The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. Wellstone: Mr. President, I rise to speak for a short time today about the Iraq resolution, and tomorrow I will have a chance to speak at greater length. I thank Senator Kennedy for allowing me to precede him. I also tell my colleague from Georgia that his speech on the concurrent receipt was powerful and, having spent the whole day with veterans yesterday, is absolutely right. It is critically important that this defense appropriations bill go through with that provision.
Mr. President, I did not have a chance to hear the President speak last night, but I read the transcript. I think it is important that the President focus on obtaining international support. The military option should only be considered as the last option. I believe that people were glad to hear that last night in Minnesota and in the country.
The problem is that the actual resolution before us goes in a different direction. What this resolution does is give the President the authority for a possible go-it-alone, unilateral military strike and ground war. I think this would be a mistake. We should not go it alone.
There is a critical distinction between going it alone and taking action in conjunction with our allies. Our focus should be going to the United Nations Security Council and asking for a resolution that makes it clear to Saddam Hussein that he must disarm. Saddam must give arms inspectors unfettered access. And, if he does not comply with this new UN resolution there will be consequences, including the use of appropriate military force. But we must do this together with our allies. We must bring the international community on board. This resolution allows for a preemptive, unilateral strike, which I believe would be a huge mistake.
When Secretaries Kissinger and Albright testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, I asked both of them about the consequences of going alone versus working with the international community. First I asked: Shouldn't the goal be disarmament, and shouldn't we make every effort to try to make disarmament happen before taking military action?
They both were in agreement. Secretary Kissinger said: Yes, we need to play this out.
No one trusts Saddam Hussein. Everybody knows he is a brutal dictator. That is not the point. The point is how to proceed; how to do this the right way. The focus should be on disarmament and getting the support of our allies in the international community.
I do not think we should be approving a preemptive, unilateral strike by the United States, going it alone, or only with Great Britain.
I asked the former secretaries what the differences would be. They spelled out hugely different consequences between our going it alone, if, in fact, military action was necessary, versus taking action with our allies.
The former secretaries made the following points. If we take unilateral military action Saddam Hussein will have a better chance of uniting the world community against us, rather than vice versa. Moreover, there could be grave consequences in the Near East and South Asia that could include energizing other radical elements and increasing support for al-Qaida. Would this not play into the hands of the radicals? This is a big question if we go it alone.
What about our men and women, our sons and daughters who would be put in harm's way? What would the consequences be on the ground for them if we go it alone versus with our allies?
What about this war against terror? As a father and grandfather of six children I take al-Qaida very seriously. Unfortunately international terror is a part of the world in which we now live. Will we have the same international cooperation to fight international terror if we go it alone? In many parts of the world we need the cooperation, assets, and on-the-ground intelligence of our allies for the continued war on terror. I think going it alone, a preemptive military strike, perhaps a ground war, could very well undercut that effort.
Mr. President, I have one more point. I am not going to talk at length about my interaction with people in Minnesota over the last several days since I announced my opposition to the first resolution, but I will tell my colleagues this: Many people have come up to me, and I had great discussions with people in Minnesota. I cannot thank them enough.
I do not really know what the breakdown is in terms of X percentage this way or that way, but I will say that the people in Minnesota and our country are worried about this issue. They are worried about us going it alone. They are worried about what might happen to our sons and daughters in Iraq. They far prefer we work together with our allies. They far prefer we have international support and that the focus be on disarmament.
I believe that is the direction in which we should go. That is not what this resolution before us asks us to do. Therefore, I will vote no on this resolution.
I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. Kennedy: Mr. President, I commend President Bush for taking his case against Iraq to the American people last evening, and I agree with the President that Saddam is a despicable tyrant who must be disarmed. As many of us had hoped, the President has now clearly given the Iraqi regime an opportunity to avoid war. The President himself says he has not yet decided war will be necessary. In this situation, it would be wrong for Congress to act now to authorize the President to go to war before the steps the President has outlined are exhausted.
The most solemn responsibility any Congress has is the responsibility given the Congress by the Constitution to declare war. We would violate that responsibility if we delegate that responsibility to the President in advance before the President himself has decided the time has come for war.
The President acknowledged last night there are major risks in going to war. I do not believe these risks have been adequately described to the American people.
General Wesley Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, told the Armed Services Committee on September 23 if you are talking to the mothers and the loved ones of those who die in that operation in Iraq, you want to be sure using force and expending American blood and lives and treasure is the ultimate last resort, not because of the sense of impatience with the arcane ways of international institutions or frustrations from the domestic political process of allies.
As the Senate continues to debate the use of military force against Iraq, we must do all we can to assess the potential costs of such a war in blood and treasure. The American people deserve to know what a conflict in Iraq might be like. They deserve to know how many casualties there might be. They deserve to know the true preparedness of our troops to fight in a chemical or biological environment. If they are in the National Guard or Reserves, they deserve to know how a conflict in Iraq will affect them and whether they are likely to be called up for duty.
Many Reservists who were initially recalled for the war in Afghanistan have been either demobilized or extended for a second year. They are concerned about what the impact of war against Iraq will have on their families and on their jobs. Many employers, who are struggling in the current sagging economy, are also deeply concerned about the stability of their workforce. These patriotic Americans are willing to sacrifice, but they deserve to know all reasonable alternatives to war have been exhausted.
None of us can foresee the course of events that will unfold if we go to war. Before Congress acts, the administration has an obligation to explain to the Congress and the American people the potential consequences of war. As of now, it has not.
The President is asking Congress to delegate its constitutional power to declare war before he has decided we need to go to war, but he has not adequately explained what this war will look like. How many ground troops will be required? How many casualties can we expect to suffer? How well can we respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons against our troops? How will postwar occupation and reconstruction in Iraq be conducted? How will our ongoing military operation in Afghanistan be affected, and what will the impact be on the overall war against terrorism?
Today, our service men and women are helping to combat terrorism in Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Nation of Georgia, and elsewhere around the world.
Our purpose is clear; defend our country against the clear and compelling threat to our security posed by al-Qaida. I strongly support the President in the war against al-Qaida and the al-Qaida terrorists. I am proud of the achievement of our Armed Forces in the war against terrorism.
Some argue that America's vastly superior military force can easily defeat the Iraqi army, but many of us are concerned that the very strength and success of our Armed Forces in the gulf war and in Afghanistan will lull America into thinking if war with Iraq becomes necessary, it will be a bloodless war with few casualties.
The gulf war was fought in the desert a decade ago with an overwhelming superiority of forces in a strong coalition of the United States and other nations. They achieved one of the most decisive victories in the history of warfare. The experts I have consulted believe that a new war with Iraq will not be as easy, especially if we do not have the support of a coalition of nations.
Some defense analysts contend the Iraqi regular army is plagued with low morale and poor equipment and may well surrender at the first sight of American might. Other experts believe, however, that unlike the regular Iraqi army, up to 100,000 Republican Guard and special Republican Guard troops of Iraq will defend Baghdad and remain fiercely loyal to Saddam Hussein.
Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution believes the Iraqi Republican Guard forces could make a U.S. military attack very difficult. He estimates that our military casualties could be as high as 5,000. By comparison, in the gulf war, just under 400 U.S. service members lost their lives.
Many believe our Armed Forces may need to occupy Baghdad, which has over 5 million residents. Testifying before the Armed Services Committee on September 23, GEN Joseph Hoar, former commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command, discussed the potential horrors of urban warfare. He said in urban warfare you could run through battalions a day at a time. All of our advantages of command and control, technology and mobility are, in part, given up and you are working with corporals, sergeants, and young men fighting street to street. It looks like the last 15 minutes of the movie "Saving Private Ryan."
Despite the risks of urban warfare, the administration has avoided questions about how a military operation in Iraq may unfold. We have not been told how many ground troops we will need or, again, how many casualties we can expect. The Joint Chiefs should provide Congress with casualty estimates for a war in Iraq as they have done in advance of every past conflict. These estimates should consider Saddam's possible use of chemical or biological weapons against our troops.
Unlike the gulf war, many experts believe Saddam would resort to chemical and biological weapons against our troops in a desperate attempt to save his regime if he believes he and his regime are ultimately threatened.
In the September 19 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited a long list of improvements that have dramatically increased the combat effectiveness of our forces since the gulf war. He said our troops now have improved ability to protect themselves against chemical or biological attacks.
However, the General Accounting Office published a report on October 1 which clearly suggests that our forces are not adequately prepared for a chemical or biological attack. The report concluded that although the Defense Department has taken significant actions to provide such protection, serious problems persist. This is what the GAO report found: Chemical and biological defense training continues to be a problem; medical readiness of some units to conduct operations in a contaminated environment remains questionable; some units are critically short of required protective gear.
One Air Force wing has only 25 percent of the protective masks required and only 48 percent of required patient decontamination kits.
If Prime Minister Blair is correct in saying that Iraq has the capability to launch chemical or biological warheads in 45 minutes, what sense does it make to put our soldiers in the path of that danger without exhausting every reasonable means to disarm Iraq short of war?
We do not know whether the military will be able to adequately protect our service men and women from a chemical or biological attack, and this issue should be explained to the American people.
The Wall Street Journal reported last week that in addition to chemical and biological chemical deficiencies, there are other notable gaps in the Pentagon's planning. Civilians working at port facilities in the Persian Gulf region, where our forces will be unloading warfighting equipment, have not all received the proper protective gear or training for a chemical and biological attack.
The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have not adequately answered such questions about the military operation in Iraq. They both say there will be risks to a conflict, but they have not adequately and fully discussed those risks with Congress and the American people.
The Bush administration has also repeatedly claimed that we can fight a war in Iraq without undermining the war against terrorism, but last year, on June 21, 2001, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld cited significant problems in military readiness. He said we have underfunded and overused our forces, and we are steadily falling below acceptable readiness standards. Yet last month, on September 19, when asked about military readiness in the Armed Services Committee hearing, Secretary Rumsfeld said recent defense budget increases, coupled with the recall of reservists and shifts in the assignment of existing personnel, have reduced the stress on our forces.
He did not explain how the budget increases, which only recently took effect, could have reversed the starkest estimate of readiness he provided to the Armed Services Committee last year. In fact, experts say that most of the growth in operations and maintenance spending over the past decade have been for infrastructure-related programs, not military readiness.
General Myers, in his September 19 testimony, agreed that the U.S. military was stretched in some key areas. He said if our operations on the war on terror are expanded, we will be required to prioritize the deployment of unique units in high demand such as special operation forces and combat rescue forces. He also said our coalition partners may facilitate our combined operations by having similar units of forces. That, of course, assumes we will have a coalition in terms of a potential conflict.
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee 2 weeks ago, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs admitted that because of the high demand placed on some of our forces that coalition partners are necessary to mitigate the risk of war in Iraq.
Two weeks ago, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs admitted that because of the high demand on some of our forces that coalition partners are necessary. The way we are going to get the coalition forces is by going to the United Nations and gaining their support for the disarming of Saddam, and if action is necessary in the future.
War against Iraq may well undermine the ongoing war against al-Qaida and our continuing operation in Afghanistan by draining resources from our Armed Forces that are already stretched thin. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces continue to search villages, caves, and potential hideouts. The searches are now being conducted by the 82nd Airborne, not the elite special operation forces which are being recalled in preparation for a potential invasion of Iraq.
Many of us in the Senate are aware of these concerns with the Reserves and National Guard. We have heard them firsthand. Already, the Nation has mobilized and demobilized thousands of reservists and National Guardsmen to support the current war on terrorism. Massachusetts reservists and reservists from across the country are providing training, intelligence, and security support around the world.
Almost 1,500 National Guardsmen from Massachusetts alone are deployed to support the war on terror. Citizen soldiers are now serving in critical security positions throughout the United States and in Afghanistan. They have distinguished themselves for their patriotism and superior service. They have proven ready to meet the challenge of fighting the war on terrorism, despite outdated equipment and funding shortfalls.
The phenomenal performance of our forces in the war on terrorism attest to their resolve. But how long can we sustain this high level of operation? Approximately 11,000 of our reservists from across the Nation have been recalled for a second year to support the war on terror. This is the first time in decades that we have needed to take this measure to enhance our military strength. Not even in the gulf war did we recall reservists for over a year. If we open a second front in Iraq, we may be forced to recall even more.
Additionally, due to critical shortages of special operations personnel, pilots, intelligence specialists, and security personnel, another 22,000 service members, a number about as high as the entire gulf war, have been involuntarily retained on active duty as part of the current war on terrorism. If we embark upon a premature or unilateral military campaign against Iraq or a campaign with only Great Britain as our ally, our forces will have to serve in even greater numbers for longer periods of time with graver risks.
There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is a despicable tyrant. The international community must work together to disarm him. But the war against terrorism and our wider interests in the region and the world demand a course that relies on war only as a last resort after all reasonable alternatives have been fairly tried.
I have no doubt our forces will prevail in any conflict with Iraq. But Congress and the American people deserve to know the true risk of war with Iraq. The administration has the responsibility to state what the real costs of such a war may be. We need that information now, before--not after--Congress exercises its constitutional responsibility to declare war.
I yield the floor.
Mr. Warner: If I could ask my colleague a question. It seems to me the risk is only magnified by the passage of time--whether it is weeks, months, or years--if we do not act.
I draw to my colleagues' attention what the President said in addressing the Nation last night:
Approving this resolution does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable.
I paraphrase that he has not sought by this a declaration of war. War is the last option. The decision has not been made.
Continuing, the President said:
The resolution will tell the United Nations and all nations that America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of the civilized world mean something.
Congress will also be sending a message to the dictator of Iraq that his only choice is full compliance and the time remaining for that choice is limited.
I draw the Senator's attention to a document entitled "Joint Resolution" distributed by the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the chairman of the committee on which my distinguished colleague and I serve. While this document is not at the desk, it purports to be in the form of an amendment and is under some consideration. I presume that because that is what was distributed by my good friend and colleague, Senator Levin.
From page 4, I read the following:
Authorization for use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to a new United Nations Security Council resolution.
The question I ask for my colleague is in regard to section A:
Pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council described in section 22, after the enactment of this Joint Resolution and subject to subsection B, the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States in destroying and rendering harmless weapons of mass destruction, [et cetera.]
I read that as putting in the hands of the United Nations a veto on the actions taken by this body, a veto on the President's ability to use, as he has been given by the Constitution, the Armed Forces of the United States to protect at any time he deems necessary the security of America.
Does the Senator support such a concept that the United Nations would have a veto at any time in this situation? The President has gone to the U.N. asking that they take action to enforce the 16 resolutions that have been ignored by Saddam Hussein, defied by Saddam Hussein, and they are now looking at a 17th, a framework for perhaps a new inspection regime, but this current draft of a proposed amendment implies that the U.N. has to act before our President can utilize the forces given to him by the Constitution of our country.
Mr. Kennedy: The Senator has asked a number of questions in his comments. I will do my best to respond.
As the Senator has rightfully pointed out, the President has not decided on the course of war. If the President has not decided that we have an imminent threat from Saddam Hussein, we have a serious threat. It is a very important threat. For all the reasons that have been outlined on the floor during the course of this debate about Saddam Hussein, we understand that. But the President of the United States has not made a judgment that it is an imminent threat to the United States.
He has not made a judgment that he is prepared to go to war today. If that is so, which is what he stated last night, why in the world are we saying, in the Senate of the United States, we will give him this power when he has not made up his mind he wants to use it, without any limitation on time--no sunset of this? That is No. 1. So I am opposed.
Second, on the question of the Senator from Virginia, in referring to the Levin amendment, that conforms with the constitutional authorities I have discussed, that we have done in other periods. That does not happen to be my position. I believe in a two-step approach. I believe the Security Council should have a tough resolution with unfettered inspections and we ought to galvanize the international community. I personally believe the way we galvanize the international community is by demonstrating we believe the international community has the responsibility and obligation to take action.
I believe if we go ahead and take action as being proposed by the Senator from Virginia, that will be unilateral, where the President says: I have not made up my mind whether there is a necessity for war. I am not even prepared to say we are in an imminent threat. If we had an imminent threat from Saddam Hussein, he obviously would have a responsibility to take action in order to protect the American people.
What we are saying to the Security Council is: We are just going to have something over here on the side in case you people up there are not going to be serious.
I would like to challenge the Security Council the way the President of the United States did. I commend President Bush for finally going to the Security Council, challenging the Security Council. That is the way to go. The Security Council takes every step, uses every opportunity, and finally comes back and says: There is no alternative, there is an imminent threat.
We should be at our desks at that time in making the judgment we will have to make about committing American forces--a two-step approach for those reasons.
I have difficulty in accepting the concept that we are going to effectively give to the President of the United States the authority when he has stated, as the good Senator stated, he has not made up his own mind.
Lastly, part of the trouble we have been in over the period--and I have great respect for my colleague, and he knows he is my friend and colleague--the debate has been about the resolutions, but not about the war. We are debating the resolutions. My good friend from Florida is talking about changing the resolutions. We ought to be talking about what the implication is going to be in terms of the conflict and the war. The American people ought to understand that more clearly. That is an issue where the administration has failed the American people.
What are the best estimates?
What should we expect are going to be needed in terms of the forces?
What is the best judgment in terms of how Saddam Hussein will react?
What will be the enormous impact it will have in our battle against terror around the world?
What will it do in terms of inflaming the Muslim world if the United States has a go-alone policy, which this resolution will permit?
Will it be effectively a breeding area for al-Qaida terrorists?
We ought to be debating those issues. We do not do that. We have been debating the technicalities of these resolutions.
I know the Senator has--as I have--listened to many debates, not only on the technicalities but the broad issues of war and peace as well. But it is my regret that we are going to be faced with a cloture motion here to try to insist on a vote on this in another 2 days when we have just barely talked about the issues of war and peace and haven't had that kind of informed debate and haven't had that kind of information that is available to us. That is part of my deep concern about where we are on the floor of the Senate now.
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I thank my colleague for his kind remarks. Indeed, we have worked together many times. We work together.
I strongly differ. I think our President has clearly said--first before the United Nations and as late as last night--that there is imminent danger to our Nation from Saddam Hussein and his possession of weapons of mass destruction. We clearly have a difference on that.
I strongly believe that this resolution, if it is to be brought before the Senate, will place a veto power in the hands of the United Nations. I cannot be a part of that. I will certainly oppose it as strongly as I know how.
Mr. Kennedy: Would the Senator be willing to change the words? I don't have it here. Would he be willing to change the words to include "an imminent threat" from the language that is included in the resolution which talks about a grave threat or continuing threat?
Mr. Warner: Mr. President, I will say at this point in time, Senator Lieberman and I, and Senators McCain and Bayh drafted this resolution after listening to the suggestions of many Senators on both sides of the aisle. At this point in time, if any Senator has talked about changes, then the format by the Senator from Florida I expect should be followed by way of a formalization of the amendment. But at this point in time, we have other colleagues who are anxious to speak.
I will give three quotes from President Bush's speech to the Nation last night about the imminent threat posed by these weapons of mass destruction:
In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and is capable of killing millions . . .
Alliances with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints . . .
We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical and biological weapons across broad areas. We are concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using UAVs for missions targeting the United States.
Mr. Warner: I yield the floor.
The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. Brownback: Mr. President, I have listened with a great deal of interest to this presentation. I think there are a couple of clear points one can make in response, and then I will comment.
We have been dealing with Saddam Hussein with our men and women in uniform for 12 years. We have been occupying positions in the Middle East. We have been flying over the regions that Saddam has. We are flying the no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq. We had weapons inspectors in there for the 12 years, until they were kicked out 4 or 5 years ago. After Saddam was kicked out of Kuwait, after there was a United Nations agreement, and after basically he agreed to an armistice, and after inspectors, he said: I will take out all weapons of mass destruction, and I will turn them over to the international community. And he has not done that. We know that. He has failed to do that.
We have had economic sanctions against Iraq for a period of years now. They have not worked. There is such a sieve in the region that he is able to get oil out and goods in without any problem.
We have worked with the United Nations. We had some 16 resolutions that passed through the United Nations. It is as if some of the debate on the floor is that we are just now starting to try to deal with Saddam Hussein, when I think you have to look back over the past 12 years. We have been dealing with this dictator and this despot for 12 years in every way conceivable.
I think the conclusion most people have is that 12 years ago we should have gone into Baghdad and removed him at that time. That is the real conclusion people come to. Yet, for reasons of the Congress or the international community--whoever you want to say in that point of time--there was no agreement to kick him out.
Since that time, it has not changed. He is the same guy who has these weapons of mass destruction. It has just gotten worse in that period of 12 years.
I would analogize it to having cancer. If you have cancer, you have a couple of options: You can deal with it. You can go in and have surgery to remove the big areas that are spreading. You can try to contain it for a period of time through different therapies. Or you can ignore it and just say: It does not affect me today. I am fine today.
Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. He has biological weapons. He is working on nuclear weapons. He has missile capacity to deliver all of these.
That is the cancer that exists. We can say we feel fine today; we are fine. What if he decides to launch any one of those? What if he does it not at military targets but at civilian targets, at one of our allies, or even at us? Are we fine then? I can just see us having a commission after that period of time asking: Why didn't we catch these terrorists? We were working on Iraqi soil before they attacked the United States. We should have gone in there. Did we not know enough? Were we not sufficiently concerned about it in a similar way that we are having hearings now about why we didn't do things prior to September 11? Did we see the clues and the situation building up prior to the Twin Towers and the Pentagon being hit? Did we not see this coming?
Let us apply that same standard to Saddam Hussein and the nexus he provides between the weapons of mass destruction and terrorists. They are clearly there. I just articulated the weapons of mass destruction that he has. He is also working on such things as smallpox. We think he may be trying to do something with that. He is working on all sorts of things. Yes. Weapons of mass destruction.
What about the terrorist connection that is there? Abu Nidal's organization was headquartered there for a period of time. He just died, or he was killed recently, for whatever reason. Al-Qaida leadership is in Iraq. Hussein has worked closely with a number of terrorist organizations in and on his soil. They are there. You have the mix of these two sitting side by side--a toxic mix that the United States cannot countenance.
I respect a number of people who think this isn't the way we do things. Democracies have real difficulty declaring war. That is a very good thing. This is just something we don't like. We want somebody to come and hit at us first, before we go on to war. You can look through the history of the United States and the acts where we were hit and then we responded. That is the way we are most comfortable in dealing with these tough, difficult issues about whether you go to war with a foreign nation. It is good that we wrestle with that and with this situation.
It is like in the old television show "Gunsmoke." At the end of the "Gunsmoke" episode every week, it ended the same way: Matt Dillon walks out on the main street of Dodge City. The bad guy walks out on the street on the other end. They stare at each other for a little while. The bad guy has a chance to walk off, if he wants to. He also gets to draw first. He draws first. Then Matt Dillon draws. The bad guy goes down. There is a sense of fair play and honor about that. There is a set of rules. The bad guy gets to shoot first, but you are going down in the process. If you are going to do that; you have a chance to walk away. If you decide not to, that is your choice.
That is the way we like to do things, because there is a sense of, Do we really want to bother somebody else to this degree? Is this the right thing to do?
Saddam Hussein doesn't operate that way. The terrorists today don't operate with those same sorts of rules of decorum in operation, and the rules of boxing, if you will.
These are people who don't go out on Main Street with Matt Dillon. They sneak around behind buildings and try to get at innocent people and women and children. They don't go straight at our military. They attack people in civilian positions. Their object is to disrupt. It is not to protect a nation state. It is not to confront the military. It is to kill as many civilians as they can.
Can we afford, in that type of atmosphere and that new way of operating, to have terrorists force us to sit back and say: OK? Are we going to wait until somehow they attack us, or try to get botulism in our food supply, or try to get anthrax into a broad area of the United States, or one of our allies, or try to make a weapon with smallpox, and then we will go at them?
The cost of doing that is to spread a cancer; the deaths of many people. This is not something we can countenance. It is not something-- when my primary duty and the primary duty of the elected Members of this body is to provide for the national defense--that we can countenance. It is not something we can do.
I want to read from some testimony Henry Kissinger gave 2 weeks ago before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
I ask unanimous consent that his entire testimony be printed in the Record after my comments.
The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. Brownback: Mr. President, former Secretary Kissinger is probably one of the best minds, if not the best mind, in foreign policy in the world. He dealt with the cold war. He was directly involved in that, and he has been a very astute student. And now he is a student of what takes place today in the war on terrorism that we have. Listen to just a couple paragraphs of what he says about these weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a country that also works with and provides support and housing for terrorists. He says this:
If these capabilities remain intact--
That is, weapons of mass destruction--
they will become an instrument--actual and symbolic--for the destabilization of a volatile region.
There he is speaking of the entire Middle East.
And if Saddam Hussein's regime survives both the Gulf War and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will compound the existing terrorist menace.
He points out in this statement that he thinks going at Iraq will have a very positive impact on terrorism, and if we do not go at Iraq, our war against terrorism will just devolve into an intelligence operation, and that would be the likely continued status of it.
He handles another argument. I will read another quote from Secretary Kissinger:
It is argued that dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq weakens the war against terrorism. The opposite is more likely to be true. Eliminating such weapons in Iraq is an important aspect of the second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign. It demonstrates American determination to get at the root causes and some of the ultimate capabilities of what is, in essence, a crusade against free values.
That is what Secretary Kissinger goes on to say in this presentation. He argues that this is an essential part of the war against terrorism, if we are to effectively deal with this terrorist threat and the problem that we have. And not to overrepeat this, but I do not think one can overrepeat it. It is a little bit like a doctor's prescription dealing with your health where you are, and here are the possible problems you have.
Here is what we know that Saddam Hussein has.
Gaps identified by UNSCOM in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains stockpiles of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin, and mustard.
UNSCOM reported to the U.N. Security Council in April 1995 that Iraq had concealed its biological weapons program and had failed to account for 3 tons of growth material for biological agents.
In 2001, an Iraqi defector reported visiting some 20 secret facilities in Iraq for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
Saddam continues to pursue nuclear weapons, and has used chemical weapons against his own people, as well as his neighbors.
I do not think I need to remind people about what he has done in his region. He has attacked Iran, invaded Kuwait, and he has launched missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel. That is why we will have had, and have today, strong allies in the region opposed to Saddam Hussein continuing.
I want to look at the positive, the upside of dealing with Saddam Hussein. We have a lot of difficulty, a lot of potential problems to deal with, but what happens if you get Saddam Hussein out of power?
I think there are significant, positive steps moving forward in that region.
It is interesting to note that from 1920 until the late 1950s, Iraq had a constitutional monarchy, a bihouse parliament that had authority over budgets and ministers. They have a history of some democracy. It was not the level of democracy we have, but they have that in their historical background.
Ten percent of the world's oil supplies are located in Iraq. They have an educated urban population. They will embrace and encourage and move forward with democracy on a rapid basis. Now, it is not going to be completely free of any hitches, but I think the potential in developing an active, vibrant, working democracy in Iraq is significantly greater and higher than what we are seeing in the situation in Afghanistan, which is moving forward but with a lot of difficulty. They do not have the natural resources to build. They do not have a historical basis of democracy with which to work. They have a number of warlords in the area, which does not exist in Iraq.
There is reason to believe that the upside potential with Iraq, and the spread of democracy and human rights and religious freedoms and pluralism will be significant in Iraq. And that will spread throughout that region. These are a set of values, of human values, for which the United States stands and has stood for years, and we have been very positive in this. Yet we have not pushed this set of values generally in that region of the world, in the Islamic region of the world.
There is something like 49 countries and 2 democracies in that region of the world. And a number of people wonder why there is the push for human rights, democracy, and religious freedom everywhere else and not there. And we have kind of hemmed and hawed and "well, I don't know," and we have allies there, and we are dependent on the oil, and we don't want to upset things in the region.
The truth is, we need to stand for the things there that we stand for everywhere else. And if we do that, and push that in Iraq, it is going to be a flower that will bloom there in the desert. It is going to show the way to a number of countries. It is going to involve the people. And the people are going to be able to grow and possess that beauty of liberty that they seek and know and want. We will be able to help put it forward and move it into action in that region.
These are very difficult times for us. There are difficult times in the region. But I think the question clearly before us is whether we should move forward. I think the answer is definitely yes, that we should move forward.
This is a time for us to be very humble and wise about what we need to do and definite about how we move forward. We do not make this choice lightly, nor without the understanding that with this action comes difficult consequences to some of our finest citizens in the Armed Forces and potentially of terrorist attacks to our allies and to us.
We would do well to remember the words of Psalm 140:
Grant not, God, the desires of the wicked one; do not grant his conspiracy fruition. . . .As for the head of my besiegers, let the mischief of their own lips bury them.
Once again, we have come to deal with a very difficult situation where we are called upon to stand up to the threats of evil and tyranny--something we have had to do many times in the history of this wonderful Nation. As daunting as this is, it is not a responsibility we can shirk. Saddam has made the case against himself. He has buried himself with his own lips and his own actions. We cannot ignore this. And we should not put off for another year, or a few, a difficult matter that will only get worse. If we do not take this action now, we are unlikely to any time in the near future. Now is the time for us to act.
I support the bipartisan resolution authorizing the President to use force in Iraq. I hope all the American public is praying for us, and praying about this for wisdom, for protection, for limited loss of life, and for the right thing to be done.
This is a tough moment. It is a different stage for us. It is a ways and means of handling something we have not done in the past where we go in and try to take care of a situation before it kills many people. We need those prayers for wisdom and wise action.
I urge my colleagues to support this resolution, this bipartisan resolution authorizing the President to use force in Iraq.
I yield the floor.
Statement of The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 26, 2002
Mr. Chairman, Congress is considering one of the most consequential expressions of its views since the end of the Cold War: what action the United States should take to deal with the threat posed by illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and their potential growth. President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a cooperative would order by asking the United Nations to rectify Iraq's defiance of a large number of U.N. resolutions mandating the destruction of these stockpiles as well as Iraq's flagrant breach of its pledge to do so as a condition for the suspension of the Gulf War in 1991. But were the world community, by fudging its response, to opt for the risk of a greater threat in the future, can American and a coalition of the like-minded acquiesce in stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? Thus the Committee will need to consider not only the risk of action but also the consequences of inaction.
The Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction will be growing in an international environmental in which their danger merges with the threat of terrorism. For on September 11, 2001, the world entered a new period in which private, non-state organizations undertook to threaten national and international security by stealth attacks. The controversy about preemption is a symptom of the impact of this transformation. At bottom, it is a debate between the traditional notion of sovereignty of the nation-state prevalent since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the adaptation required by both modern technology and the nature of the terrorist threat.
Osama bin Laden's base was on the territory of a national state, though his was not a national cause. Highly disciplined operatives are scattered around the globe, some on the soil of America's closest allies and even within America itself. They enjoy financial and organizational support from a number of states--most frequently from private individuals ostensibly not under the control of their governments. Bases for terrorists have been established in several countries, usually in areas where the governments can plausibly deny controls are actually not in control, such as in Yemen, Somalia, or perhaps Indonesia and Iran.
Having no territory to defend, the terrorists are not subject to the deterrent threats of the Cold War; having as their aim the destruction of social cohesion, they are not interested in the conciliating procedures and compromises of traditional diplomacy.
Unlike the previous centuries, when the movement of armies foreshadowed threat, modern technology in the service of terror gives no warning, and its perpetrators vanish with the act of commission. And since these attacks are capable of inflicting catastrophic damage, traditional notions of sovereignty have to be modified with respect to countries that harbor terrorist headquarters or terrorist training centers. The problem of preemption is inherent in the nature of the terrorist challenge.
The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in violation of U.N. resolutions cannot be separated from the post-Afghanistan phase of the war against terrorism. Iraq is located in the midst of a region that has been the hotbed of the special type of global terrorist activity from which the attack on the United States was organized. And the consequences of weapons of mass destruction have many similarities to those of terrorism. They can be used without warning; their impact is catastrophic. In some circumstances, their origin can be uncertain. If the world is not to turn into a doomsday machine, a way must be found to prevent proliferation--especially to rogue states whose governments have no restraint on the exercise of their power.
Cold War principles of deterrence are almost impossible to implement when there is a multiplicity of states, some of them harboring terrorists in position to wreak havoc. The Cold War world reflected a certain uniformity in the assessment of risk between the nuclear sides. But when many states threaten each other for incongruent purposes, who is to do the deterring, and in the face of what provocation? This is especially true when that which must be deterred is not simply the use of weapons of mass destruction but the threat of them.
Suicide bombing has shown that the calculations of jihad fighters are not those of the Cold War leaders. The concern that war with Iraq could unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on Israel and Saudi Arabia is a demonstration of how even existing stockpiles of weapons turn into instruments of blackmail and self-deterrence. Procrastination is bound to magnify such possibilities.
The existence and, even more, the growth of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq poses a threat to international peace and stability. The issue is not primarily whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of Iraq is essentially geopolitical and psychological. Its policy is implacably hostile to the United States, to neighboring countries, and to established rules that govern relations among nations. It possesses growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population. Iraq is working again to develop a nuclear capability. Saddam Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by preventing the operation of the international inspection system he had accepted on his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There is no possibility of a direct negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international community. By what reasoning can the world community--or America--acquiesce in this state of affairs?
If these capabilities remain intact, they will become an instrument--actual and symbolic--for the destabilization of a volatile region. And if Saddam Hussein's regime survives both the Gulf War and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will compound the existing terrorist menace.
By its defiance of the U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring it to give up weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has in effect asserted the determination to possess weapons whose very existence compounds the terrorist threat immeasurably. Global terrorism cannot flourish except with the support of states that either sympathize or acquiesce in its actions. To the extent that these countries observe the flouting of U.N. resolutions, the weakening of international norms, and the defiance of America, they feel less restrained in acquiescing in or ignoring terrorist activities. For the nations of the world to accept the existence of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction where the new form of terrorism has been spawned is to undermine restraint with respect not only to weapons proliferation but to the psychological impulse toward terrorism altogether.
The campaign in Afghanistan was an important first step. But if it remains the principal move in the war against terrorism, it runs the risk of petering out into an intelligence operation while the rest of the region gradually slides back to the pre-9/11 pattern, with radicals encouraged by the demonstration of the world's hesitation and moderates demoralized by the continuation of an unimpaired Iraq as an aggressive regional power. In short, the continuation of illegal proliferation, the global dangers which it involves, the rejection or infeasibility of a viable inspection system, and the growth of terrorism require action, preferably global, but as an ultimate resort of America's, together with those countries prepared to support it.
It is argued that dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq weakens the war against terrorism. The opposite is more likely to be true. Eliminating such weapons in Iraq is an important aspect of the second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign. It demonstrates American determination to get at the root causes and some of the ultimate capabilities of what is, in essence, a crusade against free values. Enforcing U.N. resolutions in Iraq does not compete with the capabilities needed to pursue the second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign. In all likelihood, such action will strengthen it by additional deployments to the region.
Nor should it weaken the cooperation of other countries in the anti-terror campaign. Assisting in this effort is not a favor other countries do for the United States but ultimately for themselves. And what exactly will they decline to support without risking their entire relationship to the United States? The fight against terrorism will take many years. To wait for its end before acting is to guarantee that stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction multiply.
At the same time, while reserving the option to act in concert with only the nations it can convince, the United States is wise to appeal to cooperative action of the world community. As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States has a special unilateral capacity and, indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its convictions. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by principles that transcend the assertions of preponderant power. It cannot be in either the American national interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security. The case for enforcement of established resolutions should be the opening move in a serious effort of consultation to develop fundamental principles that other nations can consider in the general interest.
The United Nations is therefore challenged to come with a control system that eliminates existing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq--together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt. the control system must go far beyond the inspection system negated by Saddam Hussein's evasions and violations. It must prevent any possibility for local authorities to harass informants or to impede free access to the inspectors. It should be backed by standby authority and perhaps a standby force to remove any obstacle to transparency. Moreover, any system of inspection must be measured against the decline in vigilance that accompanied the previously flawed system's operation. Nor can it be achieved at the price of lifting sanctions while Sad Dam Hussein stays in office. For that would provide the Iraqi regime with the means of rearmament as a reward for ending its violations. Indeed, the rigorous measures required to implement the U.N.'s own resolutions are almost surely incompatible with Hussein's continuation in power.
In the end, enforcement of U.N. resolutions should be coupled with a program of reconstruction for Iraq. Because of the precedent-setting nature of this war, its outcome will determine the way U.S. actions will ultimately be viewed. And we may find more nations willing to cooperate in reconstruction than in enforcement, if only because no country wants to see an exclusive position for America in a region so central to international political and economic stability.
Reconstruction will require dealing with how to preserve the unity and ensure the territorial integrity of a country that is an essential component of any Gulf equilibrium. A federal system to enable the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish ethnic groups of Iraq to live together without domination by one of them is surely appropriate. But any serious planning would have to consider the means to prevent autonomy from turning to independence, which, in the case of the Kurds, would put Turkish support for the military phase at risk. And all this would have to take place in the context of a government capable of resisting pressures from the remnants of the old regime or from neighboring countries determined to destabilize the emerging system.
The United States has put forward a reasoned definition of the dangers: the possession of weapons of mass destruction by governments that have demonstrated their willingness to use them, have professed hostility toward America or its allies, and are not restrained by domestic institutions. Can the world community reject that definition of the danger?
However the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is resolved, the longer-range goal must be to devise a system for dealing with new attempts by additional countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction or biological and chemical weapons. We are only at the beginning of the threat of global proliferation. The nations of the world must face the impossibility of letting such a process run unchecked. The United States would contribute much to a new international order if it invited the rest of world, and especially the major nuclear powers, to cooperate in creating a system to deal with this challenge to humanity on a more institutional basis.
Congress has an opportunity to vindicate a system of international order. I urge you to give the President the authority to enforce the appropriate U.N. resolutions together with the world community if at all possible, in concert with like-minded nations if necessary.
