of-mass-destruction programs, recognize Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti property and end support for international terrorism. Iraq immediately began a decade-long pattern of defiance, alternating with stalling, tactical capitulation and more defiance. This was particularly so concerning what remains the central issue: the demand that it destroy its weapons of mass destruction and stop developing new ones.
To enforce and conduct inspections, the United Nations created a special commission, UNSCOM, which went to work in April 1991. Almost immediately, Iraq began impeding the inspections. The United Nations responded by passing its first resolution-to-enforce-the-resolution, Resolution 707, on Aug. 15, which ordered Iraq to comply with unfettered inspections of all sites and to make full disclosure of all of its suppliers to its program for weapons of mass destruction. On Oct. 11, the United Nations also passed Resolution 715, which established a long-term monitoring program.
Some success ensued, but Iraq resumed impeding inspections in March 1996. The Security Council responded with Resolution 1060, on June 12, 1996, demanding, again, Iraqi cooperation, which was not forthcoming. So, on June 21, 1997, the august body duly passed Resolution 1115, which threatened noncooperating Iraqi government officials with travel restrictions. This was followed on Oct. 23, 1997, by Resolution 1134, which threatened travel restrictions-- again--and which banned consideration of lifting the U.N. sanctions against Iraq until April 1998.
On Oct. 29, Iraq barred American inspectors assigned to UNSCOM from conducting any inspections. So, on Nov. 12, 1997, the United Nations went right darned ahead and imposed those mean old travel restrictions. The next day, Iraq expelled all the American inspectors. The U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution authorizing the use of unilateral U.S. military action if necessary. But the measure died in the Senate, of inattention.
In November 1997, Russia brokered a compromise that allowed UNSCOM to resume some temporary and sharply limited inspections. In February 1998, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan put together a second compromise, by which Iraq agreed to allow inspections with the proviso that it be allowed to protect "presidential sites" from undue indignity. Iraq designated eight large tracts of land (containing more than 1,000 buildings) as "presidential sites." Inspectors could visit these sites only after announcing the visit in advance and informing the Iraqis of the composition of the visiting team--nuclear, chemical or biological inspectors. In appreciation of this joke, the Clinton administration supported lifting the travel ban on Iraq and resuming sanction reviews.
In August 1998, Iraq barred UNSCOM from inspecting any new facilities. The Senate and House passed a resolution, signed on Aug. 14, declaring Iraq to be in "material breach" of the cease-fire. On Sept. 9, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1194, suspending sanction reviews. On Oct. 30, the council offered Iraq yet another chance to have the sanctions lifted if it complied with inspections, but Iraq spurned the offer and announced the cessation of all cooperation with UNSCOM. A very angry Security Council passed the very fierce Resolution 1205, which called Iraq's action a "flagrant violation" of the February 1998 agreement. A very, very angry President Clinton very, very fiercely threatened airstrikes. On Nov. 14, Iraq agreed to cooperate. President Clinton promptly canceled the airstrikes.
On Dec. 15, 1998, UNSCOM announced that Iraq had refused to hand over key weapons-program documents and was, again, impeding inspections. UNSCOM inspectors withdrew from the country and the United States and Britain bombed Iraqi military and security targets for several days. UNSCOM never went back into Iraq. On Dec. 17, 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1284 establishing a new inspection body, UNMOVIC, and offering Iraq the suspension of most sanctions in exchange for a resumption of inspections. In February 2001, Iraq entered into talks with the U.N. secretary general on this basis, "but the talks made little progress."
I'd say the current Iraqi offer can be dispensed with, oh, now.
From the Washington Post, Oct. 4, 2002]
The Myth of U.N. Support
By Charles Krauthammer"This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum--in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful--without limiting our freedom of action."--President John F. Kennedy, Cuban missile crisis, address to the nation, Oct. 22, 1962
"I'm waiting for the final recommendation of the Security Council before I'm going to say how I'm going to vote."-- Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Iraq crisis, address to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Sept. 27, 2002
How far the Democrats have come. Forty years ago to the month, President Kennedy asserts his willingness to present his case to the United Nations, but also his determination not to allow the United Nations to constrain America's freedom of action. Today his brother, a leader of the same party, awaits the guidance of the United Nations before he will declare himself on how America should respond to another nation threatening the United States with weapons of mass destruction.
Ted Kennedy is not alone. Much of the leadership of the Democratic Party is in the thrall of the United Nations. War and peace hang in the balance. The world waits to see what the American people, in Congress assembled, will say. These Democrats say: Wait, we must find out what the United Nations say first.
The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, would enshrine such lunacy in legislation, no less. He would not even authorize the use of force without prior U.N. approval. Why? What exactly does U.N. approval mean?
It cannot mean the U.N. General Assembly, which is an empty debating society. It means the Security Council, Now, the Security Council has five permanent members and 10 rotating members. Among the rotating members is Syria. How can any senator stand up and tell the American people that before deciding whether America goes to war against a rogue state such as Iraq, it needs to hear the "final recommendation" of Syria, a regime on the State Department's official terrorist list?
Or maybe these senators are awaiting the wisdom of some of the other nonpermanent members. Cameroon? Mauritius? Guinea? Certainly Kennedy and Levin cannot be saying that we must not decide whether to go to war until we have heard the considered opinion of countries that none of their colleagues can find on a map.
Okay. So we are not talking about these dots on the map. We must be talking about the five permanent members. The United States is one. Another is Britain, which support us. That leaves three. So when you hear senators grandly demand the support of the "international community," this is what they mean: France, Russia and China.
As I recently asked in this space, by what logic does the blessing of these countries bestow moral legitimacy on American action? China's leaders are the butchers of Tiananmen Square. France and Russia will decide the Iraq question based on the coldest calculation of their own national interest, meaning money and oil.
Everyone in the Senate wants a new and tough inspection regime in Iraq: anytime, anywhere, unannounced. Yet these three countries, whose approval the Democrats crave, are responsible for the hopelessly diluted and useless inspection regime that now exists.
They spent the 1990s doing everything they could to dismantle the Gulf War mandate to disarm Saddam Hussein. The Clinton administration helplessly acquiesced, finally approving a new Security Council resolution in 1999 that gave us the current toothless inspections regime. France, Russia and China, mind you, refused to support even that resolution; they all abstained because it did not make yet more concessions to Saddam Hussein.
After a decade of acting as Saddam Hussein's lawyers on the Security Council, these countries are now to be the arbiters of America's new and deadly serious effort to ensure Iraqi disarmament.
So insist leading Democrats. Why? It has no moral logic. It has no strategic logic. Forty years ago, we had a Democratic president who declared that he would not allow the United Nations or any others to tell the United States how it would defend itself. Would that JFK's party had an ounce of his confidence in the wisdom and judgment of America, deciding its own fate by its own lights, regardless of the wishes of France.
Or Cameroon.
From the Washington Post, Oct. 6, 2002
The Weight of American Empire
By John KeeganWarminster, England.--The statement of principles that will guide the national security strategy of the United States during the war on terrorism, and against states that acquire weapons of mass destruction for nefarious purposes, is presented in the language of American statecraft at its most traditional. The allusions from the past proliferate-- allusions to the Four Freedoms, to the Atlantic Charter, even to President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. The values that President Bush promises to defend with all the power at his disposal are central to the American way--democratic self-government, free association, freedom of expression, equal rights for individuals. It is a very American, and very old-fashioned, document.
At the same time, it makes commitments that are unprecedented in the language of American national policy. To put it bluntly, the president makes threats. He warns terrorists that they will be opposed by every weapon and every means at America's disposal. That might be expected and is no more than terrorists deserve.
But he also warns that states that harbor terrorists--or are compromised by terrorism--will be held to account, by which he means military account. He goes on to say that enemies of the United States who are preparing weapons of mass destruction (enemies unspecified but by implication already identified by the Pentagon and State Department) will find themselves targets of U.S. action, even if--and this is a particularly menacing note--such preparations are not complete and the threats to American and its allies are not fully formed.
No doubt it is America's readiness to make threats that contributes to the anti-Americanism now rampant in Europe. Fifty years of peace have skewed the European outlook on the world. Apart from some minor Balkan troubles, Europeans have not known war since 1945, and they have fallen into the habit of viewing war as an alien activity to which they have found a superior alternative--the building of pan-European institutions, free trade and the convening of tedious international conferences. They conveniently forget the threat posed until 1990 by the vanished Soviet Union and they show no appreciation at all of the effort and expense undertaken by the United States in acting as the leading military member of NATO during the Cold War.
There can be no doubt that the American approach to the future is far more realistic than the European and would have been so, if stated, even before the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed, the logic of President Bush's statement depends less on the emergence of terrorism as a serious threat to civilized states, or even on Saddam Hussein's specific defiance of U.N. resolutions requiring him to admit weapons inspectors, than it does on factors already apparent as the Cold War was drawing to its close.
Students of the Cold War perceived that it imposed, for all the rhetoric of nuclear threat and counter-threat, an artificial stability in international relations. The existence of two superpowers, and the confrontation between them, obliged almost all states to choose sides--and, having chosen, to accept a consequent restraint on their foreign military power. The superpowers offered protection to their clients. But they also expected and got a measure of obedience.
In no respect was that more true than in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. On whatever else they did not agree, the United States and Soviet Union--as the world's only fully equipped nuclear powers--concurred that possession of nuclear weapons should be confined to the smallest possible number of states. From their points of view, the ideal number would have been two. But failing America's ability to constrain its wartime nuclear partner, Britain (which had acquired most of the necessary expertise to build bombs), and then France (which could not bear the indignity of nuclear inferiority to its ancient enemy), the United States reluctantly accepted a troika of Western nuclear powers. The Soviet Union would have preferred to remain the only communist nuclear power, but China's size and strength prevented Moscow from constraining Beijing.
Thus the nuclear balance of the Cold War years was established on a basis of five powers; and, as each was a stable state, experienced in the ways of the world, the tacit agreement between the superpowers to maintain world order worked. Indeed, it survived even unilateral superpower efforts to win local wars at the boundary between the spheres of influence--Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola.
The more farsighted observers perceived, however, that, should the Cold War ever come to and end, so would the stability it had imposed. While most states, particularly the richer and longer-established ones, would choose to go on as before, a minority of others, those with grievances against their neighbors or with their standing in the world order, would rebel. They would try to become local superpowers and they would challenge the right of the United States and Russia, the Soviet Union's successor, to maintain the old Cold War order.
So it has turned out. The emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers, though undesirable, was predictable and is containable. They deter each other. The dissidences of Iraq and of Chechnya are of a different order. Chechnya, traditionally disruptive of Russia's efforts to maintain order in its borderlands, is a menace and Moscow deserves Washington's support in its effort to bring the Chechens under control. Iraq is a far more serious problem, since it is a comparatively advanced state and potentially very rich. Under a regime that would cooperate with the international community, it would be nothing but a force for good in the Middle East. Its society is not Islamic and its population is well educated. But because power in Iraq has, lamentably, passed to a megalomaniac and his hometown clique, it has become exactly what students of post-Cold War politics feared the future might bring at its worst.
Unspoken in Bush's national security document is the idea that small, unstable, self-seeking states under dictatorial control must not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq happens merely to be the first in that category to appear. Its pretensions to nuclear power must be quashed. But--and this is the real import of the president's statement--so must similar pretensions, if and when they appear, forever. The president has committed his country to a fearsome duty. It will never go away.
Mr. Roberts: I yield the floor.
